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INTERESTS IN ASIA:
SECURITY IN THE 1990s

by

Mark T. Staples

December, 1989

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United States-Japanese National Interests in Asia:

Security In the 1990s

by

Mark T. Staples

Lieutenant, United States Navy

B.A., University of Colorado, 1981

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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


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ABSTRACT

Perceptions of the bilateral security relationship between the United States and Japan are beginning to depart the post-war norm. Japan's economic competition is beginning to be seen by some in the United States as a greater threat to U. S. national security than the traditional threat of Soviet expansionism. A difference in fundamental values between the United States and Japan may exacerbate these diverging views during a period of dramatic East-West change. This thesis proposes that the U.S. and Japan re-examine their bilateral security relationship and replace it with a formal, rational division of burden and decision sharing by allocating primary areas of security responsibility in Asia within the alliance. It proposes that Japanese naval forces assume primary responsibility of stability and peace in Northeast Asia while the United States continues primary responsibility of stability and peace in the vital sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas. The flexibility of this strategy would permit coping with the uncertainty of United States-U.S.S.R. relations until the success or failure of Soviet reforms can be ascertained. Also, a revised security arrangement between the United States and Japan would diminish the prospects of an independent Japanese military posture in Asia.



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I. INTRODUCTION

United States foreign policy appears to be approaching a third epoch of strategy in Asia this century. Beginning with the first period, in 1900 the United States promoted an "Open Door" policy tailored to the requirements of a rising power seeking an equitable position in a multi-power world. However, this policy failed to prevent a single power from gaining hegemony in Asia and was a precursor to war between the United States and Japan. In the second period formulated after World War II, the United States followed a policy of "Containment" to deter the expansion of the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.. NSC 68 provided the security framework that allowed Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to develop and prosper with the ultimate goal that they would generate amenable political, social, and economic values, along with military self-sufficiency, promoting stability and security in the region.¹ As our Asian allies have increased in economic stature in contrast to the perceived relative decline in threat from the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R., the very success of containment has brought into question the necessity and cost of maintaining the second grand strategy.

¹John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 98, 99, states, "NSC-68 defined containment as an effort by all means short of war to block further expansion of Soviet power...(and) foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system...that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards." To ensure this goal, "United States strength would have to be sufficient to provide an adequate defense against attack on the United States...(and among other areas) the Western Pacific...and on the long lines of communication to those areas."

In the late 1990s the United States debates what new strategy, if any, should guide foreign policy, and consequently, military force structure. As the United States proceeds into the Twenty First Century the nation should develop a strategy in Asia which protects and promotes American values and interests, maximizes U.S. assets yet is attuned to domestic fiscal and regional political restraints in the exercise of power, and recognizes the convergent/divergent interests and mutually beneficial assets of our allies, namely Japan, to achieve objectives in the region. The United States and Japan should restructure a security alliance which recognizes the possible political trends of the world in the 1990s:

- A "beyond-containment" world that is evolving toward an international system of multiple power centers.
- Continued economic turmoil and possible political instability in the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. as these nations attempt to resolve the contradictions of implementing economic and political reforms while maintaining "democratic centralism" to further single party rule.
- Increasing pressure within the United States for fiscal responsibility and global economic competitiveness which may require an adjustment of security commitments.
- Japan's conventional armed forces will reach parity, in a maritime aspect, with those of the Soviet Far East in the 1990s. Therefore, Japanese-U.S.S.R. relations may become increasingly antagonistic.

This thesis discusses the option of a strategy of increased security alliance with Japan. The U.S. goals of this alliance should be: 1) the continued stability and prosperity of the region, 2) relieving the United States from the task of full

conventional security responsibility in the region, moving toward one of equal partnership with Japan, and 3) preventing hegemony by another power that may restrict economic access and influence in Asia for the United States. This strategy would not prevent the United States from unilaterally defending U.S. national interests in Asia.

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The United States allies and friends, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are testaments to the success of containment in Northeast Asia after World War II. To implement this strategy of containment, the United States deployed military forces forward, as necessary, to help deter and contain communist expansion. This military capability to secure lines of communications enabled the United States to project power in Asia advancing U. S. and allied interests.²

United States economic supremacy after World War II easily supported the military force structure to defend commitments in Northeast Asia. However, the United States recent relative decline in economic supremacy, vis-a-vis our allies rebuilding after the war, has created concern over the validity of maintaining the security status quo.³ Some scholars, such as Paul Kennedy, predict a possible decline of U. S. global supremacy as a result of "imperial overreach," while others, such as Samuel Huntington, proclaim the United States, while in relative decline compared to the 1950s, is the only nation capable of meeting all the requirements of world leadership

²Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 1, 2.

³Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 August 1988, p. 10, reports that in 1950 the U.S. share of world reserves was fifty percent, while in 1988 it had diminished to less than nine percent.

well into the next century.⁴ The crucial importance of economic competitiveness as an integral component of U.S. national security policy, while admitted, is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be addressed in detail. Nevertheless, the current reality is that the United States has entered a period of fiscal restraint in defense spending--during a period of economic growth--to reduce the fiscal deficit. This reduction may continue, and even increase, in the 1990s if the economy ends consecutive years of expansion and recession forces negative growth in defense outlays. The danger of this scenario of a relative U. S. economic weakness and an unwillingness to make structural changes in alliances before economic turmoil could lead to rash Congressional actions on troop withdrawals and force structure cuts.⁵ In other words, U.S. defense policy and force structure may become based solely on economic priorities rather than a balanced security strategy.

A continued reduction in U.S. Navy force structure, a high possibility during the Bush Administration given the budget crisis and warming of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, may place naval deployments in Asia at greater risk as current commitments continue with fewer resources.⁶ If commitments are reduced risk may also increase since fewer

⁴Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1987), and Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippman Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3, 1988.

⁵James Chace, "A New Grand Strategy," Foreign Policy, Spring 1988, p.4.

⁶Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1989 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 191 states sixteen frigates were cut from the Navy by fiscal reasons. This has been followed with a cut of an additional thirty three destroyers and frigates from the active Navy by SECDEF Cheney in FY 90. Unfortunately, according to Mr. Carlucci in Defense 88, May-June, p. 22, construction of new combatants will not keep pace with these cuts, increasing risk for U.S. security.

ships will deploy to the Western Pacific to secure lines of communication necessary to defend U.S. and allied interests. A lowered force structure compels remaining military units to function at an unacceptable level of combat capability for a global war scenario, i.e., sequential operations in successive theaters will become necessary, with the risk and uncertainty that approach takes.⁷ A global war between the United States and U.S.S.R. seems increasingly improbable as the 1980s come to a close. However, the United States must be prepared for a possible hard-line backlash and dismissal of Gorbachev's reforms in the 1990s. Additionally, U.S. security strategy must be able to deal with all nations capable of severely threatening U.S. interests, no matter their stated intentions. Conflicts in multiple theaters at the same time would not necessarily require Soviet participation, i.e., the Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula. The United States inability to secure sea lanes of communication and project power in Asia during the period of the "open door" policy placed U.S. interests in an undefendable position and failed to deter war. Post-war U.S. strategy has provided for flexibility and sufficient application of force to ensure that no area of vital interest is lost by default.⁸ During this period of force structure reduction several U. S. vital interests in Asia remain.

First, the Arabian Gulf region, with fifty-five percent of the world's proven oil reserves, is a vital interest and critical to the economic health of the free world. The United States has maintained a naval presence in the Gulf since 1949. Three administrations, including the present, have committed the United States to ensure the

⁷Reagan, previously cited, p. 39.

⁸Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 89, previously cited, p. 57.

critical lines of communication in Southwest Asia remain secure.⁹ Northeast Asian reliance, especially Japan's, on Middle Eastern oil was a primary consideration in the U. S. decision to escort oil in a "de facto" war zone. This act of world leadership to bring stability in the Gulf played a key role in ending the Tanker War and contributed to the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. However, while European allies eventually responded to U. S. leadership by deploying combatants in the region, Asian allies, especially Japan, contributed little.¹⁰

Concern over the Gulf will remain in the future. Of all the possible scenarios for war on the Soviet periphery, it would be more in the Soviet favor if they attacked the Arabian Gulf area. It is assumed they would never attack in the Gulf region alone--an unwarranted assumption.¹¹ However, it is not necessary to assume reckless Russian expansionism producing a calculated initiative to cut energy supply lines. Confrontation could come from an escalation crisis that begins, for example, with an inconclusive radical coup in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf is an area which U.S. economic concerns are most directly linked with security planning. United States interests in Northeast Asia

⁹Michael H. Armacost, "US Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging," Current Policy, No. 978, U.S. Department of State, pp. 1, 2. See also Reagan, previously cited, p. 29.

¹⁰For example, the author served aboard a cruiser homeported in Japan which was one of the first ships dispatched into the Gulf after the Stark incident and consequently participated in the first nine "Ernest Will" convoy missions. While the cruiser departed Japan to escort tankers, many of which were destined to Japan, the JMSDF sent ships of an "Escort Flotilla" on a world tour making port visits in Pearl Harbor and San Diego. Japan did donate a \$10 million navigational system, equal to the cost of ten days U.S.N. presence in the Gulf.

¹¹The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 23.

can only be appreciated in terms of the larger area.¹² Certainly, secure lines of communication in Southwest Asia will remain a vital interest well into the 21st Century as world demand for oil continues to grow and as reserves elsewhere dwindle.¹³

Second, peace on the Korean Peninsula is vital to Northeast Asian security. The only "hot" vestige of the "cold war," armed conflict in Korea may be improbable just as much as keeping the peace there may be unpredictable. Certainly a conflict on the peninsula would damage the well-earned economic development and increasing trends for democracy in South Korea, favorable forces for regional stability. Additionally, war on the peninsula without an United States commitment could induce a Japanese response of unknown proportions. Likewise, a dramatic total removal of U. S. military forces from the peninsula may induce one, or both, of the Korean governments to develop an independent nuclear arms capability, causing a dramatic reappraisal of Japanese defense requirements.¹⁴ Consequently, the United States is determined to stand with South Korea in preserving the common defense.¹⁵ However, this traditional commitment to the Republic of Korea, represented by the presence of 40,000 soldiers and airmen of the U.S. 8th Army and 5th Air Force, is coming under increasing review. The question now heard in Congress is, why should the United States continue

¹²Richard K. Betts, "Washington, Tokyo, and N.E. Asian Security," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1983, pp. 7, 9.

¹³U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1989 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Agency, 1989), p. 120.

¹⁴Franklin B. Weinstein, "U.S.-Japanese Relations and the Fallacies of Burden Sharing," Pacific Community, October 1977, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 6.

¹⁵Carlucci, Defense 88, previously cited, p. 9.

a presence in Korea nearly four decades after the Korean War while the United States finds itself in a \$10 billion trade imbalance with South Korea?¹⁶ Also, it appears South Korea, by virtue of its superior economy, has required Kim Il-Sung to spend up to twenty-five percent of GNP on defense to keep pace with the R.O.K.. For example, the Roh Tae Woo government spent "only" six percent of GNP on defense even though the South out spent the North by \$6.2 billion to \$3.9 billion in 1987.¹⁷ Military modernization and a strong economy in the Republic of Korea makes long-term prospects on the peninsula favorable.¹⁸ Therefore, increasing anti-Americanism, R.O.K. nationalism, and the safety and cost of tens of thousands of military dependents located in Seoul, a mere twenty-five miles from the DMZ, make it highly probable some form of reduced presence in South Korea is in the future interest of the United States.¹⁹ The United States commitment to peace in Korea may change in structure, but not in essence, until a peaceful resolution on the peninsula is reached.

Third, Japan is the keystone to U.S. security interests in Asia. Cooperation and convergent interests with Japan remains basic to U.S. relationships in the region.²⁰ The two nations produce almost forty percent of the world's GNP and half of the world's overseas development assistance (ODA). Global economic growth and prosperity will

¹⁶Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 May 1988, p. 25. (Hereafter referred to as FEER).

¹⁷The Economist, "Survey South Korea," 21 May 1988, p. 12

¹⁸Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY 89, previously cited, p. 35.

¹⁹New York Times, 21 October 1988, p. A4. reports President Reagan stated reduction is a "possibility should tensions wane "

²⁰Reagan, previously cited, p. 30.

remain highly dependent on U.S. and Japanese economic and technological achievements for the foreseeable future.²¹ Economic interdependence between the United States and Japan makes security of Northeast Asia imperative. For example, nine out of ten of the world's largest commercial banks are Japanese. Japan is the world's leading creditor nation, holding roughly \$500 billion in overseas assets in 1987, and the Tokyo stock exchange total capitalization exceeds the N.Y. stock exchange.²² Japan is a vital co-leader of the world economic system, and as such, has convergent interests with the United States in maintaining the current international order. The United States finds in Japan a market for eleven percent of U.S. exports (\$28 billion), including almost seven billion in foodstuff-the world's best market for the U.S. agriculture. Thus, Japan is a better market for U.S. exports than West Germany, France, and Italy combined. In 1986 Japanese investors placed \$65 billion into U.S. money markets, reducing interest on the U.S. budget deficit.²³ In 1988 that figure had grown to \$160 billion, with Japan financing approximately thirty percent of the U.S. deficit.

Japanese democracy should make for a favorable influence in the region as that nation exercises more political power commensurate with economic status. Japan has played a key role in providing capital in Asia, fueling growth, stability, and prosperity

²¹Mike Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, 1989, pp. 3-5.

²²Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S., Japan, and Asian Pacific Security in Perspective," Current Policy, No. 974, U.S. Department of State, p. 2. Also, Chace, previously cited, reports that Nomura Research Institute estimates Japanese overseas assets will exceed \$1 trillion by 1995.

²³Will Clark Jr., "U.S.-Japanese Relations in Focus," Department of State Bulletin, April 1988, pp. 58, 59.

in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the region. Continued growth of the NICs may well depend on the availability of open Japanese markets to absorb regional exports.²⁴ Of most importance, Japan's consistent defense force growth may have a significant impact on the conventional balance of power in Northeast Asia during the 1990s. This potential shift in the current conventional balance of power, based on a "modernization gap," with the U.S.S.R. will be discussed in Chapter Three. Finally, Japan depends on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to prevent blackmail and coercion. As the United States approaches the 21st Century it would seem prudent to restructure the United States-Japanese security relationship towards an alliance of increased responsibility sharing and decision sharing. This could help increase the credibility of achieving convergent interests and help reduce economic friction.

Fourth, the United States promotes the expansion of free markets and human rights in the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). A multi-power balance in Northeast Asia depends on a stable, effective government in China to help prevent hegemony in the region.²⁵ Thus, the United States has welcomed the significant contribution China provides to regional stability, especially tension reduction in Korea and Indochina.²⁶ As a consequence of recent democracy demonstrations, the future orientation of the P.R.C. may be increasingly unpredictable, but in the long-run, a modern China can only come about with increased personal freedoms, the free flow of information, and competing

²⁴FEER, 8 June 1989, pp. 51-56.

²⁵James Chace, previously cited, p. 17.

²⁶Gaston Sigur, "East Asia and the Pacific: An Era of Opportunity," Current Policy, No. 971, U.S. Department of State, p. 3.

ideas.²⁷ This was the essence of the Chinese people's demonstrations for free speech, democracy, and removal of the back door, guanxi, corruption of the communist party.²⁸ As China's leading dissident, scientist Fang Li-Zhi, stated, "there can be no four modernizations without a fifth one--democracy." During the largest demonstrations in modern Chinese history, students at Tiananmen were quoting Patrick Henry, Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, but little from Marx or Lenin. Thus, the United States has an important role to play in supporting the human rights of the people of China. The possibility of a freer China is real, and in the long-term, a far more reliable ally than a geo-strategic relationship with a hard-line, totalitarian P.R.C.. A China which has opened up to free markets and becomes increasingly Western via freedom of speech and incremental democracy could alter the global balance in favor of those nations which hold similar values. The intellectual elite of China may be just as ready for democracy and increased personal freedoms as their unprepared counterparts were in East Europe.²⁹ As Gaston Sigur astutely observed, "rapid socio-economic modernization juxtaposed with occasions for political succession may fuel popular pressures for political reform within, increasing popular support for democratization at the expense

²⁷Michael Armacost, "The U.S. in the Changing Asia of the 1990s," Current Policy, No. 981, U.S. Department of State, p. 1, reports that if Chinese GNP growth continues at 7%, by the year 2000 the PRC would be on par with the UK or France as a trading nation. Without meeting popular demands, continued unrest or disenchantment with the communist regime has appeared to lower this forecast.

²⁸John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 368.

²⁹See "Helmsmen's Lost Bearings" and "Things Fall Apart, The Center Cannot Hold" in FEER, 27 October 1988, for discussion of loss of legitimacy in the CCP, economic warlordism, and increasing official corruption in China before the Tiananmen demonstrations.

of authoritarianism."³⁰ As the Chinese hard-line octogenarians pass away and the economy compounds recent poor performance with a preference of "reds" over "experts" in management, demands for democratic reforms may well return to Tiananmen in the near-term.³¹

Last, the United States has a vital stake in promoting democratic values and institutions throughout Asia, along with an "open door" attitude towards commerce.³² This enhances the security of Northeast Asia. Such a policy fosters respect for law, economic growth, stability and ability to resist subversion. This protects our own security and prosperity as well as advancing our fundamental ideals.³³ Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines are examples of increasing democratization. The people of China have shown the world that opposing tyranny is worth dying for; indeed, they have reaffirmed our own core values expressed by the "Goddess of Democracy" statue erected by Chinese students at Tiananmen. As the leader of the free world, the United States should not deny the responsibility of assisting those who cry out for freedom against tyranny. Asians have looked to the United States for protection of human rights, demonstrated by the safe haven provided Ninoy Aquino, Kim Dae-Jung, and

³⁰Gaston Sigur, "An East Asia-Pacific Prognosis: The Vital Signs are Strong," Strategic Review, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 41.

³¹United Press International Newswire, 1 October 1989, reports that Premier Li Peng stated on the 40th Anniversary of communist rule that, "all schools should...give top priority to steering a firm and correct political orientation."

³²Walter S. Mossberg and John Walcott, "US Shifts Strategy on Security Policy," Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1988, p. 1, reports that Mr. Bush remarked that, "economic growth is now as much a matter of foreign policy as it is a monetary policy."

³³George Schultz, "Matching Foreign Policy Resources With Goals," Current Policy, No. 992, U.S. Department of State, p. 3.

Fang Li-zhi. Turmoil in Southeast Asia will likely remain in the 1990s as the Khmer Rouge remains a militant force in Cambodia and the behind-the-scenes dictatorship of Ne Win in Burma continues in power. The United States has the duty as a world leader to induce our wealthy allies in Northeast Asia to join in a multinational effort in resolving these crisis areas.

The United States interests in Asia are many and likely to increase as the nation enters the 21st Century. The basis for an expanding national interest in Northeast Asia is also contingent on a shifting economic balance of power from the European theater to the Far East. Over the past decade, East Asia has surpassed all other regions of the world in economic development, GNP growth, and expansion of its share of international trade.³⁴ In 1986 the United States transacted \$219 billion in gross trade with Asia, some seventy-five percent more gross trade than with Atlantic nations.³⁵ This creates a shifting balance of power with both new opportunities and new dangers for U.S. security. The danger is based in the lack of an established geopolitical alignment in Asia and no indigenous historical context (outside of the "tributary system" of Imperial China) to look back to.³⁶ Also, only in Northeast Asia do four major world powers, the United States, Japan, U.S.S.R., and P.R.C. have direct interests. Consequently, many, like ex-Secretary of the Navy James Webb, have called

³⁴Gaston Sigur, "East Asia and the Pacific: The Roads Behind and Ahead," Current Policy, No. 1084, U.S. Department of State, pp. 2, 3. Thirty-five percent of US global commerce is in Asia, surpassing all other regions.

³⁵James H. Webb, Remarks to National Press Club, Washington D.C., 13 January 1988.

³⁶James Chace, previously cited, p. 4.

for an appropriate shift of U.S. interest and military posture towards Asia. For example, in 1986 U.S. commitments in Asia cost \$42 billion in the U.S. defense budget, compared to \$134 billion spent for the defense of Europe.³⁷ As Japan is the regional economic power of Northeast Asia, a revised U.S. strategy, which takes into account domestic fiscal restraints, should increase security ties based on convergent interests and maximizing each other's national assets. As such, a new United States-Japan security alliance should seek to enhance convergent interests based on a rational division of security labor and power sharing. However, American-Japanese values may differ at times regarding certain economic and political issues. As such, each nation will ultimately seek those policies which promote their respective national interest. This is to be expected among nations in a full-partnership alliance. The strength of any alliance may ultimately be judged by the convergence of values over the long-term.

B. JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Japan was totally exhausted from conflict at the completion of World War II. Never before in Japanese history had destruction and despair so totally encompassed the archipelago. To Japan's leaders who had terminated the war, the most important issue was preserving Kokutai, or "national essence."³⁸ The importance of kokutai, and relevance to Japan's national security today, will be discussed in Chapter Four. The United States commenced the occupation of a surrendered enemy with great attention directed towards the Japanese people. Their main objective was mere survival. At the

³⁷Webb and Chace, both previously cited.

³⁸Odawara Atsushi, "No Tampering with the Brake on Military Expansion," Japan Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, 1985, p. 250.

height of Japan's food crisis (1946-47) it was believed that 10 million people would starve. Gen. MacArthur rerouted food from the Philippines to Japan in order to reduce suffering. Once the threat of mass starvation was checked, the United States implemented NSC-13 in 1948 to bring about recovery of the Japanese economy and strengthen the nation's resistance to communism.³⁹ To the Japanese, the threat became apparent as the Kuomintang fled mainland China after being defeated by Mao Ze Dong's 8th Route Army in 1949. In February, 1950, the threat was highlighted by a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between Communist China and the Soviet Union regarding Japan as their hypothetical enemy. The threat became real with the outbreak of war in Korea on June 24, 1950. Upon regaining sovereignty in 1952, Japan concluded a Security Treaty with the United States. Japan viewed this as not a mere military pact but as a high level political treaty covering military, economic, and cultural fields, especially when it was revised in 1960.⁴⁰

Japan concentrated on "economics first" while the United States assumed total responsibility for defending the islands. At first, the United States did not expect Japan to develop the economic wherewithal to fully defend itself. Within Japan, constitutional questions also hindered assuming full responsibility of defense. The constitution of Japan will be examined in Chapter Four. Japan pursued a policy of seikei bunri to further economic growth. This policy separated politics from economics regarding

³⁹Hata Ikuhito, "The Postwar Period in Retrospect," Japan Echo, Vol. XI, Special Issue, 1984, p. 14, mentions NSC-13 concluded that instead of throwing an unarmed Japan in to the midst of the Cold War, a better policy would be to prolong the occupation, preventing a weak Japan from facing communism.

⁴⁰Kajima Morinosuke, Modern Japan's Foreign Policy (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1970), pp. 77, 121, 122.

foreign trade. Japan's exports were largely directed to Southeast Asia until the mid-1960s when the production of high quality, inexpensive products began to penetrate the U.S. market.⁴¹

Japan's export-oriented foreign policy, U. S. security assistance, and the diligence of the Japanese people produced an "economic boom" in the 1960s that exploded into today's "economic superstate." However, total reliance on economics as the basis of foreign policy began to receive Japanese review after the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the proclamation of the "Nixon Doctrine," and the achievement of conventional and nuclear parity with the United States by the U.S.S.R. during the years of detente in the 1970s. The era of Pax Americana in Asia had come to a close. Prime Minister Ohira announced a "Comprehensive National Security" policy in 1979 that stressed more self-reliant efforts, strengthening U.S.-Japanese alliance relations, expanding contacts with the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., and emphasizing diplomacy in securing food and energy supplies.⁴²

Comprehensive security, in short, relied primarily on political and economic means, in addition to military self-strengthening, to protect Japan's national interests. In the 1980s the Japanese government began to increase defense expenditures to meet the guidelines of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).⁴³ While these

⁴¹Hata, previously cited, p. 21, reports that in 1960, S.E. Asia received 33.5% of Japan's exports.

⁴²Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Comprehensive National Security Policy (McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1984).

⁴³Frank Langdon, "The Security Debate in Japan," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1985, pp. 399-401. The Comprehensive Security group had recommended an annual increase of twenty percent in defense spending, but the government settled for an

expenditures will acquire the force structure recommended in the NDPO to provide the required, stated minimum to defend Japan from low-scale aggression by 1990, Japan has contributed little to international and regional security outside of foreign aid. This "minimalist" foreign policy has been criticized as a "cheap ride" on one hand, to a policy that is unbecoming of a nation-state on the other hand. Congress has passed resolutions calling for the Japanese to spend at least three percent of GNP on security.⁴⁴ While frictions between the United States and Japan in economic matters rise, the security relationship is also coming under increased scrutiny from both sides. As the United States-Japanese relationship appears to be heading into new waters, Japanese national interests are extremely similar to U.S. interests.

The paramount Japanese interest, a vital one, is to secure access to resources and markets for exports. The nation is heavily dependent upon food and raw materials imported from all over the world.⁴⁵ A disruption of the free-flow of commerce would have severe consequences on the well-being of Japan. No nation has so much to lose from a break-down of the current international order of free trade. For example, fifty-five percent of Japan's oil passes through the strait of Hormuz. At any one time up to twenty Japanese owned or operated tankers are in the Gulf.⁴⁶ Over eighty percent

average six percent increase.

⁴⁴Richard L. Armitage, "Our Security Role in Asia and the Pacific," Defense 88, May-June 1988, p. 31.

⁴⁵Martin E. Weinstein, "Trade Problems and US-Japanese Security," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1988, pp. 26, 27. Japan depends on foreign sources for 87% of energy, 98.6% of iron ore, 95% of copper, 82% of lead, and 100% of aluminum and nickel resources.

⁴⁶The Economist, 7 November 1987, p. 40. Seven Japanese tankers were attacked in the Gulf during 1986. Oil comprises 60% of Japan's energy.

of Japan's oil and LPG imports pass through the Malacca strait. This extreme reliance on foreign resources is equally matched with the eighty-five percent of Japan's exports which are sea-borne.⁴⁷ The primary destination of Japan's exports is, of course, the United States, which receives approximately thirty-eight percent. As mentioned before, Japanese investment overseas has reached such an unprecedented level that virtually no area of the globe is without some degree of interest to Japan. Consequently, regional stability promotes the security of the \$1 trillion that the Japanese will have invested overseas by 1995.

The second vital interest to Japan is peace on the Korean peninsula. This has been a historical interest based on simple geography. Japan was willing to go to war with Imperial China, and then Imperial Russia, over influence in Korea to ensure that no threat neared the home islands. Prime Minister Sato stated in the joint Nixon-Sato communique of 1969 that security of the Republic of Korea is "essential" to Japan's security.⁴⁸ Despite this traditional interest in Korea, Japan declines to directly contribute to the security of the Republic of Korea, outside of financial assistance, for Constitutional reasons. Japan's foreign policy of neglect, when it concerns the military defense of Korea, lessens the United States ability to maintain a credible security posture on the peninsula. Unlike NATO, where allies are willing to share the burden of a common defense, the United States would likely find no initial or direct assistance from Japan if the D.P.R.K. attacked the R.O.K.. This diminishes the prospects of the

⁴⁷Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruption in S.E. Asia and the Middle East," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1986, pp. 356-364.

⁴⁸Hong Nack Kim, "Japan's Korea Policy in the Post-Seoul Olympic Era," Korean Observer, Vol. XLX, No. 3, Autumn 1989, p. 245.

the U.S. public supporting military intervention in Korea during a conflict while Japan awaited the outcome. However, the United States should not assume that since Japan has no declared defense strategy regarding Korean security that an undeclared, indigenous strategy does not exist. The Republic of Korea, United States and Japan have convergent interests in preserving the peace on the peninsula, yet only the latter is willing to forego a stated commitment of military assistance if aggression occurs.

Since Japanese security is directly linked with security of the Korean peninsula, Japan hopes for "peaceful coexistence" on the peninsula and desires cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers (Japan, U.S., U.S.S.R., and P.R.C.). This would reduce tensions, introduce both nations into the U.N., and pave the way for peaceful reunification. However, Prime Minister Nakasone's proposal for a four power conference (U.S., P.R.C., D.P.R.K., and R.O.K.) was rejected by Beijing.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Japan has shown keen interest in Soviet diplomatic maneuvers and policies on both sides of the 38th parallel. Concerning the D.P.R.K., Japan has been alarmed by the Soviet's transfer of large quantities of modern military equipment to the Kim Il-Sung regime, including MIG-23, SU-25, and MIG-29 aircraft, and also SA-5 missiles.⁵⁰ The SA-5 system has a range covering Seoul's Kimpo international airport. Even though the D.P.R.K. may prefer to be independent of the U.S.S.R., Japan has tried to dilute Soviet influence in the North via trade with Pyongyang.⁵¹ Japan has also enticed the

⁴⁹Kim, previously cited, pp. 245, 246.

⁵⁰Janes Defense Weekly, 3 September 1988, p.4.

⁵¹Edward Olsen, "Keeping North Korea out of Soviet Hands," FEER, 14 May 1987, pp. 40, 41. Prof. Olsen points out North Korean desires to unify Korea on its own terms would be constrained by Moscow if it became "Finlandised."

D.P.R.K. to assume a moderate political foreign policy in exchange for economic incentives of increased trade. Prior to the Seoul Olympics, Tokyo and Seoul offered Pongyang economic ties with an implicit understanding that peaceful behavior during the games would be rewarded. The United States followed those initiatives by easing restrictions on travel and limited trade to the D.P.R.K..⁵² Pyongyang allowed the Olympics to occur without an incident, but has done little else to ease tensions and match R.O.K., U.S., and Japanese diplomatic initiatives. Joint ventures and increased trade is limited by the D.P.R.K.'s default on numerous Japanese loans. Moreover, Kim's dictatorship rejects glasnost, perestroika, and continually expresses a deep hatred for Japan. Soviet moves on the peninsula, especially military-related efforts, will continue to attract Japanese national security interest.

South Korea is increasing economic ties with North Korea's ideological supporters, the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C.. The R.O.K. has promoted economic transactions with the communist giants via third parties, hoping to loosen their ideological ties with the D.P.R.K. in exchange for capitalist ventures with the R.O.K.. Trade with the P.R.C. stands at \$2-3 billion annually.⁵³ East European trade offices in Seoul are seen as providing the opportunity for eventual official Soviet trade leading to possible normalized political relations.⁵⁴ Poland and Hungary have already diplomatically recognized South Korea. Clearly, both the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. can use R.O.K.

⁵²New York Times, 1 November 1988, p. 1.

⁵³FEER, 8 September 1988, p. 83.

⁵⁴"South Korea Nears Trade Pact," The Asian Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1988, p. 3.

technology and capital in joint ventures to help their respective modernization efforts. In return, South Korea is receiving de facto recognition from Moscow and Beijing, hoping such economic ties will force Pyongyang to "open up" and join the relaxing of tensions between East and West. However, Japan's role in contributing to Korean reunification is limited by historical animosity. The legacy of Japanese colonialism in Korea continues to impede Korean-Japanese relations. The legal status of 700,000 ethnic Koreans living in Japan and the question of Japanese reparations for Koreans residing in Sakhalin remains a central issue between the governments.⁵⁵ Japanese efforts at "internationalization," and assuming a larger political status in the region may be hindered without a resolution of Japanese responsibility towards non-Japanese who are or were members of the Japanese nation.

Stability in China is very important to Japanese interests. President Nixon's 1972 trip to Peking, playing the "China card" to counterbalance Soviet moves in Europe, was followed with a visit to the People's Republic by Prime Minister Tanaka to counterbalance Soviet moves in Asia. Subsequently, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between Beijing and Tokyo in 1978. It including a statement against "anti-hegemony" in the region. This codeword for anti-Soviet expansion brought fears in Moscow of a Tokyo-Beijing entente on their eastern borders in conjunction with NATO in the west. Some scholars believe this warming of Japanese-Chinese ties hardened the Soviet position on the Kuriles. Deployment of SS-20s also may have been a further

⁵⁵Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 17 August 1989, p. 36, reports the ROK has asked the Japanese government to assist in the relocation of Koreans residing in Sakhalin. These Koreans were under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Empire prior to World War II.

Soviet reaction to diminish a possible Tokyo-Beijing alliance.⁵⁶ The United States reassertion as a power in Asia during the Reagan years has partially altered Sino-Japanese relations. A dramatic U.S. military buildup combined with a new strategy emphasizing horizontal escalation in the Pacific, relieved China's security concerns of encirclement by the U.S.S.R.. No longer feeling the full threat of Soviet hegemony, Beijing has refocused political attention on Tokyo. The P.R.C. has chided Japan politically while at the same time desiring economic aid and assistance. Deng Hsiao-Ping's refusal to meet Japan's Defense Agency Director Kurihara Yuko, when he visited China in 1987, was not received well in Japan.⁵⁷ Continuing flaps over Japanese revisions of its account of Japan's role as an aggressor in the Pacific War have been met with Chinese consternation.⁵⁸ Cabinet Minister Okuno Seisuke was forced to resign in 1988 after China protested his view of history, and even Prime Minister Takeshita Naboru retracted statements concerning the war after offending the Chinese. Such actions do little to further Sino-Japanese relations.

Mainland China has vast potential for economic growth, and is a close market for Japanese exports. To develop this market, the P.R.C. has been Japan's principle ODA recipient since 1982.⁵⁹ Besides economic reasons, the P.R.C. has considerable

⁵⁶Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, ed., The Soviet Far Eastern Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Ma.: Auburn House, 1986), p. 146.

⁵⁷Defense and Foreign Affairs, October-November 1987, p. 54.

⁵⁸Yu Wen, "Okuno Seeks to Reverse Verdict of War," Beijing Review, 9-15 May 1988, p. 13.

⁵⁹Robert M. Orr, "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin, and the ROK," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1986, p. 39.

influence on the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia, areas of great concern to Japan. A potential power struggle after the death of Deng Hsiao-Ping that leads to an extreme leftist hard-line regime in China would have profound implications for Japanese security. A leftist hard-line regime, adhering to strict Marxism, would close the "open door" to Western capital and have fewer restraints in the conduct of foreign policy. For example, the future status of Taiwan has immense importance to Japan. A forceful take over attempt of the Republic of China by the P.R.C. would certainly indicate an aggressive, radical foreign policy by the mainland which could threaten vital lines of communications which pass through the Bashi Channel separating the R.O.C. and the Philippines. A hard-line regime that adopts a "Maoist" foreign policy reemphasizing revolution in Southeast Asia may be a worst-case scenario, but a hard-line government in Beijing that was willing to ignore international condemnation regarding the June 3rd 1989 massacre may also be willing to sacrifice restraint regarding Taiwan's "reunification with the mainland." Taiwan's dramatic economic growth has deepened the social contradictions between the two countries, lowering the prospects for future reunification. This trend may become increasingly ominous unless the P.R.C. renounces the "four conditions" to use forceful reunification.⁶⁰

Democracy demonstrations and subsequent hard-line approach have not diminished Japan's long-term economic interest with China. After the Tiananmen massacre Japan

⁶⁰Betts, previously cited, p. 51, mentions, "over the long-run, the most probable point of inflammation (in Asia) is Taiwan. Terminating the formal commitment to defend Taipei was facilitated by the judgement the mainland lacks a capability to attack the island. This could change." The P.R.C.'s stated four conditions to allow for a forceful reunification are, 1) Taiwan becoming a nuclear power, 2) Taiwan declaring independence, i.e. Republic of Taiwan, 3) Taiwan concluding a military pact with the U.S.S.R., and 4) an extraordinary time to reach reunification.

was the first Western nation willing to resume economic relations in a "business as usual" manner. However, China's economic direction is presently uncertain. Beijing is debating over expanding reform or revision, and this places Japanese investment at a disadvantage.⁶¹ Japanese economic projects are hesitant on expanding without knowing if the Chinese economy will become increasingly planned by communist cadres or follow the laws of supply and demand. Also, certain pro-democracy elements in China have regarded Japanese economic policy as leaning towards economic domination and supportive of the Deng-Peng-Jiang regime. Death threats directed at Japanese economic circles in China by dissidents must surely remind all parties concerned of the May 4th movement and subsequent anti-Japanese economic boycotts in the 1920s.⁶² Instability in China not only threatens Japanese economic interests but security interests as well.

As a consequence of China's turmoil and the unpredictability of the final status of the current regime, Japan has a necessary role as a decision-maker in promoting peace in Northeast Asia.

Southeast Asia has been a traditional source of resources and markets for Japan. Large quantities of commerce pass through the waters of Southeast Asia with some form of economic link to Japan. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei supply Japan with about twenty-five percent of its oil and large sums of tin and aluminum.⁶³ In return,

⁶¹see Nicholas Kristoff, "Beijing's Course: A Fractured Party Spinning in Circles Without Direction," New York Times, 1 November 1989, p. A7.

⁶²New York Times, 22 June 1989, p. 11.

⁶³Sheldon W. Simon, "Is There a Japanese Regional Security Role," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1986, pp. 31, 47. Mr. Simon states forty-four percent of ships in Malaccan straits over 30,000 tons are Japanese.

ASEAN states have been receiving over half of their bilateral ODA from Japan to develop their economies (roughly thirty to thirty-five percent of Japan's total aid). This aid has been labeled the "New Asian Industries Development Plan" by MITI Minister Hajime Tamura in January, 1987, focusing on more assistance in the development of export industries.⁶⁴ Economic growth not only provides stability, but also a larger market for high-value Japanese exports. Thus, development of Southeast Asia promotes Japanese security. For example, Japanese aid to the Philippines exceeds that of the United States, and for good reason. The Philippines border the crucial Bashi Channel that funnels sea-borne commerce to Japan. As the Philippine Islands continue to display economic and political disorder, Japan's interests are likely to increase as U.S. base rights at Subic Bay and Clark field appear less certain.⁶⁵

Japan's Foreign Ministry in 1986 stated, "Japan's international responsibilities are growing as the United States declines from the position of dominant economic power." A Japanese sense of responsibility in Southeast Asia is growing among Japanese government and academic circles, much like the way the United States views Latin America.⁶⁶ Japan has begun to assert a more visible foreign policy in the region. For example, Japan claims to represent Asian states during international conferences of Western powers, such as the group of seven, and also attempted to influence the Ne

⁶⁴Orr, previously cited, pp. 42-50.

⁶⁵Edward A. Olsen, "Determinants of Strategic Burden Sharing in East Asia," US Naval War College Review, May-June 1986. Prof. Olsen commented that if the US relinquishes bases in the Philippines and the Soviets coopt them, "Tokyo would be faced with regional instability."

⁶⁶Hiaoko Yamane, "Japan as an Asian-Pacific Power," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 12, December 1987, pp. 1303, 1305.

Win regime in Burma by linking reform as a condition to continued aid.⁶⁷ As Burma receives the majority of its foreign aid from Japan, the Japanese were capable of exerting a measure of influence beyond other nations during the popular revolt crisis in 1988. Japan's attempt to assist reform in Burma failed, however, and that nation remains in a precarious position of economic stagnation and police-state rule. Nonetheless, given the vast potential Burma has since it is blessed with abundant natural resources, Japan may yet play a key role in rebuilding Burma after political reform takes place.

Japan's emergence in a more activist foreign policy may soon take place in Cambodia. The removal of Vietnamese troops from foreign soil in Indochina may lead to reduced tensions and promote economic development throughout the region. To assist in ensuring a peaceful resolution in Indochina, and preventing civil war and a return to power of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Japan announced in July, 1984 at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference it would: 1) contribute to expenses of peace keeping activities, 2) provide personnel for an internationally supervised election, and 3) grant economic assistance to the countries of Indochina.⁶⁸ If this policy is actually implemented, Japanese standing in the region would increase dramatically while removing the old fears that stimulated anti-Japanese riots in the region during the

⁶⁷Margaret Shapiro, "Once Shunned, Japan is Again a Giant in Asia," Washington Post, 14 October 1988, pp. A1, A32. Ms. Shapiro points out that at the Toronto economic summit in 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita took the role of Asia's advocate on issues from protectionism to the Seoul Olympics. Also, Ms. Shapiro states Japan attempted to force the authoritarian government of Burma to make some economic reforms.

⁶⁸Suedo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, May 1988, p. 519.

1970s. The Director General of Japan's Defense Agency emphasized, during the JDA's first official visit to Southeast Asia in 1988, that Japan is now a nation to be trusted.⁶⁹ If Cambodia returns to a state of war, leading to another Khmer Rouge regime, then Japanese policy, or lack of policy, centering on resolving conflict in Southeast Asia will be closely monitored by ASEAN nations as a gauge of Japanese leadership.

Relations with the United States hold a key position in Japan's national security. The economic, military, and political relationship between the nations is crucial to the continued prosperity of Japan. Americans also are coming to realize the importance of Japan to U.S. security, especially in economic matters. As former Ambassador Mike Mansfield has frequently stated, "The most important relationship in the world-bar none-is that between the United States and Japan."⁷⁰ Despite economic and defense frictions, the strategic relationship Japan has with the United States is far more beneficial to Japanese interests than a scrapped alliance and a neutralist policy. Japan and the United States agree on matters of foreign policy importance, such as China, Korea, and IndoChina.⁷¹ Furthermore, at current defense expenditures, Japan is becoming increasingly able to unilaterally guarantee vital national security interests outside of the nuclear realm. In particular, the safe passage of resources and trade along the sea lanes of communication in the Far East is not beyond the capabilities of

⁶⁹Michael Richardson, "Japan and the Soviet Union Extend Their Influence," Pacific Defense Reporter, August 1988, p. 20. Defense Agency Chief Kuwara asked Singapore and Indonesia to cooperate in assuring the safety of Japanese ships through the Malacca straits.

⁷⁰Mansfield, previously cited, p. 15.

⁷¹Sato Seizaburo, "Appraising the Japan-US Partnership," Japan Echo, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1988, p. 39.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces in the 1990s. Japan's maritime build-up will be addressed in Chapter Three. Japan's previous dependence on the United States to provide an anzen hosho, security guarantee, that ensures access to the world's markets via the SLOCs is receiving increasing criticism on both sides of the Pacific. The U.S. insists upon more burden sharing from Japan, while Japanese are demanding a less ideological, more equitable decision making process concerning security policy in the Pacific.⁷² For the continued prosperity of the alliance between Japan and the United States an adjustment of the security relationship seems in order. A security readjustment which provides economic relief to the United States (so that it may direct more resources to promote economic competitiveness) could set the framework for closer cooperation between the United States and Japan in the decades to come. This strategy will be addressed in Chapter Five.

Among the major powers, only relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be in a strained and uncompromising state. Despite perestroika and unilateral Soviet arms cuts, Japanese-Soviet relations may not follow the general East-West trend of lowered tensions. Because of geography, historical animosity, differing but related security interests, and a possible shift in the conventional balance of military power between them, these two nations may become antagonistic in the coming decade and beyond, discussed in the next two chapters. Therefore, U.S. security

⁷²Susan Chira, "Japan Ready to Share Burden, But Also Power, With US," New York Times, 7 May 1989, p. A4. Ms. Chira quoted Mr. Makato Kuroda, former top trade negotiator for Japan, as saying, "Burden sharing is the other side of the coin of power sharing."

policy in Northeast Asia during the 1990s may not be solely founded on a strategy dealing with a United States-Soviet confrontation.

II. JAPANESE AND SOVIET RELATIONS

International relations appear to have reached a post-war record of reduced tensions as the 1980s come to a close. Withdrawal of Soviet, or Soviet-sponsored, armed forces from Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola reverses the temporary territorial gains Moscow achieved in the 1970s during the United States retrenchment after Vietnam. The Reagan Administration's policy of rebuilding U.S. military might and a willingness to support "freedom fighters" eager to "roll back" recent communist take overs has been successful. However, part of the success is derived from the failure of central planning to revive stagnant economies in communist countries. Following the People's Republic of China's example, the Soviet Union seeks negotiation and dialogue to provide a period of peace in order to mend the economic order without maintaining an arms race. Mikhail Gorbachev has gone beyond Deng Hisao-Ping's policy of opening China to Western capital, by appealing to the West for a new international order beyond the Cold War. The West should remember during this period of change that neither Deng or Gorbachev have introduced reforms, the former economic and the latter political, from a position of relative strength.

The Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty between the United States and U.S.S.R., political policies of perestroika and glasnost in Soviet society, and requests for joint ventures with capitalists are part of Moscow's "peace objective." A policy of "new thinking" has evolved with the rise of General Secretary Gorbachev, which has been partially successful in removing from the general population of Europe a fear of

threat and animosity towards Russians. The Sino-Soviet summit may have laid the framework for reduced tensions along the Soviet Union's eastern borders. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has made overtures to the Kremlin to bring the U.S.S.R. back into the community of nations. Some national security analysts believe the Cold War is over and the West won. However, one major bilateral relationship remains abnormal. Despite some improvements, Japanese-Soviet relations are virtually as cold as ever.

Within the increasing cooperation between East and West, the strained relations between Japan and Russia stand out as an aberration.⁷³ This is of significance because of three factors. First, the Soviet Union desires to extend influence in Asia. Second, the Soviets want to promote economic development in the Soviet Far East through expansion of trade with Asian nations.⁷⁴ Without assistance from Japan in the latter, the former goal will be difficult to achieve. Third, Japan is an ever increasing economic and conventional military power. Japan's Gross National Product is triple that of the People's Republic of China, North and South Korea, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, IndoChina and Indonesia combined.⁷⁵ Japan's defense budget in the early

⁷³"M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with Takako Doi," Pravda, 7 May 1988, pp. 1, 2, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XL, No. 18, 1988, p. 15. M.S. Gorbachev told JSP Chairperson Takako Doi "it is completely abnormal for Japanese-Soviet relations to be like a smoldering fire that doesn't burn but is more apt to smoke."

⁷⁴See FEER, August 7, 1986 for text of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech outlining Soviet economic-political goals in Asia.

⁷⁵Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1988 Yearbook, 1988, pp. 6, 7. Japan's 1988 GNP was \$1,980 billion while the PRC, DPRK, ROK, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan combined GNP was \$633.5 billion. No figures available for IndoChina. Japan's GNP is also larger than the USSR's.

1990s may also surpass all-before-mentioned nations combined for the first time.⁷⁶ As a result of the yen's devaluation, Japan's military expenditures measured in dollars have more than doubled from twelve billion in 1985 (\$1=260 yen) to thirty two billion dollars in 1990 (\$1=125 yen). Despite the yen's devaluation, Japan has funded an aggregate increase of over five percent per annum on defense spending since regaining sovereignty.⁷⁷ During the 1980s this nominal defense increase has averaged over six percent per annum.⁷⁸ Outside of the Soviet Union and United States, Japan is the major power in Greater East Asia (to use the Japanese term of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia combined). An increased Japanese defense budget of three percent GNP, as advocated by many in the U.S. Congress, during the 1990s could approach \$90 to \$120 billion. Even with incremental increases in defense expenditures during the next decade, the Soviets may perceive Japan's forces as the strongest conventional security threat near any Russian border in the 1990s after East-West Conventional Force Europe (CFE) negotiations have been implemented.

Japan and the Soviet Union appear to be unable to improve relations without a resolution of the Northern Territories issue. In general terms, the Northern Territories included former Imperial Japanese domains in Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands

⁷⁶Asia 1988 Yearbook, previously cited, pp. 8, 9. In 1987 Japan spent \$24.03 billion on defense while all other's concerned spent \$33.58 billion. Japan's 1990 defense budget is \$32 billion. If pensions are included, the FY 90 budget is \$42 billion-third largest in the world.

⁷⁷International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-89 (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 220 Japan surpassed the PRC in defense spending, \$11.08 to \$11.07 billion respectively, in 1983.

⁷⁸"Japan Flexes Defense Muscle," Defense Attache, No. 6 1988, p. 20.

until World War II. Specifically, the term used today means the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Hobomai group which are just due northeast of Hokkaido and south of the Soviet controlled portions of the Kurile island chain ending with Urup island. This issue of sovereignty over the islands, like the separation of Korea and Germany, is a direct result of the outcome of World War II.

Soviet troops entered the Japanese Empire in Manchuria and Korea after the atomic bombing in direct violation of the Neutrality Pact between the two nations. Additionally, Japanese efforts to negotiate an end to the war, prior to Soviet intervention, were ignored by Stalin in July 1945.⁷⁹ Japanese have not forgotten this "back stabbing" or the cruel treatment administered by the Red Army to Japanese civilians, millions of whom were fleeing the Asian mainland. Soviet forces followed the path of least resistance, stopping only when U.S. forces were met.⁸⁰ Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile chain (including the islands in dispute) were taken next. General MacArthur rejected Stalin's demand for participation as an occupation force in Hokkaido. Clearly, U.S. actions concerning the Soviet presence south of the 38th parallel in Korea and in Hokkaido set the framework that assisted eventual economic success in South Korea and Japan.

Truman and Churchill induced Stalin to fight in the Pacific in exchange for territory lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Cairo Conference Declaration stated "Japan will be expelled from all territories which she has taken by

⁷⁹Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1986), p. 334.

⁸⁰In Korea, the Red Army could have moved all the way to Pusan if there had not been prior agreement with the U.S. to stop at the 38th parallel.

violence and greed." Additionally, the secret agreement at Yalta included the Kuriles as territory to be taken from the Empire of Japan and reverted to the U.S.S.R.⁸¹ Did Yalta consider all islands north of Hokkaido part of the Kurile chain? No treaty between the Russians and Japanese exactly defined "the Kuriles." Russians first explored Kamchatka in 1700 and visited the Kuriles in 1713-14 in an effort to find Japan. They gathered information on Japan from Ainu and Japanese who had settled in the Kuriles some decades earlier. It appears both countries had an interest in settlement of the area at nearly the same time. In 1860 the Russian ship *Nadiezhdha* raided points on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, attacking Japanese trading posts and "took possession" in the name of the Tsar. Another expedition by the warship *Diana* in 1811 investigated the southern Kuriles, landing in Kunashiri, where they were captured by Japanese.⁸² Is there a separation of traditional sovereignty in the island chain? Japan exchanged sovereignty of the Kuriles with Imperial Russia in exchange for southern Sakhalin by treaty in 1875. Did this include the islands in question? Many Japanese strongly believe the islands in question today, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Hobomais, have always been inherent Japanese territory--koyu no ryodo.⁸³

⁸¹Kenichi Ito, "Japan and the Soviet Union--Entangled in the Deadlock of the Northern Territories," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1988, pp. 41, 43.

⁸²George B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 213, 214, 244. The captured Russians were released in 1813.

⁸³Ito, previously cited. p. 36. According to Ito, unlike Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles north of Etorofu, the islands in question have never before belonged to any other nation besides Japan and therefore did not meet the Cairo Conference definition of "territories...taken."

Japanese are of the opinion that the occupation of the islands by the Soviets has no legal standing since Japan was not a participant to the Yalta Conference and the Soviet Union was not a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Without returning the islands in question, Soviet occupation is seen as a continuation of the illegal entry into the Pacific War. The opinion that the Soviets won the war and therefore have legitimate claim to the Northern Territories contrasts with the United States return of the Bonin (Iwo Jima) and Volcano islands in 1968, and the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972.⁸⁴ Japanese must feel that patience will pay off on this territorial issue since no peace treaty has been signed officially ending the war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.⁸⁵

Moscow's determination to influence post-war Japan did not end with General MacArthur's rejection of Soviet occupation rights in Hokkaido. At the San Francisco Peace Conference in September, 1951, the Soviet delegation attempted to introduce an amendment to the treaty essentially making Japan another Finland under Soviet hegemony. Included were demands to: 1) place limitations on Japanese rearmament, 2) prohibit Japan from entering into any military alliances, and 3) agreement to exclusive rights of free passage for Soviet warships through Japan's four strategic straits

⁸⁴Roy U.T. Kim, "Warning Up Soviet-Japanese Relations?" Washington Quarterly, Spring 1986. Mr. Kim observed on p. 88, that, "even the U.S. return of Okinawa in 1972, while appreciated by the Japanese, did little to further U.S.-Japanese relations." Perhaps the Soviets seek a quid pro quo on the issue.

⁸⁵"Forward to 1986," The Economist, 25 June 1988, p. 42 points out Japan's desire to have the Kurile issue included in broader East-West negotiations, which Moscow has rejected.

(Tsushima, Tsugaru, Soya, and Nemuro).⁸⁶ It seems Moscow's concerns for safe passage had not diminished since the days of the Tzar.

Imperial Russia had inherent concerns over safe passage and warm water ports in the Far East. With the acquisition of vast areas of eastern Siberia from China by treaty in 1860, Russia had additional territory to protect and promote along with the settlements in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Those outposts in the Far East, during the 18th and 19th Century, were highly dependent on sea-borne supply. Overland support was unreliable and uneconomical given the vast distances involved. Moreover, Japan's geographic position was a natural barrier to logistical support of the Russian Far East before the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad. Russian efforts to supply the Maritime Provinces by trade with Tokugawa Japan failed. In 1861 the Russian warship Passadonick arrived at Tsushima island. The captain requested anchorage and repairs from the local leaders, and then commenced to build permanent shore facilities. Other Russian warships soon visited Tsushima, whose location between Korea and Japan strategically commanded the strait.⁸⁷ The Tsar's designs were clear: establish Tsushima as a naval base, ensuring safe passage to the Pacific allowing unhindered lines of communication to the Maritime Provinces. This attempt failed when the Japanese

⁸⁶Osamu Miyoshi, "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1987, p. 15. Nemuro strait is between Hokkaido and the Northern Territories. Exclusive rights of free passage for Soviet warships in the Tsugaru strait would have effectively isolated Hokkaido from Honshu. John Foster Dulles chided the intentions of the Soviets, who later refused to sign the peace treaty.

⁸⁷Kim Key-Hiuk, The Last Phase of East Asian World Order (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California, 1980), p. 19.

Bakufu government requested England to send warships to evict the Russians from Tsushima.

Japan held similar security concerns over safe passage as the Russians, but there was a difference. Russia's primary interest was in economic supply, whereas Japan's primary interest was in territorial integrity. Japan in the mid-19th Century was in the midst of responding to foreign demands that she "open up" after over two hundred years of self-enforced isolation.⁸⁸ The Japanese were suspicious of Western designs, fearing a similar fate that had befallen the Ch'ing Dynasty in China from the policies of British Imperialism. The Japanese meet this challenge by reforming their institutions during the Meiji Restoration and sought to control or influence Okinawa, Taiwan and Korea to keep the West at bay.⁸⁹ Geography confronted Russian development in the Far East with Japanese security concerns. In Korea the two nations vied for preeminent influence. Japan could no longer accept the status quo when Russia established a naval base at Yungampo and negotiated with the Korean government for further warship port rights near the Tsushima strait. These competing desires for spheres of influence culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.⁹⁰

⁸⁸Edwin O. Reishauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 113-125.

⁸⁹See Kim, previously cited, Chapters III-V for detailed explanation of Japanese expansionist rationale, means and objectives.

⁹⁰Japanese claims in Manchuria after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 were rejected by the Triple Intervention of France, Germany, and Russia. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 prevented a similar recurrence of outside interference after the defeat of Russia. As a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia ceded Southern Sakhalin, interests in Korea and southern Manchuria to Japan.

Soviet perceptions of Japanese intentions in the Far East are influenced by historical animosity. As stated, competing spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria increased antagonism between the two nations to the point of war in 1904. Russian distrust of Japan continued after the communist revolution. Japanese troops entered the Maritime Provinces as part of a U.S.-led international force in 1918. The United States became alarmed over Japanese intent when Imperial troops went beyond Vladivostok and all the way to Irkutsk.⁹¹ U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1920, but Japanese forces remained in the Maritime Province until 1922. A Japanese pledge to withdraw them had been made at the Washington Conference. However, Imperial troops were not withdrawn from Northern Sakhalin until 1925.⁹² Japan's militarism and anti-communism drew Soviet notice during the 1930s. Within Japan the militarists were forming factions divided over how best to promote perceived national interest. Two major factions arose between the "strike north" and "strike south" policies. The Imperial Army favored the former, while the Navy endorsed the latter.⁹³ After the Marco Polo incident in 1937, "strike north" army officers instigated an incident along the Soviet, Manchukuo, and Korean border with the Soviets. Japan was not as successful against the Soviets as they were against the Manchurian army of Chang Tso-lin. The Soviets quickly repulsed Japanese intrusion. Still, the Imperial Army persisted,

⁹¹Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972) p. 309. Secretary of State Hughes opposed Japanese expansion at the expense of Russia no less than at the expense of China.

⁹²Hane, previously cited, p. 202.

⁹³W.G. Beasely, The Modern History of Japan (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1973), pp. 260, 267, 268.

and in 1938 border disputes with the Soviets along the Outer Mongolia-Manchuria area culminated in the routing of Japan's army at Nomonhan, despite the size of their force (56,000).⁹⁴ Only Russia's concern with Hitler and a two front war kept the Soviets from dealing with the Japanese on the Asian continent.

Yalta clearly revealed inherent Russian Far Eastern security concerns, in regard to safe passage, by providing Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base and "preeminent interests" in an international port at Dairen.⁹⁵ A return to this sphere of influence, legitimized by Yalta, was prevented by revolution in China. Today, Soviet interest in safe passage from the Sea of Japan may increase with Moscow's desires to become an economic power in the Pacific. Moscow's political position on the Northern Territories reflects Soviet national security concerns regarding safe passage to the Pacific sea lanes of communications (SLOCs).

The traditional Soviet policy line has stated the disputed islands are part of the U.S.S.R. as a matter of historical fact. For decades Moscow refused to admit that there was any issue to discuss. To negotiate over the island's status implied redrawing an inviolable border formed at the completion of the war.⁹⁶ Also, returning the Northern Territories to Japan could set a dangerous precedent. This is especially so since the

⁹⁴Hane, previously cited, pp. 281, 283, 287. Over eight thousand Japanese died during the fighting.

⁹⁵Ito, previously cited, p. 41.

⁹⁶"Japanese Dissonance," Pravda, 24 June 1988, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XL, No. 25, 1988, p. 22. In response to P.M. Takeshita's statement that "Perestroika has no visible effects in Asia" and Japan and the U.S.S.R. had a "territorial issue," Pravada asserted "... we have stressed repeatedly that Japan's claims are illegal and unfounded. The issue has been decided on...historical and...legal basis."

occupied Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have become ever more vocal in seeking self-determination. According to Soviet judgment, the Helsinki accords legitimizing Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe are seen as an appropriate precedent for the Northern Territories.⁹⁷ The political status of Eastern Europe and the boundary of the Northern Territories were determined by the outcome of the last world war, and to negotiate the status of one may jeopardize the legality of the other. It appears Japan has no intention of participating in a "Helsinki-type" forum legitimizing Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories.⁹⁸

If the dispute over the Northern Territories and historical animosity were not enough to further strain Japanese-Soviet relations, current events may have. In 1987 Japanese Self Defense Forces fired their first shot in anger in recent memory when a Soviet Badger reconnaissance flight overflowed Okinawa. An ASDF F-4 fired warning shots after the Badger had violated Japanese airspace.⁹⁹ Those shots seem to reflect the political frustration between the two nations. To make matters worse, in 1987 diplomats were expelled from each other's capital over spying charges, followed by the arrest of

⁹⁷Genrikh Apalin, "Peace and Security for Asia and the Pacific," International Affairs (Moscow), November 1986, p. 22.

⁹⁸Masahiko Asada, "Confidence Building Measures in East Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, May 1988, p. 507. Mr. Asada states, "there is little likelihood that Japan would join in such a conference without a sure guarantee that it would not have any negative effect on Japan's territorial claim against the Soviet Union."

⁹⁹Defense Asia Pacific, 2/1988, p. 4. Much criticism had been made of JSDF inability to even defend themselves without prior approval of the government (IAW Constitutional interpretation). After the shooting one wonders if this is no longer the case, or was there prior approval for warning shots to be fired at Soviets violating Japanese airspace.

Japanese base employees selling F-15 and E-2C technical manuals to the Soviets.¹⁰⁰ However, this all paled in comparison with the embarrassment the Japanese government experienced during the Toshiba case. Toshiba sold milling machines to the Russians that reduced the tonal signatures of propellers. These new propellers were then installed on very noisy submarines, improving stealth capabilities. Many the United States felt Japan appeared to be sacrificing Western security for economic self-interest. Future trade across the Sea of Japan will no doubt be scrutinized to prevent further scandal.

Economic competition, perhaps the only card left for the Soviets to play, may induce Japan to invest in Soviet Far Eastern projects. Japan rarely turns down an economic challenge, be it with the Sandinista regime in Managua, amidst apartheid in South Africa, or in Vietnam after that nation had invaded Cambodia--despite past protests from ASEAN. This idea of separating politics from economics, seikei-bunri, has been used throughout the world as an adjunct to Japan's comprehensive security policy. An example of seikei bunri at work was during the Iran-Iraq war, where Japan maintained close ties with both nations and tried, but failed, to mediate between the two. With South Korea, and perhaps Taiwan, discussing investment and profit in Siberia, will Japan follow?¹⁰¹ Japan has conducted trade with the U.S.S.R., but appears hesitant to expand economic relations with the Soviets and, going beyond seikei-bunri, make the political decision to assist in development of the Soviet Far East.

¹⁰⁰Chalmers Johnson, "Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Early Gorbachev Era," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 11, November 1987, p. 1158.

¹⁰¹"Russia, Very Pacific about the Pacific," The Economist, 15 October 1988, p. 42 explains Moscow's intent of increasing trade with Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. However, to fully develop the Soviet Far East only Japanese capital and technology will suffice.

Comprehensive security places primary emphasis on economic and diplomatic initiatives, but it does not negate military strategy as part of security, i.e., Japan still finds the Soviets a potential military threat.¹⁰² Japanese security diminishes if there is a militarily strong and economically sound Soviet Far East. Japan's rearmament in response to the Soviet military buildup in the Far East is a partial reflection of these concerns. The other part is denying full *seikei bunri* in Japanese-Soviet economic relations.¹⁰³ Japanese financial assistance for perestroika may follow, to a certain degree, U. S. aid to the Kremlin. However, Japanese and American financial institutions would approach any Soviet bond offerings "with great caution."¹⁰⁴ The Soviet's dismal economic prognosis in itself may hinder Western aid. Return on investment may also be questioned depending on Soviet internal disorder, i.e., the nationalities problem, and the very future of perestroika and glasnost should Gorbachev be removed. Furthermore, Japanese aid to the U.S.S.R. should be considered in the context of historical animosity, the unresolved Kuriles, lack of a Peace Treaty between the two nations

¹⁰²Janes Defense Weekly, 3 September 1988, p. 5. Japan's Defense White Paper, published by the government, stated a commitment to defense expansion because of an increasing threat from the Soviet Union. Besides the Soviet military build up, Japan also cited increased Soviet naval and air activity including violations of its air space as primary examples of the Soviet threat.

¹⁰³Sato, previously cited, p. 40. Mr. Sato points out that the Toshiba event reminded Japan of the importance of the US over the USSR, and "reduced the likelihood of any move to scrape the US-Japanese security arrangement and adopt a nonaligned status-even in the event of the Northern Territories are returned."

¹⁰⁴New York Times, 1 November 1989, p. A4.

ending World War II, and Japan's traditional concern of a strong power positioned near the home islands.¹⁰⁵

After the summit between Moscow and Beijing, Japan may find itself in quite a different security position facing an entente of convenience between dictatorial powers relying on brute force to maintain rule. For example, the Russian people's desires for increased freedoms may receive a hard-line reaction, leading to similar events that occurred in China. In such a scenario, increased ties between hard-line leftists seeking to remain ideologically pure to Marxism in Beijing and Moscow may weaken Japan's regional status. For example, both now are vehemently opposed to any increase in Japanese Self-Defense Force military capabilities.¹⁰⁶ As Japan's defense structure assumes new status in the next decade, Moscow and Beijing may come forth with joint condemnations. China and Russia have found common ground opposing a well armed Japan before. The 1897 Li-Lobonov Treaty allowed Russian warships port rights in China if Japan attacked that nation. The U.S.S.R. supported the K.M.T. and C.C.P. in 1937 with a treaty of nonaggression and military aid after Japan invaded China. Also, Soviet support continued during the K.M.T.-C.C.P. United Front against Japan. Finally, Mao and Stalin agreed on mutual assistance against Japan if militarism arose from the ashes of WW II.¹⁰⁷ Also, Beijing holds similar views on nuclear free zones and

¹⁰⁵Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense (New York, N.Y.: Abt Books, 1986) pp. 7-13, points out most historical threats to Japan have come from great powers via the Korean peninsula.

¹⁰⁶See Gengu, "Japan Tones Up Defense Policy," Beijing Review, 6-12 March 1989, for PRC concerns.

¹⁰⁷David Nelson Rowe, Modern China (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 163. Article One of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950 dealt singularly with

disarmament talks which have been proposed by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ Japan's security relations with the United States may increase if hard-line communists in the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. find common ground against Japan's increasing military, economic, and political power.

United States relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China appeared to be entering the 1990s in an unsurpassed condition of cooperation and lowered tensions. However, the Tiananmen massacre severely altered U.S.-P.R.C. relations. Moreover, if the communist regimes fail to reform, lose political legitimacy, and rely solely on the terror of tyranny to maintain power, the contradictions between free and closed societies may increase global tensions. In this context, United States-U.S.S.R./P.R.C. relations do not have the vital economic interdependence, similar dependence on the existing international system, nor complementary security interests found between the United States and Japan. As the Cold War has proven, the United States has been able to prosper without friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., P.R.C., or both. In fact, Beijing's volte face on Marxist ideology regarding economics, and Moscow's reversal on class struggle, shows the converse to be true. However, it remains to be seen if the United States and Japan can prosper with a "Cold War" between themselves. Considering the importance of United States-Japanese relations and uncertainty of reform after Deng and Gorbachev, an entente between the P.R.C.-U.S.S.R. directed at Tokyo should foster a U.S. response of support for Japan. Until

opposing Japanese militarism.

¹⁰⁸Ivan Glebov, "For New International Relations in Asia and the Pacific," International Affairs (Moscow), October 1987, p. 29.

U.S. and Japanese interests differ on a scale similar to United States-P.R.C./U.S.S.R. interests, Washington and Tokyo will remain strong allies.¹⁰⁹

General Secretary Gorbachev has pushed his "new thinking" into every area of the globe, appearing to make concessions showing the sincerity of Soviet policy. Soviet diplomats cross the globe with a willingness to directly negotiate differences. With one exception, Gorbachev has conducted personal diplomacy with every major world power after the Sino-Soviet summit. Somehow, Japan remains outside the "new thinking" agenda.¹¹⁰ Meetings between Foreign Ministers Shevardnaze and Uno in December 1988 ended with little accomplished except the reaffirmation that neither side will move on the Kurile issue.¹¹¹ Instead, the Soviet preference is to increase economic cooperation and trade now, removing the Kuriles as the first issue to be resolved.¹¹² Gorbachev's Asian speeches in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, and Beijing failed to mention the dispute over the islands. However, a return of the Northern Territories to Japan is possible and

¹⁰⁹Olsen, previously cited, p. 12. Prof. Olsen remarked, concerning US-PRC strategic alignment, that "China can be a useful adjunct for the US and its Allies, but-as long as it remains poor and adheres to any variant of Marxism-it cannot play roles comparable to those Japan can fill."

¹¹⁰While the General Secretary of the CPSU has a standing invitation to visit Japan, it is unlikely Gorbachov will go without providing a resolution to the Kurile issue.

¹¹¹"They Ran Aground on the Usual Isles," The Economist, 24 December 1988, p. 44. Moscow did agree to press the D.P.R.K. to release two Japanese sailors detained since 1983 and allow limited visitation rights for some Japanese in the Kuriles.

¹¹²Mikhail Kapitsa and Konstanin Sarkisov, "Promoting Bilateral Relations," Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), No. 4, 1988, p. 63. Referring to a recent Japanese-Soviet symposium, Kapitsa stated, "old political thinking made itself evident when discussions centered on bilateral issues, especially the so-called 'territorial problem'." Sarkisov believes "the U.S.S.R. and Japan should orient themselves to setting up joint ventures." Kapitsa is Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, while Sarkisov is the Head of the Japanese Department.

will be discussed later. Still, the Soviets do not appear to be willing to negotiate the issue as the 1980s come to a close. This is very peculiar since Japan is expected to provide most of the technological expertise and investment required to develop Soviet Far Eastern projects. To consider the matter settled and beyond discussion contrasts with Moscow's bending over backward to remove the "three obstacles" that had restrained better relations with Beijing. As in Europe, Moscow is withdrawing troops in Mongolia to underscore Soviet "sincerity."¹³ Does the Kremlin believe development of Siberia as a powerful economic entity in Asia will come from P.R.C. capital and technology? Why won't the Soviets return some of the islands now and promise future negotiations on the remainder? Clearly, the economic benefit would be substantial. Japanese joint ventures and technological aid could ensure that development of the Soviet Far East would not lag behind the development of the Russian heartland. Considering that the Soviets were just on the verge of offering just such a proposition to Japan in 1956 (partial return), but refuse to do so now in the age of "new thinking," reveals a perceived strategic high cost far outweighing potential economic advantages.¹⁴ While traditional Russian concerns over safe passage of SLOCs were based in logistical strategy, modern strategic nuclear policy has placed a new, higher interest on the Kurile Island chain as a guarantor of safe passage. The military significance of the islands increased so much they have been vital to Soviet security during the 1980s.

¹³FEER, 16 March 1989, p. 14.

¹⁴Leszek Buszynski, "International Linkages and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1988, p. 231.

A. MILITARY VALUE OF THE KURILE ISLANDS

A solution to the dispute over the islands becomes more remote as the military value of the territory increases. As previously stated, there has always been an inherent Russian concern over safe passage out of the waters of the Sea of Japan. Today, traditional interests are reinforced by the role of nuclear strategy in defense of the Soviet Union. The strategic military value of the Kuriles is derived from the importance of maintaining secure areas of operation for Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Nuclear strategy is extremely complex, but the central notion of nuclear deterrence is to possess adequate nuclear forces to deter attack. In order to maintain adequate nuclear forces, they must be deployed in such a manner that an incoming first strike will not diminish their number to such a level that enough strike forces to threaten "unacceptable" damage does not remain. In other words, after receiving a first strike there must be enough nuclear weapons left to administer sufficient retaliation so that an opponent would not rationally strike first--without risking unacceptable retaliation.¹¹⁵ This is a central part of nuclear deterrence. Survivability is one key to a credible nuclear deterrence, and SSBNs are considered the most survivable delivery system due to the difficulty in finding and targeting them. Soviet SSBNs are a primary

¹¹⁵Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 165-175 contain theory on Soviet SSBNs as a strategic reserve providing war-termination on favorable terms to the USSR during a global conventional war. Strategic reserve is an additional role for SSBNs complementing the traditional deterrent role.

part of Soviet deterrence.¹¹⁶ If they are vulnerable, then Soviet nuclear deterrence strategy comes into question and the Soviet Union's national security is threatened.

In 1978 the Soviets commenced deployment of Delta I-class SSBNs in the Far East. Unlike the earlier Yankee, Hotel, and Golf-classes, the Delta I nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles have sufficient range to reach targets in most of the United States from the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. Nine Delta I SSBNs have been augmented by eight newer Delta III SSBNs in the Soviet Far East. Nine Yankee SSBNs and six lesser-range Golf SSBs (nonnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) are also deployed in the Far East. The latter class remains in Vladivostok, their importance increased after completion of the INF treaty. After the removal of SS-20s from the Soviet Far East, Soviet SSBs remain a direct threat to cities and military installations in Japan. The SSBNs are primarily stationed in Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula, but three or four may be in Vladivostok.¹¹⁷

With regard to SSBNs, theories on Soviet nuclear strategy options during a global war are numerous. A major hypothesis contends that the Soviets desire a safe sanctuary for their SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan.¹¹⁸ Other theorists believe the vast number of Soviet submarines deployed in the area will require some of them to

¹¹⁶Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (New York, N.Y.: St. Martins, 1987), see pp. 217-221 for critical role of SSBNs in strategic nuclear strategy.

¹¹⁷Derek da Cunha, "The Growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force," International Defense Review, 2/1988, pp. 127, 128.

¹¹⁸U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 48

break out of the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk to relieve congestion.¹¹⁹ No matter which theory is correct, bastion or break out, or a combination of the two, the straits around Japan and the Kuriles are of strategic significance to the U.S.S.R., United States, and Japan.¹²⁰

If the Northern Territories are returned to Japan one-third of the Kurile island chain leading to Petropavlovsk will leave Soviet control. Besides the straits "locking up" the Sea of Japan, the Kuriles are the keys to "lock up" the Sea of Okhotsk. The primary military reason for the Soviets to maintain control of the islands is to control entrance and exit to the sanctuary of their primary nuclear counterforce/strategic reserve. Without control of access or exit, opposing attack nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) may be able to hunt SSBNs like "fish in a barrel." The Sea of Okhotsk may be a big "barrel," but in relation to the Pacific, detecting SSBNs may be relatively easier. Soviet ability to mine the Kurile strait, if sovereignty of the Northern Territories is returned to Japan, would be contingent on control of the Soya strait. Also, Petropavlovsk is not constrained by any strait blockade, but it is constrained by possible resource denial if the straits "locking up" the Sea of Japan are closed.¹²¹ Soviet

¹¹⁹Capt. Richard Sharpe, ed., in forward, Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89 (London, England:Jane's Publishing Ltd.), 1988, p. 111.

¹²⁰Soviet Military Power 1988, previously cited, p. 123, points out the strategic significance of Japan and the Kuriles. In a global war, the Soviets may intend to conduct "sea control" in the waters around Japan to defend their SSBN sanctuaries. Such actions would have unknown consequences regarding Japanese maritime commerce.

¹²¹There are no pipelines or railroads leading to Kamchatka from Siberia. Thus, supplies required to sustain Soviet naval forces there, i.e. SSBNs, are highly dependent on safe passage from the Maritime Provinces.

occupation of the Northern Territories enhances an ability to secure the Soya strait if required during conflict. The eastern "flank" of the strait is already secured via occupation of the disputed islands. Without the Northern Territories, this ability is not only diminished, but increases the ability of an opponent to close the strait. If an opponent of the Soviet Union deployed cruise missiles, aircraft, and anti-submarine helicopters in the Northern Territories, exit from the Sea of Japan would be in jeopardy and security of the Sea of Okhotsk could become more difficult.¹²² This would have vital implications for Soviet strategic nuclear policy.

Soviet nuclear deterrence in general, and strategic reserve in particular, could face a disturbing disruption of the status quo if the Northern Territories were returned to Japan. Without all of the Kuriles, the U.S.S.R. must be able to guarantee safe passage to Petropavlosk without threat of blockade in the Soya strait. Additionally, the Soviets must still be able to control the whole Kurile chain protecting their SSBN force in the Sea of Okhotsk. To rely only on the Sea of Japan as a bastion may induce congestion of SSBN operating areas. Perhaps the Soviets could make a guarantee of safe passage in the 1970s. However, growing Japanese conventional ability in the 1990s makes future certainty of strait control by the Soviets unpredictable. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. may try to enhance security of Sakhalin and Kamchatka by political means, discussed later.

¹²²John O'Connell, "Strategic Implications of the Japanese SSM-1 Cruise Missile," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1987. The former U.S. Naval Attache to Japan points out the navigable waters of the vital straits are within SSM-1 range. With this missile deployed on the Northern Territories, vessels in the Sea of Okhotsk can be targeted. Future Japanese missiles may double or triple the SSM-1 range.

Soviet-Japanese relations have become more strained by Japan's so-called role in the U.S. maritime strategy.¹²³ This strategy intends to threaten Soviet bases in the Far East and attack Soviet SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk/Sea of Japan during a global war, i.e., a war in Europe. The former action is intended to open a second front on the Soviets, denying resupply for the central front in Europe, while the latter is to provide war termination on favorable terms by altering the nuclear correlation of forces.¹²⁴ Japan has agreed to mine the straits during an emergency denying Soviet access to the Pacific.¹²⁵ The possibility of mining the straits is very real since they are relatively shallow and not very wide.¹²⁶ Conflict in the Persian Gulf revealed that dedicated minelayers are not necessary to create a mine field. The Soviets may prefer, however, to do defensive mining themselves so they can control entrance and exit to the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okostok. Control over all of the Kuriles is required to create an effective mine barrier. Certainly, the U.S.S.R. believes a Japanese defense policy of locking up the straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya endangers their national

¹²³see Konstantin Deribas, "New Leaders in Tokyo," International Affairs (Moscow), March 1988, pp. 81-85 for Soviet concerns over Japan and the maritime strategy. The Soviets state Japan has an offensive role against Russia during the execution of the Maritime Strategy.

¹²⁴U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, January 1986.

¹²⁵Chalmers Johnson, "Reclining Dragon on a Free Ride?" Speaking of Japan, December 1986, pp. 30, 31.

¹²⁶Daniel I. Gallagher, Sealane Defense: Japanese Capabilities and Imperatives, Master's Thesis (Monterey, California, Naval Post Graduate School), December 1987, p. 83 contains an excellent account on mines necessary to blockade the straits.

interest.¹²⁷ To enhance security of the straits, the Soviets have increased their amphibious lift capability in the Far East and reinforced their forces in the Kuriles.¹²⁸ Despite Soviet increases in military force at or near the Kuriles, Japan's decision to mine the straits in an emergency is not viewed by the Soviets as an action of inherent Japanese interest. Instead, it is simply seen as following the dictates of U.S. global security strategy.¹²⁹

B. PROSPECTS FOR JAPANESE-SOVIET RIVALRY

Japan's geographic position is a Soviet security nightmare if that nation is hostile to Soviet interests; but conversely, it is a potential economic asset if relations are normal and trade extends across the Sea of Japan. Resource rich, but lacking in capital, technology, and labor, the Soviet Far East has been touted as a logical

¹²⁷Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 18 July 1988, pp. 26, 27. Colonel General V.N. Lobov expressed concern over US-Japanese military cooperation and a concept of an air-land operation to seize the Kurile islands and Sakhalin. Furthermore, he stated "we cannot underestimate the danger of this naval might close to our borders in the Far East."

¹²⁸Dereck da Chunha, "Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific," Armed Forces, October 1988, pp. 446-450. SNI doubled from 4,000 to 8,000 men in the Far East during this decade, while amphibious lift more than doubled during the same period. Primary mission of these "Soviet marines" in conflict would be to secure critical positions in northern Hokkaido near the Soya strait, preparing the way for the Red Army. To arrive quickly, with supporting armor, the Soviets have increased their hovercrafts from twelve to twenty-four in ten years. They can move 2,000 troops to Hokkaido in thirty minutes from Sakhalin. Four hundred SNI are stationed in Etorofu, where ground support aircraft have also been deployed.

¹²⁹Alexander Vorontsov, "Dangerous Geometry," Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), No. 4, 1987. Vorontsov repeats Gorbachev's Vladivostok statement declaring a "militarized Washington-Tokyo-Seoul 'triangle' is taking shape" under U.S. pressure. According to Mr. Vorontsov, Japan has developed an offensive military capability, and the U.S. desires Japan to supplement U.S. strikes on the Soviet Union during the execution of the Maritime Strategy.

economic match for Northeast Asia. The Soviets envision Siberian exports to resource-poor Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Asia in exchange for technology transfers and high quality goods. The U.S.S.R. has attempted to enter Asian economic and financial institutions to supply the capital for this goal.¹³⁰

Transportation to the Soviet heartland of valuable Far Eastern resources is still very dependent on ship-borne cargo since the Trans-Siberian, and recently completed Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), are insufficient and overworked. BAM is not expected to be fully operational until the mid-1990s. Also, since they are the only two overland sources of transportation of resources between Siberia and the Soviet heartland, they are prime targets during a potential conflict. Within the U.S.S.R., Siberia and the Soviet Far East comprise fifty-seven percent of the land, three quarters of fuel and energy resources, and half of Soviet industrial raw materials and forest resources.¹³¹ The Soviet Far East could almost become like the Kamchatka peninsula-a virtual island when it comes to supply-if these railroads are destroyed. Therefore, the Soviets still are concerned with safe passage of resources in and out of the Soviet Far East by sea lanes of communications.¹³² If the Soviet Far East is to develop into a real economic

¹³⁰Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, ed., Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments (New York, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988), Chapters Five and Seven point out Soviet economic desires in Asia.

¹³¹Satoshi Takayama, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan Quarterly, Summer 1988, p. 134. Mr. Takayama believes as development efforts shift to Siberia and the Soviet Far East region, the relative political weight of Japan, closer geographically, increases.

¹³²Seth Cropsey, "The Bear Facts," National Review, 5 June 1987, p. 28. The former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy stated, "nearly all fuel, supplies and other material support for the Soviet's remote Asian-based forces must be transported, at great cost, across half the globe."

Asian power, as stated in Gorbachov's Vladivostok speech, then concern over supplying resources and finished goods to and from the area will increase Soviet concerns over secure SLOC passage. Soviet control of the disputed islands in the Kuriles has enhanced safe passage out of the Sea of Japan.

Japan's growing military power may make Soviet military security of safe passage in time of war increasingly difficult during the 1990s. Instead, Moscow may attempt to achieve security of Soviet SLOCs by political means. Japan's economic and rising political-military power and influence is of central importance to the Soviet concept of an Asian forum to create "a comprehensive system of international security in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR)."¹³³ The broad theme of Soviet "new thinking" concerning security affairs depends on the premise that offensive warfare is no longer viable in the nuclear age. It appears that Gorbachev is trying to refute Clausewitz's dictum that "war is politics by other means."¹³⁴ According to Gorbachev, offensive strategy is counterproductive leading to an arms race, and should therefore be replaced with a strategy of "reasonable sufficiency." A nation will supposedly increase its security by embracing a strategy that relies on defensive warfare and maintains only enough forces sufficient for defense. This "reasonable sufficiency" is to be guaranteed by "confidence building" measures of dual verification, force structure reduction, and limitations on force deployment, i.e., tactical and nuclear weapons. To accept

¹³³Kapista asserted in his Asia and Africa Today interview, previously cited, p. 62, that "the system of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific is inconceivable without a highly developed system of Soviet-Japanese relations." (Author's emphasis)

¹³⁴Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York, N.Y.:Harper and Row, 1987), p. 141.

Gorbachev's proposals one must also accept his basic premise-that offensive warfare is no longer possible in the nuclear age. This theory is not unique to President Gorbachev. The idea that nuclear war cannot serve political goals was the primary reason a flexible response strategy was created.¹³⁵ Even with sufficient flexibility to respond conventionally without escalation into an all-out nuclear war, many in the West believe any offensive war will become unmanageable. In a historical context, the idea that war is obsolete is not novel. Gorbachev's viewpoints on reasonable sufficiency and war certainly must bring to mind the efforts of the Kellog-Briand Pact and the Washington Conference to outlaw or reduce the prospects of war during the 1920s. The nations which eventually violated these treaties were not the Democracies. Clausewitz's axiom has not been rejected en toto by leading Soviet military figures.¹³⁶ Continued Soviet military aid to Nicaragua, then funneled to the F.M.L.N. in El Salvador, is nothing less than "politics by other means." In this context, Japan considers Soviet proposals for comprehensive security.

The Soviet comprehensive security system is divided into economic, political, and military spheres. In Asia, the economic sphere consists of Moscow's desires to gain access to financial institutions, removal of economic barriers, and multilateral cooperation to carry out regional programs and projects. In the political sphere, an Asia-Pacific forum would concentrate on lowering the risk of nuclear war, i.e., establish nuclear free zones. To relax tensions and settle regional contradictions, the

¹³⁵Gaddis, previously cited, p. 214.

¹³⁶Juviler and Kimura, previously cited, p. 138, quotes Marshal Sokolov as saying "World War in the nuclear-cosmic era has outlived itself," implying there are other wars that do not necessarily develop into World War.

Kremlin emphasizes the Bandung and Pancha Silla principles of nonaggression, respect for territorial boundaries, and noninterference in internal affairs of other nations. Finally, in the military sphere, limitations on naval activities in the busiest sea lanes, class of vessels (anti-submarine and major classes), and similar "confidence building" measures.¹³⁷

The Soviets have traditionally desired to decouple the U.S. military presence from Asia, as in Europe. After the opening of the Iron Curtain, this Soviet strategy appears to be in a stage of transformation. For example, in Europe, the fear of a unified Germany has lead to the Soviets to call for a continuation of NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances. Perhaps in Asia, Soviet fears of a conventionally powerful Japan in the 1990s may also lead to a call for a continued U.S. military presence in North East Asia as a counter to possible Japanese military expansionism. Nevertheless, current Soviet strategy prefers to separate the United States and Japan in security efforts.¹³⁸ Playing on Japanese public opinion, Gorbachev has stated a desire to convene a regional conference in Hiroshima to establish nuclear free zones in the APR. The Soviet ideal would have nuclear free zones in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and Korean peninsula. Soviet Far Eastern nuclear weapons, besides SS-20s removed by the

¹³⁷Mikhail L. Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1988, pp. 55-69.

¹³⁸Julive, and Kimura, previously cited, p. 155, quotes Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech declaring, "The Soviet Union is a convinced advocate of disbanding the military groupings, renouncing the possession of military bases in Asia...and withdrawing troops from the territories of other countries."

INF treaty, are not included since they are claimed to be for defensive purpose only.¹³⁹ Soviet talk of nuclear free zones has not been followed with appropriate deeds in the APR. During a 1987 Merdeka newspaper interview Gorbachev announced the Soviets would not increase the number of nuclear-weapons-carrying aircraft in Asia.¹⁴⁰ This pledge was expanded by Gorbachev, during his Krasnoyarsk speech of 1 September 1988, to include any type of nuclear weapons in the region.¹⁴¹ Therefore, no Blackjack bombers, or new SSBNs should have entered the APR since the pledge. However, Japan's Defense Agency has reported that the Soviets have deployed in the Soviet Far East additional Akula-class submarines (supposedly capable of carrying strategic cruise missiles) and a new Delta III ballistic missile submarine since Gorbachev's pledge.¹⁴² Also, Moscow at first refused to accept "global double zero" and stated that the INF would not include Far Eastern SS-20s.¹⁴³ A determined effort by the Reagan Administration negotiated the removal of SS-20s from Asia, to the enhancement of security for Japan and the P.R.C.. The Soviets consider it a major concession.

¹³⁹Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech defended SS-20 deployment in Asia, saying there was no reason for any Asian to be concerned since the Soviet missiles were strictly defensive.

¹⁴⁰Titarenko, previously cited, p. 60.

¹⁴¹U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, April 1989, p. 14.

¹⁴²Dennis Warner, "No Change in Soviet Military Buildup," Pacific Defense Reporter, March 1989, pp. 40-41. CINCPACFLT, ADM. Jeremiah, commented in Proceedings, April 1989, p. 14, about the significance of this broken promise.

¹⁴³Herbert Y.Schandler, "Arms Control in Northeast Asia," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987. Mr. Schandler believed there would be difficulty in meeting PRC/Japanese security concerns regarding the SS-20 in Asia during the INF negotiations.

Moscow's confidence building measures limiting naval ships near international straits, e.g. Malacca, limitations on anti-submarine warfare vessels in the Indian ocean, and withdrawal of nuclear weapons-carrying vessels from prescribed areas, e.g. Southeast Asia, contrast to European conventional force reduction talks. The Soviet approach in the APR is primarily concerned with naval forces.¹⁴⁴ Such an agreement, under the banner of an Asian Security Conference, would remove the United States ability to respond quickly to any military threat to the SLOCs of Asia. The United States could find itself in a security position similar to the period of the "open door" policy. Without military presence in Asia, the United States must rely on treaties to promote national interest. If such agreements are violated, and written agreements become mere scraps of paper, the United States may have the "open door" shut. U.S. naval forces would then be required to fight their way across the Pacific. This lesson of World War II, regarding U.S. security interests in Asia, still applies. For this very reason, the United States has insisted on excluding naval forces in CFE negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviets have proposed to play a role in sea lane protection.¹⁴⁵ Besides commerce, Middle Eastern oil enroute to Japan and the Four Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong would be forced to fend for themselves if the United States is decoupled from Asian SLOC security. Simply removing naval

¹⁴⁴Titarenko, previously cited, p. 58.

¹⁴⁵see Armacost, Current Policy, previously cited. The Soviets made similar proposals concerning the Persian Gulf. Despite criticizing US escorting of reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers and presence in the Gulf, Soviet combatants were in the Gulf escorting Soviet merchants carrying military equipment bound for Iraq. In fact, the Soviets transported Kuwaiti oil prior to US reflagging. Their first escort also struck an Iranian mine.

forces from the sea lanes does not remove the threat from ashore, be it piracy in Malacca or Soviet Backfire bombers from Soviet Central Asia.

U.S. Navy carrier battle group presence in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea prevents Soviet land-based aviation, such as Backfire bombers, from attacking targets of opportunity in the Hormuz and Malaccan straits without significant risk. Without U.S. naval presence, aerial mining of these straits, by the Soviets, could severely restrict critical energy supply to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Until success of Soviet reforms has been ascertained, to withdraw U.S. naval forces in favor of "zones of peace" appears to place U.S. and allied national security interests at unnecessary risk.

Soviet statements on comprehensive security in the APR make much talk of the need for naval limitations, but there is no mention of limiting land based naval aviation which is very capable of interdicting the sea lanes Asia depends upon. Despite legitimate, traditional concerns over Far Eastern SLOC security, Soviet rhetoric is not in line with offensive capabilities.¹⁴⁶ Ever since Vasco de Gama arrived in the Orient, trade over the SLOCs there has been protected by navies. First the Portuguese and Dutch, then the British. Now the United States protects sea lanes, and the general principle of freedom of the seas on behalf of others. The current international system of free trade relies on unhindered SLOCs-protected from harm by the traditional presence role of naval forces. However, the Soviets feel that the nations of Asia can only achieve comprehensive security when the United States reduces or limits naval

¹⁴⁶see ADM Jeremiah's assessment of Soviet rhetoric and capabilities in Proceedings, previously cited.

forces in the APR, leaving only the Soviets with long-range conventional power projection capabilities in the area. Can the nations of Asia, especially Japan, so heavily dependent on resources and exports transported over sea lanes, rely on a reasonable sufficiency which leaves only the Soviets with offensive projection capabilities in the area? President Reagan remarked that the United States must "continue to judge the Soviets by their actions, rather than their words, and found our national security strategy on a realistic view of Soviet aims and capabilities."¹⁴⁷ Likewise, Prime Minister Takeshita remarked that "perestroika has no visible effects in Asia." Because the Soviet government relies on a political party and not institutions with the rule of law, perhaps Soviet good intentions may change with new leadership.¹⁴⁸ Events in China highlight the contradictions between dictatorship and institutions. Since no one can predict the outcome of glasnost and perestroika, the Bush administration has emphasized a cautious approach in dealing with the Soviets while supporting perestroika. The Soviets themselves did not know if their reforms will succeed, and for this very reason it would seem prudent for the Western world to "keep the powder dry." Likewise, it is highly unlikely given historical animosity and traditional security concerns that Japan

¹⁴⁷Reagan, previously cited, p. V, preface.

¹⁴⁸Asada, previously cited. Mr. Asada points out on p. 495 that in 1969 Brezhnev proposed an Asian Security Conference in the context of a "Collective Security" system in Asia. Brezhnev revised his views on an ASC in 1972 which included principles of "renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders." Afghanistan, of course, discredited Brezhnev's ASC concept.

will depend on a Soviet concept of regional security that seeks to remove U.S. forces from Northeast Asia.¹⁴⁹

Soviets desires to promote regional security by joint Japanese-Soviet economic efforts may be accepted by Japan, however, as long as Soviet military capability remains to threaten Japan's SLOCs, Moscow's intentions will continue to be scrutinized by Tokyo. Therefore, Soviet "peace objectives" in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian SLOCs are a legitimate security threat to Japan if Gorbachev's proposals are accepted by a regional conference, Soviet military capabilities remain, and the U.S. forward deployed forces, especially naval, are decoupled from Asian security. A retreat of U.S. naval presence in Asia would diminish the credibility of existing U.S. security treaties and obligations. For example, the U.S. would be unable to comply with security arrangements, i.e., South Korea and the Taiwan Relations Act, in sufficient time to assist allies during the critical first week of conflict if U.S. naval forces had to transit across the Pacific.

Yasuhiro Nakasone has stated that if the Soviets are sincere about becoming a Pacific power, their military force levels in Asia must decline.¹⁵⁰ No doubt the ex-Prime Minister was alluding not only to the Soviet military build-up threatening Asia, but also the structural imbalance within the Soviet Far East. Siberia and the Maritime Provinces remain little more than military outposts as industry, cultural and civilian enterprises lag far behind. Perhaps this is why seven out of ten Russians moving to the

¹⁴⁹Juviler and Kimura, previously cited, pp. 164, 165.

¹⁵⁰Yomiuri Shimbun, 7 August 1988, p. 2 in "Daily Summary of Japanese Press," American Embassy, Tokyo, 17 August 1988.

Soviet Far East leave the area within three years.¹⁵¹ Asians would certainly feel more secure if Vladivostok became an open city for more than a week and not merely a naval port for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. If the Soviets actually reduce their offensive capabilities, especially land-based naval aviation which threaten SLOC security, the Cold War in Asia may finally come to a close. Only until the military forces of both East and West have become decoupled as a threat to each other's security will military capability no longer remain a primary determinate in major power relations.

The Soviets may attempt to politically decouple Japan from the United States by offering all, or some, of the Northern Territories in exchange for increased trade and joint ventures.¹⁵² However, Moscow must continue the guarantee of safe passage, especially to Petropavlosk, after such a diplomatic move. Also, a political arrangement would need to reduce Japanese military capabilities of the 1990s. The Soviets would prefer a demilitarized Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, or at least naval restrictions in the area, prior to a conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.¹⁵³ Due to the nature of Soviet Pacific naval force structure, discussed later, very large reductions of up to fifty percent may be offered by Gorbachev to induce Japan to make a deal on the Northern Territories. Such a diplomatic move may be well received by the Japanese population at large. With the Northern Territories returned to Japan and the U.S.S.R.'s maritime

¹⁵¹The Economist, 15 October 1988, p. 42.

¹⁵²Sato, previously cited, p. 40, remarked that the "growing strategic value of the Sea of Okhotsk makes it highly unlikely that Moscow will move in that direction."

¹⁵³Asada, previously cited, wisely commented in p. 505 that "arms control measures between any two of the three (PRC, USSR, and Japan) may jeopardize their respective security positions vis-a-vis the third state."

force structure reduction completed, the Soviets would certainly desire an economic quid pro quo. Japan may agree to increase economic ventures and accept confidence building measures with the Soviets, especially if excessive U.S. protectionism forces Japan to seek additional markets. In such a case, Japanese-Soviet relations would reach an unprecedented level of cooperation and trust. This scenario tends to follow the general lowering of East-West tensions, in favor of mutual cooperation. The United States would probably concur with such a move as long as it follows an incremental process, just as it has supported East-West European trends, and if it appears perestroika and glasnost are succeeding. Any sign of Soviet revisionism into a hard-line regime would naturally alter East-West relations, including Japanese-Soviet relations.

Japan may choose to meet the Soviets half-way in a Kuriles resolution. For example, it is unlikely the Japanese will accept the islands with demilitarization strings attached.¹⁵⁴ Japan knows the Soviets are dealing from a position of economic weakness, and while economic ventures may be provided by Japan in exchange for the islands, would Japan limit defense structure based solely on Japanese-Soviet relations? Japan's concern over the Korean peninsula, and a declining U.S. presence in the Western Pacific due to financial restraints, is also a part of Japanese security planning. The Soviets appear to be cutting defense expenditures regardless of what Japan does. While Soviet economic failure threatens to decrease Soviet military power, Japan's economic success can provide a dramatic increase in Japanese military power. At only three

¹⁵⁴Ito, previously cited, p. 38, points out the Japanese government favors the iriguchi-ron (the entrance theory), which states the territorial issue should be at the entrance of Japanese-Soviet relations, with other issues, i.e. economic, to follow.

percent GNP defense spending, \$90-120 billion in the 1990s, Japan could be a conventional equal to any power in the region. If it were to choose, it could also maintain as many nuclear weapons in the region as any other country. Sato Seizaburo, commenting on military power and its link with economic power, stated:

...an ambitious challenger...will voluntarily limit the growth of its military only when it judges itself powerful enough or when financial constraints preclude further spending. Such a challenger is likely to cooperate in arms limitation talks only when it judges that this will not be to its detriment and that failure to cooperate will put it at a disadvantage relative to its richer opponents. Exactly these considerations were what convinced Japan to accept a 1922 treaty limiting naval power at the time of the famous Washington Conference.¹⁵⁵

The Soviet Union, not Japan, fits Mr. Sato's description of an ambitious challenger. While Japanese acceptance of Soviet offering of demilitarization in exchange for the islands would lower tensions between the two nations, Japan's conservative leadership (LDP) may be more concerned with the long-range implications of a economically strong Soviet Far East. Japan's defense structure should also be viewed in the context of a nation heavily dependent on overseas resources and markets, in addition to an estimated \$1 trillion invested overseas by 1995. Japan's growing economic power will mean a growing Japanese national interest in overseas areas. In other words, the more Japan has to gain, the more it has to lose, and protection of economic assets is a historical justification for strengthening defense forces. Japan's consistent increases in defense expenditure reflect this interest. Therefore, Japanese

¹⁵⁵Sato, previously cited, pp. 68, 69.

acceptance of demilitarization or naval limitations in the area regarding the Kuriles may not last long after the transfer of sovereignty.¹⁵⁶

The Recruit scandal, the forced resignations of Prime Ministers Takeshita and Uno, and a very unpopular consumption tax, portends a possible shift away from conservative-dominated government in Japan. A lower-house victory by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) in the Diet during the 1990 election, matching their upper-house victory in 1989, could have immense implications for Japanese relations with the United States and Soviet Union in the security sphere. The JSP, like all other Japanese political parties, including the Japanese Communist Party, insists on a return of the Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty.¹⁵⁷ However, the traditional "unarmed neutrality" stance of former JSP Chairman Isihibashi Masashi, that gained public support in the 1970s, seems inappropriate for the 1990s.¹⁵⁸ In 1986 Takako Doi was selected as the Chairwoman of the JSP and began to formulate a viable alternative to the conservative LDP, which has virtually controlled the Diet since World War II. Ms. Doi places U.S.-Japanese relations as top priority and recommends that the security treaty and defense forces be accepted on "defense only" and Japan continue the one percent GNP limit on defense spending.¹⁵⁹ If the JSP attains a majority in the lower house, Japan's defense spending may return to below one percent GNP. Also, Doi

¹⁵⁶The Economist, 24 December 1988, previously cited, points out that Japan is in no rush to do business with the USSR after experiencing difficulty in economic relations with the PRC in the midst of economic reforms. Also Siberia's natural resources are in less demand by Japan than during the 1970s.

¹⁵⁷Ito, previously cited, p. 36.

¹⁵⁸Sato, previously cited, p. 63.

¹⁵⁹Endicott, previously cited, pp. 48, 49.

would be more inclined to accept "demilitarization" of the Northern Territory area in exchange for the islands. However, the JSP may find immense opposition from Japan's powerful bureaucrats.¹⁶⁰ It remains to be seen, even after unprecedented LDP political failures, whether the JSP can break the public's personal loyalties to the LDP, no matter the candidate or issue, and become the first non-conservative party in decades to gain power in Japan. This political phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Without resolution of the Kuriles issue the possibility of future antagonism between Japan and the U.S.S.R. remains. If Japan continues development of conventional military power the potential for friction increases with a Soviet perception of rising risk to Far Eastern security. The importance of Japanese military strength in the 1990s to U.S. security interest in Asia will be addressed in Chapter Five. If a well-armed Japan assumes an international/regional role commensurate with Japanese economic power, Japanese-Soviet relations may proceed from bad to worse.¹⁶¹ Japan's consistent increases in defensive spending, in conjunction with possible reductions in military expenditures in the U.S.S.R. by Gorbachev in the next decade, may narrow the military gap between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Similar events occurred between Japan and the P.R.C. in the 1980s.

¹⁶⁰Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p.73 mentions that "the collusion of the industrial-bureaucrats behind the merger of the conservatives into the LDP, and the symbiotic relationship of the ruling party with the ruling elite that had served in the pre-war and war time bureaucracy, indicated to the realists among the Japanese left that there was very little if any chance that alternative political forces would ever be allowed to take over."

¹⁶¹The firing of warning shots at Soviet aircraft by Japan indicates the potential for hostilities on a low-intensity scale.

III. SOVIET FAR EAST AND JAPANESE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

Soviet military power in the Far East has increased dramatically in the last two decades. However, this increase has not occurred in a vacuum, Japan has also modernized her Self-Defense Forces (SDF). By comparing each respective conventional force (ground, sea and air) a "modernization gap" appears to be emerging in the maritime balance between the SDF and Soviet Far East Forces. Indeed, in the areas where high technology is critical, Japan is superior not only in quality but also quantity. Since sufficient military capability is harder to accumulate than redirecting political intentions, this may have a profound impact on future Japanese-Soviet relations in the next decade, especially concerning the Northern Territories.

A. SOVIET-JAPANESE GROUND FORCES

Today Soviet Far Eastern ground forces stand 500,000 strong. The Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (Teatr Voennykh Deistvii TVD) consists of fifty-seven divisions, 14,900 tanks, 17,500 armored personnel carriers, and 13,700 pieces of artillery. These ground forces are deployed from Tashkent to Petropavlosk, mostly along the P.R.C. border. Four Districts (MDs) are situated within the TVD. The Far Eastern TVD has direct responsibility of defending the Maritime Provinces, while the Far Eastern MD provides the TVD commander with the forces he will fight with. The adjacent MD (Transbaykal) is headquartered in Chita, some 1,200 miles from

Sovetskaya Gavan.¹⁶² Gorbachev's unilateral reductions in Soviet forces announced at the U.N. reportedly allocate 200,000 of the 500,000 troop cuts to the Far Eastern theater.

The Far Eastern MD, headquartered in Khabarovsk, hosts two tank, twenty-two motor rifle, and one coastal defense divisions, plus two artillery and one air assault brigade and some six hundred and seventy supporting helicopters. This is slightly less than half of the total TVD force. Additionally, the Far Eastern MD deploys at least half of the two hundred and twenty-five Frog, eighty-plus Scud, and forty SS-12 surface to surface missiles (SSMs) in TVD inventory.¹⁶³ Some missiles of these types were used in the Iran-Iraq "war of the cities" and are a definite threat to some Japanese population centers.¹⁶⁴

Moscow has indicated an intention to reduce 120,000 troops from the TVD along the Chinese border. This reduction was formalized during the Deng-Gorbachev meeting.¹⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the Soviets have more than sufficient forces to meet any conceivable ground threat from the P.R.C. or Japan. In the former case, the P.R.C. numerical advantages are offset by vastly superior Soviet military technology and

¹⁶²Soviet Military Power 1988, previously cited, p. 15. Four Divisions are to be withdrawn from Mongolia, reducing total TVD ground forces to fifty-three divisions.

¹⁶³The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 44.

¹⁶⁴Distance between Teheran and Baghdad is approximately equal the distance across the Sea of Japan.

¹⁶⁵FEER, 25 May 1989, p. 13. Gorbachev also declared an intention to remove eleven air force regiments and sixteen warships from the Far East.

nuclear superiority, while Japan has a relatively small ground force.¹⁶⁶ Comparing the Soviet's nuclear superiority over Japan's conventional forces will not be discussed since that nation relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, given Japan's wealth, nuclear expertise, and nuclear material processing ability from domestic nuclear power plants, it should be mentioned that Japan could develop a nuclear weapons capability, if it perceived it to be necessary for the national interest, quicker than any other non-nuclear power in the world. The Constitutionality of possessing nuclear weapons will be addressed in Chapter Four.

The Sea of Japan protects the archipelago from invasion from the continent much the same way the English channel held the armies of Napoleon and Hitler at bay for the British. It would be a difficult, if not impossible, task for the Soviets to invade and occupy all the islands of Japan. The terrain of the archipelago reduces mobile armor advantages, and the Soviet's amphibious capabilities are insufficient to transport the required personnel to subdue all the islands.¹⁶⁷ An invasion of Hokkaido, however, is much more feasible. It is less populated than the other islands, and the Soviets would only need to maintain control of the northern periphery to guarantee passage through the Soya strait. This scenario in a conventional war between Japan and Russia is given increased credence by the Soviet deployment of a full army division with long range

¹⁶⁶Edward L. Rowney, "Arms Control: The East Asian and Pacific Focus," Current Policy, No. 904, U.S. Department of State, p. 3. Mr. Rowney mentions that even with SS-20s removed from Asia, the Soviets will still have a formidable and preponderant nuclear and conventional military presence in East Asia.

¹⁶⁷An armada of six hundred ships was required to subdue Okinawa during the Pacific War.

13mm artillery and approximately forty MIG-23 aircraft in the Northern Territories.¹⁶⁸ The Soviet naval port of Korsakov in southern Sakhalin is ideally situated facing the Soya strait, a mere half-hour away by hovercraft. To meet this threat Japan has deployed two-thirds of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in Hokkaido.

Japan's GSDF has a force of 156,000 men, which is divided into twelve infantry divisions, two composite brigades, one airborne brigade, one artillery brigade, and other support brigades.¹⁶⁹ Japan has finally begun to modernize her ground forces, especially tanks and air defense. The GSDF has 1,150 tanks of which one half are the new domestically produced type-74. By 1990 the number of type-74 tanks is to be increased to 1,250.¹⁷⁰ SSM-1 ground launched anti-ship missiles are being procured and they will play a primary role in GSDF anti-invasion strategy. To protect against air attack, Japan has purchased the Patriot SAM system. As the GSDF continues modernization in the 1990s, it will be increasingly difficult for the Soviets to successfully invade Japan, especially the Northern periphery of Hokkaido.¹⁷¹ Since Soviet ground forces would have difficulty conquering Honshu, Japan is concerned with the Soviet's power projection capabilities, such as naval and air assets, that can threaten the archipelago without invasion.

¹⁶⁸Defense Attache, October-November 1987, p. 50.

¹⁶⁹The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 160.

¹⁷⁰"Japan Flexes Defense Muscle", Defense Attache, 6/1986, p. 20.

¹⁷¹See O'Connell, previously cited, for importance of SSM-1/Patriot in GSDF strategy.

B. SOVIET-JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES

Soviet ability to project conventional power against Japan relies heavily on naval and air power. In the 1980s the Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) became the largest of the four fleets in the U.S.S.R.. However, Soviet naval forces are facing an increasing "modernization gap" in comparison with the JMSDF. In determining the war-fighting capability of SOVPACFLT one should consider the status of major combatants commissioned prior to 1970. The term major combatant includes only warships over 1,000 tons, a "blue water navy." Their size allows for sufficient power generation required to operate major combat weapon systems such as long-range missiles, high-quality radars, and the like. Mere "bean counting" will not do, especially if the beans are of differing quality. For example, since 1970 the advent of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), such as the air-launched version of Harpoon and Exocet, have revolutionized naval warfare much like the carrier did in World War II. Surface ships which are not able to destroy the air-launched ASCM platform before it shoots, in other words at the ASCM's maximum range, are highly vulnerable. The idea is to get the "archer" before he launches his "arrow." In the surface warfare realm, only modern major combatants are able to carry weapon systems of sufficient capability that can engage opposing fighter-bomber aircraft at ranges exceeding medium-range air-launched ASCMs, i.e., Harpoon and Exocet. Major combatant defense against extremely long-range ASCMs, such as the Soviet AS-4 and AS-6 ASCMs, remains dependent on supporting sea-based

air power to intercept the bomber before it reaches weapon release range (WRR). This may change in the 1990s.¹⁷²

The ASCM revolution has produced a little heard of counter-revolution in ships' defense. Modern ships equipped with Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) systems such as surface to air missiles (SAM) which have a range exceeding the ASCM turn the table on the "archer." Now, the aircraft may be vulnerable before he can shoot his ASCM. Warships may be equally vulnerable from surface to surface (SSM) or submarine launched missiles without an effective SAM system. Of course, any SSM platform may be equally threatened by another SSM platform, with the advantage usually in favor of longer range. A modern major combatant, with a top-of-the-line SAM system such as SM-2 ER, can engage opposing air threats at ranges of approximately 100 miles. These systems provide a combatant the opportunity to commence engagement of even sea-skimming ASCMs at the radar horizon, 15-18 miles. Thus, the ASCM can be engaged with more than one salvo, increasing kill probability, while a lesser combatant, with a short-range SAM system, may have only one salvo at the opposing ASCM. Meeting this challenge requires the highest technology, in short, a "state of the art" Navy. Refitting outdated ships, i.e., those built before 1970, is both costly and time consuming, if one has the technology. Ships which do not have this AAW SAM ability suffer the consequences. Afghanistan has shown how vulnerable aircraft can become to SAMs. Britain experienced the liability of insufficient AAW ability in the Falklands,

¹⁷²Development of a next generation surface to air missile, SM-3, may have sufficient range and altitude capability to strike at AS-4 and AS-6 carrying aircraft before the WRR. Also, laser and particle beam technology during the next decade may provide surface combatants with a weapon system that could make ASCMs obsolete and severely restrict air power at sea.

as did Iran in the Persian Gulf. U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 provide the most recent examples of modern naval warfare in a combat zone. Iraqi air strikes at merchant shipping, during the Tanker War, provided an indication of how modern warfare at sea may be conducted. British, French, Soviet, and U.S. combatants in the Gulf were under the threat of inadvertent attack by Iraqi Mirage III fighter-bombers carrying Exocet missiles. Only U.S. cruisers and destroyers, equipped with long-range SAM systems, could threaten Iraqi Mirage IIIs beyond the Exocet WRR. In other words, other combatants could only hope to destroy the ASCM, but not the aircraft, if inadvertently attacked at the WRR. Introduction of U.S.N. cruisers in the Gulf and a strengthened rules of engagement, after the Stark incident, prevented any further inadvertent attacks on U.S. combatants.¹⁷³

Ships which do have modern SAM and SSM ability are part of the coming new revolution in naval warfare at sea. SOVPACFLT is severely limited by inadequate AAW defense afloat because most ships were commissioned prior to 1970. This is the basis of a modernization gap that appears to be increasingly favorable to Japan's maritime forces over SOVPACFLT into the 1990s. An analysis of Japanese and Soviet warship classes reveals the severity of the modernization gap, bloc obsolescence in certain Soviet warship classes, and an indication of a Japanese maritime force in the 1990s that may become second to only the U.S. Pacific Fleet in conventional strength.

SOVPACFLT became respectable in the 1980s when it received two Kiev-class Very Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft carriers (CV). These vessels carry

¹⁷³ Author's observations as Tactical Action Officer aboard USS Reeves, CG-24, assigned as Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) in the Persian Gulf under Commander Middle East Forces during the first nine Ernest Will convoys.

approximately a dozen Forger aircraft, excellent for interdiction of merchant vessels. However, Forgers do not carry missiles with a range exceeding a few miles and are vulnerable to medium and long range AAW SAM systems on major warships.¹⁷⁴ Forger is also a poor air-to-air interceptor in comparison with F-14, F-18, (Navy) or F-15, F-16 (Air Force) modern jet fighters deployed by the United States in Asia. Japan's F-15s and even the older F-4s are far superior to the sea-based Forger. The two Kievs do have a powerful strike ability even if their aircraft do not. Their SS-12 missiles have a range of approximately 200 miles and one can easily put an ill-prepared combatant out of commission.¹⁷⁵ Still, such long-range weapons require excellent targeting data, especially since the waters around Japan are the world's busiest.

To counter the Kiev-class, there are strong indications Japan intends to build a VSTOL CV during the next 1990-95 Defense Guideline.¹⁷⁶ The CV, if built, will probably be based on the British Royal Navy's Invincible-class design. In comparison with the Kiev-class, the Japanese CV itself will lack long-range ASCM capability, but the Harrier aircraft it will carry will have a comparable long-range ASCM ability. The number of Harriers the CV will carry is approximately the same as the Kiev's Forgers. The big difference between the two is the Harrier's ASM-1 ASCM in comparison with the Forger's Kerry ASCM. The ASM-1 range will soon be 70-plus nautical miles,

¹⁷⁴Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 49.

¹⁷⁵Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 365.

¹⁷⁶. Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 6-12 February 1989, p. 1. Also see Defense Asia-Pacific, 2/1988, p. 4 for similar indications of Japanese CV procurement.

while the Kerry's range is less than 10 nautical miles.¹⁷⁷ Thus, Harrier can launch ASM-1 near or outside SAM range, but Forger will not have that luxury. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has four escort flotillas so it is logical that eventually each will have a CV, but probably only two will be commissioned during the next decade. If two Japanese CVs are deployed in the 1990s, SOVPACFLT may be at a disadvantage in sea-based air strike warfare vis-a-vis the JMSDF. The Soviets may deploy their first large aircraft carrier in the early 1990s, which is to eventually carry conventional (probably SU-24) or VSTOL aircraft.¹⁷⁸ Even if the Soviets deploy the new full-deck carrier to the Far East, they could still be at a disadvantage in sea-borne strike warfare unless they develop a sea-based air-launched ASCM comparable to ASM-1.¹⁷⁹ Sea-based air superiority will depend on the number of CVs Japan and the U.S.S.R. deploy in the Pacific during the 1990s.

The next signal that the Soviets intended to become a Pacific maritime power occurred when SOVPACFLT received a Kirov-class cruiser in 1987. This nuclear powered "battle cruiser" (in excess of 25,000 tons, they are the largest cruisers built

¹⁷⁷Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89 (London, England.: Jane's Publishers, Ltd., 1988), p. 718, describes the Kerry's range as eight KM. Other Soviet ASCMs, such as the AS-9 (75 KM range), and AS-14 (30 KM range) are carried on the SU-24 Fencer. Jane's states the ASM-1, in service since 1983, has a range of 50 KM. However, the new SSM-1 micro turbojet engine will probably be utilized for the ASM-1, increasing the range to at least 150 KM, when it is deployed with the FSX fighter and Sea Harrier. Japan's development of a SSM-2 may increase ranges up to 700 KM, and could be converted into a sea-based version (ASM-2).

¹⁷⁸Soviet Military Power, previously cited, p. 84.

¹⁷⁹Harrier with ASM-1 should be considered primarily an anti-surface ship strike weapon for the JMSDF, with a secondary role of flotilla air defense. Harrier would be a poor interceptor of Backfire bombers due to range limitations.

since World War II) is the most versatile vessel of SOVPACFLT. Equipped with long range SS-19 ASCMs it is a major threat to opposing warships. Another feature of the Kirov is an improved long-range SAM system. If the Kirov radar can detect enemy aircraft in sufficient time, SA-N6 SAM can destroy aircraft beyond or near the ASCM release point.¹⁸⁰ Because the Soviets previously had no warship capable of shooting down aircraft beyond ASCM range their vessels were extremely vulnerable. Now Kirov provides some measure of air defense to SOVPACFLT, but the fleet remains precarious with only one ship of this class for the job.

Meanwhile, the JMSDF has already laid the keel and funded construction of two AEGIS SAM destroyers (DDG). Weighing over 7,000 tons they will be cruisers except in name. The ultimate force structure has been proposed from four to eight vessels.¹⁸¹ Like the CV(s) to be built in the next decade, it is logical to assume that there will eventually be at least one for each of the four escort flotillas. Japan probably will have at least that many deployed during the next decade with the first ship commissioned in 1993. Japanese shipyards can easily build a total of eight before the year 2000. The AEGIS DDG will be a quantum leap in AAW effectiveness for the JMSDF. These vessels will be vastly superior to Kirov in SAM range, radar capability, and high-tech reliability.¹⁸² If SOVPACFLT does not double surface AAW capability during the

¹⁸⁰Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, previously cited. p. 571.

¹⁸¹Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, previously cited, pp. 307, 308

¹⁸²Jane's Weapons Systems 1988 89 (London, England.: Jane's Publishing, Ltd., 1988), p. 110 states, "AEGIS AAW system is probably the best anti-air missile system afloat within any Navy." Furthermore, p. 479 reports the SAM range may be up to ninety miles.

1990s, and four-eight JMSDF AEGIS ships are procured, then the JMSDF could have a technological and numerical advantage in that field of warfare. Such an advantage, in conjunction with JASDF fighters, may give Japan an opportunity to control the skies over the Kuriles in the next decade. The consequences of this ability and Soviet land-based aviation will be discussed later.

The newest cruiser addition to SOVPACFLT is the Slava-class. Only one has been introduced to the Far East, but it carries sixteen long-range ASCMs. Another will probably be deployed in SOVPACFLT in the next few years. Slava's air defense capabilities, the SA-N6 missile, are sufficient to meet the Japanese ASCM threat.¹⁸³ Slava and Kirov-class ships will be required to provide afloat ASCM AAW support for all of SOVPACFLT if it deploys beyond the range of land-based tactical support aircraft. Ten other SOVPACFLT cruisers are stationed in the Far East. They are the Kara, Kresta I/II, Kynda, and Sverdlov-classes. Their mission is primarily anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), but with a AAW SAM range of about 30 miles they are insufficient to meet the ASCM threat. While Sverdlov was commissioned in the early 1950s, the newest of the other classes, the Kara and Kresta II, were built in the 1970s.¹⁸⁴ In other words, Soviet cruisers will begin to face obsolescence in the 1990s.

Destroyers (DLs) have traditionally been considered the most versatile of surface ships, the jack-of-all trades, able to fend for themselves in AAW, ASUW, and ASW.

¹⁸³Slava's SA-N6 missile is identical to Kirov's SA-N6.

¹⁸⁴Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89, (Hereafter referred to as Jane's), p. 544 reports eleven CGs in the Pacific. Sam range and class age are reported in pp. 572-575 of Jane's.

The newest classes in SOVPACFLT are the Sovremmeny and Udaloy; four of each have been deployed in the last three years. The former class emphasizes ASUW with the world's fastest sea-skimming ASCM. The latter class was built with strong ASW capabilities in mind. Neither is able to face up to the ASCM threat with limited SAM systems that have ranges of only 15 miles at best. These new DDGs cannot engage opposing aircraft, carrying even medium-range ASCMs, before the weapons release range. After the ASCM has been released, the SAM system can only hope to defend the ship, not threaten the opposing aircraft. All other DDGs/DDs in SOVPACFLT include Kashin/Mod-Kashin-class vessels constructed from 1962 to 1972, and Kilden, Kotlin, Kanin, and Sory-classes of which none were built after 1962, very outdated, and unable to meet the ASCM challenge.¹⁸⁵ Thus, Soviet DDs also face bloc obsolescence in the 1990s.

The JMSDF has emphasized ASW/ASUW during the construction of DDs in the 1980s. Consequently, during this decade Japan commissioned twenty-one DDG/DDs with ASW/ASUW capability.¹⁸⁶ This compares with only eight SOVPACFLT DDGs and two CGs commissioned and deployed to the Far East during the same period.¹⁸⁷ If this trend continues into the 1990s, and it appears it will based on shipbuilding efforts, Japan's maritime superiority will be self-evident. To meet the requirement of protecting sea transportation in accordance with the 1976 National Defense Program Outline,

¹⁸⁵Jane's, pp. 577-583 report class age, construction, and weapons range. P. 544 reports there are sixteen DDGs and two DDs active in SOVPACFLT.

¹⁸⁶Jane's, pp. 309-312.

¹⁸⁷Four Sovremmeny and Udaloy each, and one Kirov and Slava.

JMSDF vessels are deployed in four escort flotillas comprised of eight ships and ten Divisions (three ships per Division). Each flotilla is to have eight warships with eight ASW helicopters. This is known as the eight-eight program.¹⁸⁸ The mainstay of each flotilla is one "Shirane" or "Haruna" class DDH. These ships carry an impressive ASW capability unsurpassed by any Soviet cruiser or destroyer. The reason being, DDHs carry three ASW helicopters which provide a rapid localization/attack feature for prosecuting submarines. However, they have no long-range ASUW/AAW ability besides two 5" guns and point defense systems. Two Shirane DDHs were commissioned in the early 1980s, while the two Haruna DDHs have undergone major refits in the mid-1980s after only ten years of service.¹⁸⁹

For AAW defense each flotilla will have two DDGs. Until AEGIS is deployed, the JMSDF currently has three Tachikaze, one Amatsukaze, and two Hatakaze-class DDGs. They carry SAM systems with a range of only about twenty-five miles. All were commissioned after 1975 with the exception of Amatsukaze. For ASUW/ASW each flotilla will have five DDs. These general purpose DDs include twelve Hatsuyuki-class DDs, all commissioned in the 1980s. They are armed with eight Harpoon surface to surface missiles (SSM) and 76 MM rapid firing guns. Additionally, the first ship of the new Asagiri-class destroyer completed sea trials in 1988. An improved Hatsuyuki-class, these are very capable ASW-ASUW platforms, carrying Harpoon, short-range SAM, 76 MM gun, and ASW helicopters. These ships carry indigenous sonar, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, and fire control radars, a marked departure from

¹⁸⁸"Gunji Kenkyu," JPRS, 30 August 1988, p. 7.

¹⁸⁹All data on JMSDF DDG/DDs from Jane's, pp. 309-313.

the U.S. designed equipment of the past.¹⁹⁰ Japan intends to build a total of eight Asagiri by 1991, with probably two for each Flotilla.

SOVPACFLT has deployed fifty-six frigates (FF/FFG), which is near one half of the total major combatants in the Soviet Far East. A dozen Krivak II-class FFGs have been deployed and they were introduced in the 1970s. Krivak I-class ships were built in the early 1970s and Krivak III, which is the newest, remains under operational control of the KGB. The remaining majority of FFs, such as Riga, Grisha, Mirka, and Petya-classes are 25 to 35 years old, and will have little value in the 1990s. None of these Frigates can meet the ASCM threat effectively.¹⁹¹

The JMSDF has seventeen FFs, and only three were commissioned prior to 1970. Composed primarily of eleven Chikugo-class ships, the JMSDF is in the process of further modernization. The new Yubari-class FF will be commissioned next year and will be comprised of four to six vessels.¹⁹² It is interesting to note that almost all of Japan's combatants carry ASROC (anti-submarine rocket), including the Chikugo-class FF, making them the smallest vessels in the world with that weapon. Japan has far more rocket delivered anti-submarine torpedoes than SOVPACFLT.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰James Auer and Sadao Seno, "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force," NAFO, p. 187, reports that the 1986-1990 programme contains increased funding targets for critical sustainability items needed by the JMSDF, namely missiles, mines, and torpedoes.

¹⁹¹Jane's, pp. 584-589 contain data on Soviet FFs. Page 544 reports eleven FFGs and forty-five FF/FFLs in SOVPACFLT.

¹⁹²Jane's, pp. 314-316.

¹⁹³Fifty JMSDF vessels carry ASROC, while SOVPACFLT has similar SSN-14s deployed on only half as many vessels. Figures derived from counting ASROC launchers in Jane's pp. 307-316 (Japan) and pp. 569-589 (Soviet).

In the final analysis, SOVPACFLT has a little more than a dozen ships commissioned in the 1980s and less than twenty more commissioned in the 1970s.¹⁹⁴ Considering that most warships have neared the end of their usefulness after twenty years, without a major refitting of modern weaponry, the major combatants of SOVPACFLT are approaching a bloc obsolescence crisis in the 1990s. From 1970 to 1989 the Soviets have added just over thirty major combatants (not commissioned prior to 1970) to SOVPACFLT, while over seventy warships deployed there were built prior to 1970. The older ships will have little value during the next decade, reducing the effectiveness of the Soviet Union's maritime power in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, Japan has approximately forty-three major warships built since 1970, expects to commission fifteen more in the next five years, and has only eleven built prior to 1970 still in commission.¹⁹⁵ The trend in naval combatant force levels is clear. SOVPACFLT surface combatants are facing a growing "modernization gap" with their Japanese counterparts. This is most evident in ASW and ASUW weaponry, such as ASROC and in the numbers of surface to surface missiles carried aboard the respective fleets. In comparison with SOVPACFLT, the JMSDF has one hundred and ninety-two SSMs (Harpoon missiles with a range of 70plus miles) aboard her major combatants, while

¹⁹⁴Two Keiv, one Kirov, one Slava, four Sovremmeny, four Udaloy, and a handful of Krivak FFGs were deployed in the 1980s. Ships deployed in the 1970s tabulated from Jane's. The figures for SOVPACFLT are approximate, the uncertainty caused by the exact number of pre-1970 CGs and FFs deployed there.

¹⁹⁵Force Structure of JMSDF and SOVPACFLT derived from Jane's. Also, Jane's, p. 544, reports the Soviet Navy has twenty major warships under construction (CG-FF), which must be divided between the four Soviet Fleets.

the Soviets have only ninety-six SSMs with a range greater than fifty miles.¹⁹⁶ The Soviets do have a handful of old combatants in the Far East which carry the Styx SSM, with a range of approximately forty miles. They also have a large number of ships which can fire their AAW and SSN-14 missiles in an ASUW mode, but the range is restricted to the radar horizon of about seventeen miles. Their value against a longer-ranged SSM-armed warship is questionable. Japan will build two Aegis, seven Asagiri-class, and six Yubari-class major warships in the next three-five years. This will enable the JMSDF to increase their SSMs to a total of 280 by 1993. Likewise, Japan's ASROC superiority over SOVPACFLT will be strengthened. Meanwhile, Gorbachev has announced an intention to decrease the Soviet military budget by up to fifteen percent. Even if the Soviets maintain their defense spending, it is doubtful they can keep pace with the modernization effort of the JMSDF in the 1990s. For example, the Soviets are having difficulty now maintaining current technology weapon systems, such as the Udaloy SAM system.

The greatest feature of JMSDF vessels is their technology. They are truly unique in an Asian (United States excluded) context. They have state-of-the-art fire control systems, sonar, guns, torpedoes, close in weapons system (CIWS), SSM, chaff, EW equipment, gas turbine engineering systems, and the like.¹⁹⁷ Japan's shipbuilders are at the forefront in applying super conductors for propulsion systems in maritime vessels.

¹⁹⁶Figures tabulated from Jane's (no. of ASCM launchers per vessel).

¹⁹⁷G. Jacobs, "Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Preparing for the 1990s," Defense Asia Pacific, 2/1988, pp. 17,18. Mr. Jacobs states all ships are to have updated ESM/ECM systems, and Japan is developing new radar and sonar systems. Additionally, a new GRX-3 ASW torpedo built in Japan will be introduced in the early 1990s.

A recent study by the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington stated, "the use of magnetohydrodynamic propulsion for ocean going vessels provides potential for advances in ship performance analogous to the advances in aircraft performances which followed from the development of the jet engine."¹⁹⁸ To meet this "modernization gap" SOVPACFLT will have to receive four major combatants annually into the next decade to replace an aging fleet or face a technology gap with the JMSDF. Excluding air-power and submarines, the JMSDF is on solid ground vis-a-vis SOVPACFLT in ASUW and ASW now, and will probably be superior in AAW during the next decade. Japan is also building replenishment ships for their growing fleet-a traditional Soviet deficiency. It remains to be seen if SOVPACFLT can meet the JMSDF technology challenge during the 1990s. Of course, in naval warfare one cannot exclude land-based air force and submarine force structure, yet in the 1990s Soviet Far Eastern warships may be at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis the JMSDF.

Soviet deployment of submarines in the Pacific has also increased significantly during the last two decades, however SOVPACFLT submarines could face a "modernization gap" challenge from the JMSDF in the 1990s. Vladivostok centered in the middle of the Sea of Japan, and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula, are the main SOVPACFLT submarine ports. The introduction of a new submarine facility on Shimushir in the middle of the Kurile chain demonstrates Soviet efforts to make the

¹⁹⁸Stephen Kreider Yoder, "Japanese Ship Will Use Super Conductors," Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 August 1988, p. 3. Mr. Yoder also noted that Japan has built a 150-ton experimental vessel, named the Yamato I, and expects to build full-size ships and submarines by the early 21st century that can cruise at 70 plus knots.

Sea of Okhotsk an inland lake. SOVPACFLT submarines have been considered a major power projection force in the APR.¹⁹⁹

One major conventional threat to Japan's sea lanes consists of SOVPACFLT's twenty-seven SSG/SSGNs (ASCM armed diesel and nuclear-powered submarines). These boats are more a threat to combatants than merchants, since torpedoes instead of expensive ASCMs are the preferred weapon on the latter. A modernization gap is reducing the effectiveness of these mostly pre-1970 produced boats. Only eight of twenty-seven were built from 1967 to 1989, with the rest commissioned before 1967.²⁰⁰ With no primary defensive weapons, a submarine must rely on stealth to survive. The nuclear power plants of these older boats are very noisy, which makes them easier to find.²⁰¹ This was the central issue of the Toshiba scandal (better propellers partially reduced the noise signature of these old boats). The six non-nuclear powered diesel SSGs are very quiet, but these Juliet-class boats are approaching thirty years of age.

¹⁹⁹"Chernavin Responds," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, February 1989, p. 77. ADM. Chernavin declared, "We consider both nuclear and diesel submarines, along with naval aircraft, to be the main forces of our fleet."

²⁰⁰Derek da Cunha, "The Growth of the Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force" International Defense Review, 2/1988, p. 130, reports eight Charlie I/II, thirteen Echo II (SSGNs), and six Juliet (SSGs) in SOVPACFLT. Jane's, pp. 554-559, reports only the Charlie II-class of SOVPACFLT SSG/SSGNS were built after 1973.

²⁰¹Capt. John Moore, "Soviet Submarine Technology Forges Ahead," Jane's Naval Review, 1987, p. 85. Capt. Moore stated "the early days of nuclear propulsion Soviet boats were extremely noisy...the first class to benefit from efforts to overcome this problem were the Victor IIIs, with a sound signature 20% less than previous boats." According to Jane's, the first Victor IIIs were completed in 1978. Therefore, the "newest" SSGNs, Charlie IIs, in the Pacific are, in Capt. Moore's words, "extremely noisy."

The twenty-five SSN (nuclear powered attack) and forty-three SS diesel boats in SOVPACFLT have been a traditional threat to merchant shipping in Asia. However, only two Akula, ten Victor III, and probably two Victor I SSNs along with six Kilo SSs have been designed, built and deployed to SOVPACFLT after 1970. The Akula, Victor III, and Kilo-classes are the most modern, commissioned in the 1980s. Of a total of one hundred and twenty-nine submarines in SOVPACFLT, only twenty attack (SSN/SSs) were built in the 1980s. None of the SSB, SSGN, or SSGs were. In fact, over half of all one hundred and twenty-nine SOVPACFLT submarines were built prior to 1970. Thus, SOVPACFLT submarines, like their sister surface ships, face mass bloc obsolescence. This is clearly evident in SSs diesel boat forces, where thirty-seven of forty-three are of pre-1970 design.²⁰² The greatest limitation of these older boats is their lack of modern sonar. They are ineffective in ASW operations, that is hunting other submarines. New submarines, with modern hydrophones and noise processing equipment, can hunt down older boats which lack such equipment.

Japan has sixteen Yuushio/Usushio-class diesel SS, all of which were built since 1970. All ten boats of the Yuushio-class were produced during the 1980s, and seven of them carry Harpoon, while the other three may be backfitted. The first improved Yuushio-class boat will be commissioned in 1990 with production at one per year. They will no doubt carry Harpoon, effectively making them SSGs. Today, Japan has a favorable advantage in modern SSG/SSGNs over SOVPACFLT, which has not deployed any of these boats built since 1980. The Soviets will have to introduce new

²⁰²SOVPACFLT submarine force structure derived from Derek da Cunha, International Defense Review, p. 130 and Jane's, pp. 554-563, both previously cited.

SS/SSNs to the Pacific annually to keep up the technological pace since Japan has only four less attack submarines built since 1970 than SOVPACFLT.²⁰³ The Akula appears to be in a production rate of one per year, however SOVPACFLT will certainly not receive all of them. The Akula and Victor IIIs in SOVPACFLT are top-of-the-line submarines with a quiet nuclear power plant. To counter the SSN threat, there has been considerable discussion in Japanese defense circles that a SSN is needed for JMSDF service.²⁰⁴ SSN production for the JMSDF would certainly alter the remaining submarine balance between Japan and the Soviets. Constitutional questions, regarding Japanese nuclear elements in the defense realm, will be addressed in Chapter Five. If Japanese SSN production comes on line in the next decade JMSDF SSNs may counterbalance Soviet Akula and Victor III SSNs. Therefore, the traditional Soviet advantage in submarines may become inferior due to a "modernization gap."

The water around Japan is ideally suited for submarine operations, since it is both very shallow in some areas and very deep in others making ASW difficult. One of the submarine's main role is to interdict aggressors in the "choke points" of the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya straits and Kurile island chain. This applies to both Japanese and Soviet submarines. ASW plays a major role of Japanese and Soviet naval forces given the importance of safe passage and SSBN sanctuary in the waters near Japan. The JMSDF surface fleet has better ASW capabilities than SOVPACFLT surface fleet because of the "modernization gap," i.e., JMSDF sonar, anti-submarine rocket (ASROC), ASW helicopters, etc. are newer and of higher quality than their Soviet

²⁰³JMSDF submarine force structure is reported in Jane's, p. 308.

²⁰⁴James Auer and Sadao Seno in NAFO, previously cited, p. 187.

counterparts.²⁰⁵ For example, the JMSDF has purchased sixty-six HSS-2b ASW helicopters during the current five year defense plan, increasing the number of helicopters to nearly one hundred.²⁰⁶ SOVPACFLT has approximately the same number of ASW helicopters, yet only one fifth are as new.²⁰⁷ Additionally, Japan is producing new ASW helicopters, of the U.S. SH-60 design, but incorporating Japanese electronic components.²⁰⁸

Japan has a further advantage in land-based naval aviation ASW forces over the Soviets. This is evident in the approximately one hundred P-3C ASW aircraft deployed in JMSDF naval aviation, which is four times the U.S. P-3C aircraft in the Western Pacific and a larger number than the eighty Soviet Bear-F, Mail, and Mays deployed in the Far East.²⁰⁹ These aircraft also have another function as maritime air patrol, looking for surface targets of opportunity and passing locating data to JMSDF surface forces. This targeting information is of great importance in employment of SSMs, which Japan has an advantage vis-a-vis SOVPACFLT.

To ensure control over entrance and exit to the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, both Japan and the U.S.S.R. have large, efficient mine sweeping capabilities. The

²⁰⁵JPRS, previously cited, p. 11, reports JMSDF requested Edamoto to develop a SSM with one-third more range than Harpoon. Additionally, the JMSDF desires domestically produced towed-arrays, sonars, and other high-tech equipment that is second to none.

²⁰⁶Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1987, p. 147.

²⁰⁷The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 45 reports only one out of five SOVPACFLT ASW bns is composed of the modern Helix helicopter.

²⁰⁸G. Jacobs, previously cited, p. 17.

²⁰⁹Jane's, p. 544 (Soviets), and Auer, previously cited, p. 187 (Japan).

Soviets have ninety-six of these vessels while the JMSDF has forty-five, of which the Japanese have built twenty-one during this decade.²¹⁰ The JMSDF also has twelve minesweeping helicopters. This equipment allows Japan to ensure her ports are not closed from mining. Japan's ability to mine the straits is not equal to that of the Soviets for one reason, that being the large Soviet stockpile of mines and the relatively few in Japanese inventory. Approximately 6,000 mines of various kinds would be required to block the three straits, and the JMSDF has only 1,200 in stock.²¹¹ Minelaying does not require a dedicated minelaying force, as experienced in the Persian Gulf. However, since JMSDF force structure is in a favorable position vis-a-vis the SOVPACFLT, Japan can afford to purchase mines in quantities sufficient enough to effectively block the straits. Minesweeping must be conducted with adequate AAW, ASW, and ASUW forces nearby for obvious reasons.

The purpose in comparing Soviet surface and submarine forces with their Japanese counterparts is to analyze their possible function in future conflicts and ascertain the maritime balance between the two nations. Maritime power has played a central role in modern Asian history, particularly Northeast Asia. This thesis concludes the majority of SOVPACFLT naval forces are best suited for coastal defense, i.e., the large number of old destroyers and submarines. Their value hundreds of miles away from port, where combat air patrol support will be scarce, must be questioned against modern ASW platforms such as JMSDF P-3C sonobouy-carrying aircraft and

²¹⁰Both SOVPACFLT and JMSDF MCMV force structure derived from The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, pp. 45 and 161 respectively, and Jane's p. 318.

²¹¹Gallagher, previously cited, p. 83.

ASUW/ASW destroyers carrying SSM missiles, ASROC, and ASW helicopters. Because of the "modernization gap" it is highly unlikely aging Soviet surface combatants and conventionally powered submarines will attempt a break-out of the Sea of Japan and Sea of Ohkostk on a SLOC interdiction mission. The Soviets may desire to use these assets to control the Kuriles and critical straits. Modern assets, such as the fourteen Akula and Victor I/III SSNs, along with the slightly older eight Charlie I/II SSGNs may be tasked to oppose enemy naval forces far from home waters. However, defense of Soviet SSBNs may not allow the twenty-two efficient boats of the one hundred and twenty-nine submarines to effectively threaten Japan's sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific Ocean.

Perhaps the growing "modernization gap" in favor of Japan is one reason why Gorbachev calls for regional naval limitation talks in the APR. Because of the limited value of half of SOVPACFLT, Gorbachev may propose to scrap the older half of the fleet (up to sixty warships and an equal number of submarines) as a political gesture to induce Japan to demilitarize as part of a resolution to the Kurile problem.²¹² Replacing the aging fleet with modern combatants and submarines at a pace that can keep up with the modernization gap will be increasingly difficult as the Soviet economy continues dismal performance. Gorbachev's proposal to cut Soviet spending by fifteen percent should be taken seriously since Soviet defense spending in 1989 appears to be slowing.²¹³ Soviet troop reductions in Europe, and along the Chinese

²¹²The Economist, 1 April 1989, p. 30 mentions the Soviets have considered the possibility of de facto "joint-occupation" of the Northern Territories.

²¹³New York Times, 20 November 1989, p. 1.

border, have set a precedent for a "peace offensive" directed at Japan. With Soviet naval forces facing bloc obsolescence such a move would hardly diminish Soviet security in the Far East. Additionally, it could promote a questioning of the necessity of the United States forward deployment strategy among our Asian allies. Japan may accept such proposals if it decided that restraining its military force structure is in its national interest. In the context of perestroika succeeding, the U.S. may favor such a demilitarization of the Northeast Pacific between Japan and the U.S.S.R. compared to an independent Japanese defense strategy, supported by three-six percent GNP, that might take advantage of Soviet weakness. If the U.S. and U.S.S.R. implement CFE troop reductions in Europe, cut their respective defense budgets, and Washington-Moscow relations continue to become normalized, a continued Japanese defense build-up would require a reappraisal of Japan's intent in Asia.

C. SOVIET-JAPANESE AIR FORCES

Having examined the status of ground, surface and subsurface assets, aviation has been reserved for last. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force and SOVPACFLT Naval Aviation is the one conventional sector of power projection that has remained modern and in vast quantities. Soviet Naval Air Forces are stronger in the APR than in any other area of Soviet interest. For example, as of 1986, SOVPACFLT has deployed one hundred and sixty-five naval strike aircraft (Backfires, Badgers, and Blinders) compared to ninety-five such aircraft in the Northern fleet, one hundred and fifteen in the Baltic and one hundred and twenty in the Black Sea area. In 1980 TU-25 Backfire bombers, carrying very long-range ASCMs began deployment in the APR. Soviet

Pacific Naval Aviation (SPNA) now has forty-five of these aircraft as of 1987.²¹⁴ Commercial shipping which does not have the protection of long-range AAW, either SAM or aircraft, is extremely vulnerable to these supersonic bombers. With an unrefueled combat radius of 2,000 miles, and capable of Mach 2+ dash to evade air defense, this aircraft gives the Soviets unprecedented capability to interdict the SLOCs in the Pacific, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean which Japan's economy depends on. Given the density of shipping in the Hormuz and Malaccan straits, pre-strike surveillance and targeting is not necessary for missile attacks or mining efforts. The one hundred and twenty-five other bombers of SPNA, the Badgers and Blinders, are rapidly approaching thirty years of age since they came into production in the early 1960s. While reliability will come into question in the 1990s, these aircraft are still valuable now because they can fire very modern missiles, which fly long distances and at a very high speed. Backfitting such aircraft with modern ASCMs is much easier, cheaper, and less time consuming than similar high-tech backfitting on warships and submarines.

SOVPACFLT is augmented by Soviet Air Force Long-Range aviation (LRA). Since 1978 LRA has deployed another forty-five Backfires, thirty Bear-Gs and twenty-five Bear-Hs in the TVD. These aircraft have the same capability to interdict the sea lanes with ASCMs, and the new Bear-H is armed with the Soviet version of the U.S. Tomahawk strategic cruise missile. Some twelve ASCM-armed Badgers are located in

²¹⁴Derek da Cunha, "Soviet Strike Warfare in the Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, February 1989, p. 58.

Vietnam, only a few of hours from interdicting the straits of Malacca.²¹⁵ Japan must also be concerned with Soviet bombers stationed in Soviet Central Asia, and their ability to reach the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean.²¹⁶ The only means of defeating such a weapons system at sea is by advanced carrier aircraft or the high-tech Aegis missile system. The United States Navy had a monopoly on these defensive systems, but with the sale of AEGIS to Japan that will change. The wisdom of selling AEGIS, which can defeat any current carrier aircraft, to Japan without forging formal operational U.S.-Japanese security roles, remains to be seen.²¹⁷ Japan must rely on the United States for the foreseeable future to defend Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia SLOCs which her economy, and national interest, so vitally depends on.

The Soviets have some 2,000 combat aircraft in the Far Eastern TVD, however they are spread from Tashkent to Petropavlovsk. Moreover, Gorbachev has pledged to cut 800 aircraft from Soviet airforces west-of-the-Urals.²¹⁸ Japan is primarily concerned with tactical aircraft deployed in the Far Eastern MD, headquartered in Khabarovsk.

²¹⁵da Chuna, Proceedings, previously cited, pp. 61, 62.

²¹⁶Soviet Military Power 1988, previously cited, p. 120, mentions, "the Soviets might attempt to deny oil to the West by conducting air strikes or by mining operations against oil production sources, pipelines, handling facilities, and shipping channels."

²¹⁷Gaston J. Sigur, "Proposed Sale of AEGIS Weapon System to Japan," Department of State Bulletin, September 1988, p. 13. Mr. Sigur said, "the administration views the proposed role of AEGIS as important in enhancing joint military capability of the United States and Japan in the Pacific...and AEGIS will greatly enhance the interoperability of the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF." This interoperability appears to be based on contingency, not current naval operations.

²¹⁸U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 72.

The Soviets have 360 attack fighters and 180 interceptors in the Far Eastern MD.²¹⁹ How many are to be reduced by unilateral cuts remains to be seen. These aircraft are top-of-line SU-25, Mig-27, Mig-29, and Mig-31s. Tactical aircraft are a very mobile force, capable of being deployed in a very short time. A successful Sino-Soviet summit may allow the Soviets to redeploy a larger number of warplanes within the TVD to the Far Eastern MD.²²⁰ A conventional conflict over the Kuriles would require such a redeployment.

The rapid and high quality build up of SPNA/LRA has caused the Japanese to devote a large segment of their 1990-1995 five-year plan for AAW sea-lane defense. This is in contrast to earlier five-year plans which raised JMSDF's ASUW and ASW capabilities to a soon to be respectable, if not superior, position vis-a-vis the Soviets in East Asia. To meet the air threat, Japan now has over 100 F-4s, which are receiving modern refitting of equipment, and will have some 200 F-15 interceptors by 1990, roughly the number of tactical aircraft defending the continental United States.²²¹ Japan

arm her 100 P-3C aircraft with long-range Phoenix air-to-air missiles as a means to obtain a requisite level of sea lane air defense capability. Additionally, Japan intends to build an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) located in the Bonin islands to

²¹⁹The Military Balance 1988-89, previously cited, p. 44.

²²⁰Neil Munro, "Keeping Watch on the Amur and the Sea of Okhotsk," Pacific Defense Reporter, October 1986, p. 17. Mr. Munro remarked that in any war, some of the 500-odd Su-24s and supporting aircraft of the Soviet Central Reserve could be made available to the Far East MD.

²²¹Gaston J. Sigur, previously cited, p. 13.

provide early warning of Soviet air activity in the Far East, and is studying the purchase of AWACS and inflight refueling capabilities.²²²

Japan's real step towards increasing air power in the 1990s is linked with the development of the FSX fighter. This aircraft has a primary role of firing ASCMs at enemy ships or supporting ground forces, with a secondary role as an air-interceptor. Japan may build between one hundred and fifty to two hundred of these aircraft during the 1990s. They will replace the seventy-seven obsolete F-1 attack aircraft. The traditional Soviet edge in tactical aircraft over the JASDF may be challenged by the introduction of FSX in the 1990s and a Soviet inability to redeploy tactical aircraft within the TVD to the Far Eastern MD, i.e., if the Soviets maintain the belief that China could be a potential threat.²²³ After the introduction of the FSX, Japan's ASDF tactical aircraft may reach rough parity with the Soviet tactical aircraft of the Far Eastern MD, with both forces comprising approximately 500 aircraft. Only in long-range strike aircraft will the Soviets appear to maintain a distinct advantage over the Japanese in the 1990s.

The vast superiority in numbers has traditionally given the Soviets a conventional edge over Japan's Self Defense Forces. In the 1990s this quantitative edge may be surpassed by a qualitative edge in favor of the Japanese due to the "modernization gap." For example, Japan currently has more tactical aircraft than the United States has

²²²James Auer and Sadao Seno, NAFO, previously cited, p. 187.

²²³Okazaki Hisahiko, "Burden Sharing for a Military Balance," Japan Echo, Vol XV, No. 3, 1988. Mr. Okazaki points out that "China's autonomy has great strategic significance...the Soviets cannot withdraw all of its troops from the Sino-Soviet border and concentrate its military might on Japan."

deployed in all of Asia.²²⁴ The United States has traditionally relied on such a qualitative edge to counter Soviet numerical superiority. With the FSX fighter, CV sea-based aviation, and a surface navy superior to SOVPACFLT in the 1990s, Japan's military force structure may be viewed by the Soviets as a major threat to Kuriles, and therefore, their Far Eastern Security.²²⁵ This perception would certainly be reinforced with the introduction of JMSDF nuclear submarines. JMSDF nuclear submarines would indicate Japan has sea power interests beyond the choke-points of the three straits and is willing to expend resources required to become a great military power. The Soviets' concern over SSBN defense near Japanese waters would increase with the development of Japanese SSNs. With Japanese diesel submarines tasked to straits control, Japanese SSNs would be free to interdict Soviet shipping and conduct ASW operations against Soviet SSNs and possibly SSBNs. To counter this development, Moscow may attempt a "peace offensive" to limit or reduce Japanese force structure, or increase Soviet force structure in the Far Eastern MD. The latter may be difficult given Gorbachev's pledge to not introduce any more nuclear weapons systems in the APR--effectively ruling out an increase of Backfires or deployment of new Blackjack bombers there. Additionally, perestroika may require less defense spending in favor of Soviet consumer goods.

²²⁴Armacost, previously cited, p. 2.

²²⁵Japan Economic Newswire, 5 February 1988, reports: "Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Vladimir Sidorov, said that a buildup of Japan's MSDF constitutes part of an invasion plot by the US and it would erode Japan's security rather than cementing it. The JMSDF buildup is causing uneasiness in the USSR and is based in replacing the US Navy functions (attack), rather than being for the defense of Japan."

In the context of United States-U.S.S.R. Conventional Force Europe (CFE) troop reduction possibilities and China's internal problems, Soviet security concerns in the next decade appear to have no major threat. However, if Japanese force structure in the 1990s has the capability to control the seas and skies around the Kuriles, which may be a strong possibility after FSX is produced, no other area of the Soviet border may be faced with such a conventional threat perceived by the Kremlin. The U.S. regional security policy in Asia should take into account the Japanese-Soviet balance of conventional power in the 1990s. The notion that "Japan simply does not have the capability to defend itself against the U.S.S.R.-that only the United States has that capability"²²⁶ seems to ignore the significant development of Japanese conventional defense capability in the 1980s. Japan's incremental rearmament has not, in general, been taken seriously. Perhaps this is due to Japan's Constitution, discussed later, but it also due to the fact the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are under-deployed. In the case of the JMSDF, they rarely operate far from the home islands. Of course, defense structure can be built up from scarce funds if operational requirements are fulfilled by a willing ally. So, while the Japanese force structure has grown to respectability, it remains a generally unrecognized military force shadowed by long-standing misconceptions.²²⁷ Nevertheless, if Japan appears capable of achieving maritime

²²⁶Weinstein, *The Washington Quarterly*, previously cited, p. 25.

²²⁷Joseph K. Woodard, "The Soviet Navy and Command of the Seas," *Global Affairs*, Vol. IV, No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 43 inaccurately remarked. "The Soviet Pacific Fleet is ever more disproportionate to its respective opposition, the American Pacific Fleet and the relatively benign Japanese. The once proud Japanese Navy now contributes barely two dozen destroyers and frigates." Mr. Woodard's statement is an example of the widespread misunderstanding of Japan's defense capabilities.

superiority over the Soviets in the Far East, it does not necessarily equate to an increased U.S. security posture in the region, especially under the existing U.S.-Japanese security arrangement.

Japan's maritime superiority over the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s provides the Japanese government with heretofore non-existing security options. Since Japan has no indigenous nuclear deterrence to the U.S.S.R., any antagonism between the two nations would probably be in the low to middle intensity scale of combat. However, Japan's capability to seize the Northern Territories in the next decade is real. A Japanese takeover of the islands could happen as follows: At the appropriate time Japanese FSX fighters might strike at Soviet airfields and other military sites in the Northern Territories, destroying opposing air power and Soviet SAM systems. Japanese troops might be deployed to the islands by helicopter and secure airfields. Additional troops and equipment would then be flown in, such as SSM-1 anti-ship and Patriot anti-aircraft missiles. In such circumstances, a Soviet counter strike, from Sakhalin, would probably be limited to air power. Any Soviet surface craft attempting to land troops on the islands in this scenario would likely face SSM-1 attack from Hokkaido as well as the islands in question. Soviet air power would face further initial opposition from the 450 plus Japanese fighter-attack aircraft likely to be in Japan's inventory by the end of the next decade. AEGIS DDGs would provide additional AAW support. Japan could then have the islands by fait accompli before the Soviets could shift sufficient air power from other regions. The main questions of such a hypothetical Japanese contingency plan would be surprise, sufficient force, and prospects for a quick ending. Since Japan currently deploys two-thirds of its ground forces in Hokkaido, any

attacking forces in the future could probably be mustered covertly. Such a scenario, similar to the Falklands War, would probably contain the hypothetical conflict to the islands in question and surrounding seas.

Japan's current political intentions prefer diplomacy and denying full economic joint-ventures to the Soviets to regain the islands, but this could change with a failure of perestroika, a dismissal of Gorbachev, and social instability in the U.S.S.R.. In short, a Falklands-type scenario over *koyu ryodo*, inherent territory, in the Kuriles is a remote possibility. A Japanese-Soviet middle-intensity conflict over the Kuriles should be prudently considered a possible contingency of the 1990s based on the following: 1) Territorial dispute, 2) shifting balance of conventional military power in the maritime sphere, 3) domestic turmoil distracting the U.S.S.R., and 4) historical antagonism based on the Soviets "illegal" entry into World War II and no peace treaty signed between the two nations. An increase of Japanese defense spending from 1-3 percent GNP will only further Japan's ability to regain the islands by fait accompli if negotiations fail.

Regardless of Soviet-Japanese antagonism, a shift of maritime conventional capability in favor of Japan vis-a-vis the Soviet, could allow the United States to develop new security strategies and arrangements in Asia pursuant to the national interest. However, ever increasing military strength and resurgent ultra-nationalism in Japan could be detrimental to U.S. interests and will be discussed in Chapter Five. While Japan is attaining a favorable maritime conventional balance vis-a-vis the Soviets, the Japanese people appear to be unprepared for the consequence of the nation becoming a great military power. With increased military capability Japan can exercise military power to influence events and protect and promote national interest, as other

nations likewise conduct international affairs. How well Japanese democracy can exercise the use of power while recognizing political restraint remains to be seen. The U.S. security guarantee had allowed Japan to conduct international relations without military considerations. In the context of great powers, such as Japan, this is ahistorical and abnormal. A revised security arrangement with Japan will require the Japanese to reappraise their position in the world in a realistic manner in accordance with their Constitution. Such a reappraisal would be an exercise in democracy, since the question of defense is equated with the "Peace Constitution" in the minds of many Japanese. A Japanese acceptance of a security pact that allocates primary areas of security responsibility could lessen fears of a potential ultra-nationalist Japan seeking an independent security policy that upsets the Pacific balance of power. Until Japanese defense forces take full conventional responsibility of the archipelago, and the Japanese people deal with their national security on a realistic basis, the Western notion of civilian control over the military in accordance with the Constitution remains untested.

IV. JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION

During the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, the United States initially assumed sole responsibility of defending Kuwaiti oil bound for nations other than the U.S.. Voices of criticism within Congress questioned the merit of defending resources of certain nations, such as Japan, unwilling to assist in a joint security effort. Criticism of Japan was countered by the traditional Constitutionality question of Japan's Self Defense Forces. For example, the U.S. State Department remarked that Japan's Constitution and its politics deprive it of any military role in the Persian Gulf.²²⁸ However, before the Gulf crisis ended, Prime Minister Nakasone declared that deploying Japanese minesweepers to the Gulf was Constitutional, and no different than "sweeping mines of the coast of Maizuru."²²⁹ It seems a Kempo no Kaishaku, Constitutional interpretation, problem exists in Japan and in the defense circles of her neighbors who speculate on what Japan can or can not do in the military realm. A close examination of Japan's Constitution, and specifically Article Nine, reveals a flexible document that has been interpreted various ways to suit the needs of the Japanese polity. A revised United States-Japanese security agreement should be based in accordance with Japan's Constitution and the Japanese interpretation of that document.

²²⁸Armacost, previously cited, p. 5

²²⁹Clyde Haberman, "Nakasone Says Law Permits Japan to Sweep Mines in Gulf," New York Times, 29 August 1987, p. A4. Mr. Nakasone said such operations would be for "protecting Japanese vessels."

Before discussing aspects of how law is interpreted in Japan, it is appropriate to examine the place Constitutions have held in Japanese society. In Western countries the Constitution embodies the polity of a nation. Most Western Constitutions were brought about with an exchange of rulers, i.e., from monarchy to republican forms of government, and often with revolution. The essence of modern democratic Constitutions was that political power was made of the people, for the people, and by the people. Japan's original Constitution, promulgated in 1889, was quite different than the Western norm.²³⁰ Baron Kentaro Kaneko explained this fundamental difference in 1906, after Japan's sensational victory over Russia and international interest on Japan was at an early peak, when he stated:

There is an important difference between the Constitutions of Western nations and that of Japan. The former are the outcome of popular uprisings against the tyranny of rulers...the Japanese Constitution, on the other hand, emanated from the Emperor, the fountain head of all power. Before the people dreamed of popular rights or a parliament, the Emperor had already marked out the grand policy of establishing Constitutional government in the future, because of his evident desire and purpose to elevate the country to an equal place among the civilized nations of the world, not only because he wished it, but also in strict accordance with the national policy bequeathed by his imperial ancestors. Following that policy, our Constitution was drawn up with close adherence to and careful preservation of the fundamental principle of the Imperial government from time immemorial.²³¹ (author's emphasis)

The Constitution was a part of the Meiji reforms, policies of rapid modernization by the Japanese elite to strengthen the nation in order to prevent colonization by some

²³⁰Sansom, previously cited, p. 350, observed that, "in the limited sense they came under Western influence...it becomes clear that what was finally adopted was, if Western in shape, thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance."

²³¹Kentaro Kaneko, "Resources and Ideals of Modern Japan", p. 482, in David Murray, Japan (New York, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906).

Western power.²³² Before Western intrusions, Japan's political policy was not based on a Constitution, but on an unwritten acceptance of a social order founded in a cult worship where the Emperor symbolized the apex. This is Japan's Kokur'ji, national essence, polity, and structure of the state combined, referred to by Baron Kaneko as "...the national policy bequeathed by...imperial ancestors." It does, indeed, date back to the most ancient of recorded times. The Nihongi, Japan's ancient historical work, begins with the divine conception of the first Emperor, Jimmu, and his role in spreading the "divine mission" to remote areas of Japan.²³³ Prior to the World War II, militarists utilized the cult of Shintoism, intertwined with notions of Kokutai, to consolidate national power. Three basic tenets of the cult were: 1) the Emperor is divine because he is the extension in time of the very bodies and souls of the great divine ancestors of the past and, in particular, of the physical and spiritual attributes of the Sun Goddess, 2) that Japan is under the special guardianship of the gods and, therefore, its soil, its people, and its institutions are unique and superior to all others, 3) that it is Japan's divine mission to bring "the whole world under one roof" (hakko ichi-u) and thus extend to the rest of humanity the advantage of being ruled by the Emperor. In ancient times hakko ichi-u meant unifying the world as Emperor Jimmu knew it, i.e., Japan proper, but ultra-nationalists expanded this vision. As early as 1869, the government initiated the policy of deifying and enshrining in Yasukuni Shrine the

²³²Murray, previously cited, p. 397, quotes the author of the Constitution, Ito Hirobumi, as saying "the constitution will...open a wider field of activity for serving the Emperor," and that it does not provide for a government of the people by the people.

²³³W. G. Aston, Nihongi (Rutland, Vt.: Rutland, Vt., 1980), pp. 110, 111.

souls of those who died in the cause of the Emperor.²³⁴ Japanese militarism in the 1920-30s grew from an ultra-nationalist ideology that was in place when Japan was opened to the Western world.²³⁵

China and Korea have strongly protested official visits by Japanese ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, fearing a revival of pre-war ultra-nationalism. Emperor Hirohito used the ideology of Kokutai when he spoke to the Japanese people for the first time and told them the war was over. To fight on meant the destruction of the nation, and an end to humanity.²³⁶ After the Pacific War, Japanese diplomats were mainly concerned with the status of Kokutai during the occupation. Post-war Japan is increasingly recognized as a modern Western nation, but the social order and polity, while influenced by the West, remains, to a large degree, as Prof. Sansom said, "thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance." Japan had a social order that received very little influence from foreign countries for hundreds of years before Commodore Perry arrived in 1853, and for this reason Japanese culture influences the Constitution and political institutions to a far greater extent than Western nations. Indeed, if a Constitution can be called the hallmark of a nation, then Japan has been termed "in the (Western) world

²³⁴Tiedeman, previously cited, pp. 25, 26.

²³⁵FEER, 27 November 1981, p. 18, mentions Nobuhiro Sato, who wrote in his "Secret Strategy for Expansion" in 1823 that "Japan is the foundation of the world," which was, he said, destined to become "provinces and districts" of Japan. His master-plan was to begin with conquest of China, with the first blow at Manchuria, "so easy to attack and hold." In short, an outline of Japan's pre-war version of a "New Order" in Asia--the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

²³⁶Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1986). Appendix D contains Hirohito's speech, which started with, "...the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our Imperial Ancestors...(and concluded with)...enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with progress in the world".

but not of it."²³⁷ An expectation that Japan should follow the Western norm in structure (institutions) and essence (polity) has contributed to economic friction over trade agreements, fair competition, and other issues between the West and Japan. Japan modernized under the ideal of wakon yosai, Japanese spirit and Western knowledge, but modernization was carried out not by changing the traditional social structure but by utilizing it.²³⁸ As Japan exercises political power commensurate with economic power, political frictions based on differing values may also develop if misunderstanding between the West and Japan is not cleared.

Kokutai is more than a social order based on historical institutions and ancient culture, it is a social way of life that does indeed make Japan unique in the Western world. Personal relationships hold a historical primacy over the rule of law in Japan, and the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land is no exception.²³⁹ The basis of Japanese personnel relations, from ancient times to the present, is the primacy of the group and each individual's proper position and role in that group.²⁴⁰ This polity originated from a Japanese religious cult of clan ancestor worship, the ujigami, or clan-

²³⁷van Wolferen, Chapter 16.

²³⁸Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California, 1970), p. 115.

²³⁹Nakane, previously cited, p. 139, comments that "Japanese culture has no conception of God existing abstractly, completely separate from the human world. In the ultimate analysis, the Japanese consciousness of the aspect of religious devotion grows out of direct-contact relations between individuals." In other words, personal relationships are a higher law.

²⁴⁰Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

gods.²⁴¹ The social order was strictly enforced, and to disobey meant "something incomparably harsher than the socialistic tyranny of early Greek society: it means religious communistic despotism--supreme social tyranny suppressing personality."²⁴² Today, the cult of the ujigami remains and if one visits Japan and observes the many festivals held there, ceremonies of tribute to the ancient clan-gods can be observed.

Instead of devoting one's life to his proper position in the clan, new associations, such as trading companies, command the attention of Japanese. Habatsu, cliques, are formed by association, and one's gimu, duty, to the group can last a lifetime. Relationships within the group is centered on the notions of sempai (senior), kohai (junior), and doryo, meaning one's colleagues.²⁴³ To disobey one's proper role is an act of great shame, haji, and leads to ostracism from the group. The habatsu mondai (political infighting among the factions) in Japan's Diet is a reflection of friction between the United States and Japan. Deals are made but can not be completed due to conflict with a higher obligation. Habatsu cut across organizational lines to such a degree, one questions where the real authority lies.²⁴⁴ It is hard for the Western mind to comprehend the Japanese social order without experiencing it in action. For example, there is nothing comparable in the Occident to the sight of employee roll-call in front

²⁴¹George B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 37.

²⁴²Lafcadio Hearn, Japan: An Interpretation (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1981). Hearn observed Japan at the turn of the century and his use of "communism" was meant in a classical sense. Benedict, previously cited, p. 303, mentions that Japan has not changed so fundamentally (in 1946) since the 1890s, that some of the difficulties Lafcadio Hearn described (personal loyalties) then will not likely recur.

²⁴³Nakane, previously cited, p. 26.

²⁴⁴van Wolferen, previously cited.

of some small Japanese enterprise. With precision, pomp, and seriousness, tunics are all that is lacking to envision oneself in ancient Sparta or Rome.

After the war, ultra-nationalism and extreme political ideology were purged from Japanese customs, but the social relations of the people remain uniquely Japanese. The system lasted for so long that its influence remains, with good and bad results. Japan's low crime rate, productivity, in short, a great deal of her post-war success, is due to the remaining characteristics of the ancient social order. Unfavorable characteristics include the lack of innovative spontaneity among students, and a reluctance to let outsiders into the group.²⁴⁵ The Western notion that inalienable individual rights are guaranteed from the tyranny of the majority has taken root, but not necessarily flourished, in Japan. Also, personal relationships at times conflict with the notions of Western law. This is evident in certain political and social spheres.

In the political sphere for example, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was convicted of bribery during the Lockheed scandal and was forced to resign in the 1970s, yet he was reelected to the Diet and increased his power to such a point that he became the "king maker" of Japanese politics. Tanaka's extensive personal relations, based solely on his political chikara (power) and not on some social or political issue, created a habatsu that dominated the choice of subsequent Prime Ministers until Tanaka suffered a stroke a decade later. Tanaka merely cultivated the traditional personal

²⁴⁵James Fallows, "Containing Japan," The Atlantic, May 1989, p. 52. Mr. Fallows comments that, "unless Japanese society changed fundamentally, it is hard to imagine that any of Japan's great power centers-banks, manufacturers-will ever share power with non-Japanese." Here rests a fundamental clash of Western and Japanese values.

relationships that have remained the essence of Japanese polity.²⁴⁶ Even though he broke the law, he did not serve a prison sentence. The Tanaka phenomenon shows the superiority of personal relationships over law in Japan, if one has adequate power. This does not mean that Japan is an unregulated society. On the contrary, feudal Japan was so strict that regulations which determined the size, cost, and number of gifts for children's birthdays were promulgated. Attention to detail remains in Japan. If one has inadequate power, such as Prime Ministers Takeshita and Uno, then the *habatsu* will be deficient and fail to reach a national consensus. In such a case politicians must submit to the will of the Japanese people. However, if elite *habatsu* have reached a consensus on a certain policy, and no other political *habatsu* is formed to counter it, then it appears the will of the Japanese people is not necessarily the ultimate arbitrator. For example, Japanese have come to realize that they pay more for domestic products than their foreign counterparts do for Japanese products. Also, while the Japanese per capita GNP is among the world's highest, the quality of life, such as sewer systems, highway transportation, housing, etc., is sub-par in comparison to other advanced industrialized countries. Yet the individual desire to introduce consumerism lacks *habatsu* power, and Japan's antiquated distribution system continues.²⁴⁷

In the social sphere, Japan's Constitution explicitly states that "all of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or

²⁴⁶Historical figures who attained great power are now considered deities, with shrines and festivals, such as Tokugawa Ieyasu. Tanaka's power, significant in the post-war period, pales in comparison with major Japanese historical figures.

²⁴⁷van Wolferen, previously cited, questions, "for what ultimate purpose do (the Japanese) deprive themselves of comfort and risk the enmity of the world?"

social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin."²⁴⁸ However, for almost one million ethnic Koreans and Chinese, ninety percent having been born in Japan, these words have no meaning. Even though these "aliens" pay taxes, they are deprived the right to vote, hold public office, teach in Japanese schools, and enjoy other benefits of citizenship. After the war, General MacArthur's staff requested the Japanese government draw up a draft Constitution. What was submitted was a virtual replica of the Meiji Constitution, containing pre-war notions of civil rights and the role of the Emperor. Since the occupation was concerned with primarily promoting democratization and demilitarization, the Constitution was drafted under Gen. MacArthur's direction. When the Japanese government protested MacArthur threatened to take the issue directly to the Japanese people by referendum. Knowing that the Japanese people would choose the MacArthur Constitution, with its enfranchisement of women, guarantee of labor unions, etc., over their Meiji-style draft, the government declined opposition. However, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) allowed the Japanese government to revise some articles of the Constitution, and vague phrases and words were inserted to allow for future reinterpretation. By using the term Kokumin Japanese for the word "people," the government made Article Thirteen useless for non-Japanese residing in Japan. The guarantee of civil rights in Article Thirteen was also negated by the insertion of Article Ten, which stated, "the conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law." ²⁴⁹ Laws were passed by

²⁴⁸Japanese Constitution, Article 13.

²⁴⁹Koseki Shoichi, "Japanizing the Constitution," Japan Quarterly, July-September 1988, p. 236. Mr. Koseki believes the present day Constitution is genuinely Japanese.

the Diet, similar to the Meiji style, which have restricted citizenship to ethnic Koreans and Chinese. To the Western notion of civil rights, the Diet's actions appear to be in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the supreme law of the land. Blatant discrimination directed towards the Burakumin, a traditional outcaste class of ethnic Japanese dating back several hundreds of years, is unquestionably unconstitutional. Japan's Supreme Court has failed to end discrimination for these ethnic Japanese, numbering over one million people, despite clear instructions regarding the matter laid out in the Constitution. Japanese society has, by and large, accepted the denial of civil rights to the Burakumin and other "aliens" because they are simply outside traditional groups.

The "Peace Constitution," while interpreted in ways that seem unconstitutional, has made a significant contribution in promoting democracy in Japan relative to pre-war conditions. The political enfranchisement of women has been, in a limited sense, a revolutionary measure considering their status before the war. The most important contribution to democratization in Japan is Article One, which states, "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." The Emperor is indeed the symbol of the people, and more so than other Western monarchs. He still maintains a religious connection to the Japanese people.²⁵⁰ The Japanese people support the depolitization of the Emperor, expressed by Article One, but the old notions of

²⁵⁰Nakane, previously cited, p. 140, states, "...the Emperor, with his ancestors, is conceptualized as the ultimate figure of successive lineal extensions...common to all Japanese through their respective ancestors: he is not a sacred figure divorced from his people."

Kokutai remains accepted in right-wing religious and political fringe groups.²⁵¹ Regarding the ultra-nationalistic fringe, of particular importance is the number of government officials who cling to beliefs of the ancient way.²⁵² This is not surprising considering that numerous high level government officials, even some who became Prime Minister, administered the "New Order" in Asia during the war. Personal relationships among them, loyalties of a lifetime, reinforce their view that Japan was a victim of the Second World War, only the Japanese were wrongly labeled an aggressor nation, and it was the "white race" that started the war by colonizing Asia.²⁵³ Japan's rise to an economic and financial superpower only reinforces the beliefs of right-wing elements. While some Japanese are ultra-nationalistic, the majority supports the "Peace Constitution" and what it symbolizes: an end to ultra-nationalistic militarism. The Japanese Constitution is a key issue regarding any revised United States-Japanese security arrangement, and as such an understanding of it and the position it holds in Japanese society is critical.

²⁵¹Sugata Masaaki, "Shinto Resurgence," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1988, pp. 369, 370. Mahikari, one of the fastest growing sects in Shinto today, maintains the doctrine that 73 generations of emperors had ruled over the world with Japan at its center before the coming of Emperor Jimmu.

²⁵²Clyde Haberman, "Japan Quietly Recalls WWII Surrender," New York Times, 16 August 1987, p. A4. Sixteen of twenty cabinet members visited Yasakuni Shrine in addition to two hundred LDP parliamentarians.

²⁵³Okuno Seisuke, "Shinryaku Hatsugen: Doko Ga Warui," Bungeishunju, No. 7, 1988, p. 114. Mr. Okuno resigned from the Japanese cabinet in 1988 after saying there had been no aggression in China, and the Chinese government responded with strong protests. Besides his position as Minister of Land Administration, he served in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Justice. Mr. Okuno was a member of the Tokko, thought police, during the Pacific War. (van Wolferen, previously cited, p. 359.)

A. JAPAN'S REARMAMENT

Article Nine is probably one of the most famous features of any Constitution, yet it is widely misunderstood outside of Japan. As stated in the previous section, it was common to hear in the United States that Japan was limited by its Constitution in deploying naval forces to the Persian Gulf. Also, many Japanese assume that Article Nine was forced on Japan by the United States without any Japanese counsel. Neither notion is true--there is no limit to Japanese defense spending according to Constitutional interpretation. In fact, the Japanese government can choose to interpret the Constitution to any perceived requirement for Japanese national security as long as there is a consensus among the political habatsu that is accepted by the Japanese public.²⁵⁴ The flexibility of Article Nine lies in its ambiguous wording. It states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²⁵⁵ (author's emphasis)

With the insertion of the above underlined phrases, Japanese officials have been able to revise the SCAP Constitutional draft in a way that allows for the Japanese government of the 1980s to interpret Article Nine in various ways. After Article Nine was written, neither General MacArthur nor Prime Minister Yoshida believed that the inherent right of self-defense was unconstitutional. This matter was legally settled in

²⁵⁴James R. Van de Velde, "Article Nine of the Postwar Japanese Constitution," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1987, p. 26.

²⁵⁵Japanese Constitution, Article Nine.

1959, when Japan's Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution "in no way denies the right of self-defense." Further interpretations of the document were deferred by the Supreme Court to the Japanese government. Consequently, the type of military equipment and role the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should play has been decided by the government in an incremental way, building a national consensus on security policy.²⁵⁶ For example, it was once considered illegal to have jet aircraft, but now Japan has more jet fighter aircraft than the United States has deployed in Asia. The FSX program will enable the Japanese to domestically produce top-of-the line aircraft in the future. Once it was considered contrary to the spirit of the Japanese Constitution for Japanese vessels to carry certain arms, i.e., torpedoes, but now Japan has more rocket delivered torpedoes (ASROC) than the Soviet Pacific Fleet.²⁵⁷ This ability to interpret the flexible Constitution depending on the political mood of the Japanese public allows for no legal limits concerning the security of Japan. There is no territorial limit as such for the exercise of defending Japan and national influence may require the use of the SDF during times of peace.²⁵⁸ To show the elasticity of the governments interpretation, Prime Minister Kishi announced in 1959, that nuclear weapons for defense could be possessed, and that forces could be dispatched overseas, without

²⁵⁶Van de Velde, previously cited, pp. 29-35.

²⁵⁷Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan's Security, Defense Responsibilities, and Capabilities," Orbis, Spring 1981, p. 96.

²⁵⁸Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, pg. 71, states: "The necessary minimum force to defend Japan as employed in the execution of its right to self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic scope of the Japanese territorial land, sea, and airspace."

violating the Constitution.²⁵⁹ However, maintaining strategic systems, such as ICBMs and long-range bomber aircraft, has been declared against the spirit of the Constitution. Japan is currently mulling over the prospects of allowing Japanese non-Self Defense Force personnel to participate in U.N. peacekeeping forces.²⁶⁰

The Constitution has been interpreted to allow for Japan's participation in collective security arrangements as long this is done within the framework deemed necessary for the defense of Japan only. However, the reluctance of the Japanese government to interpret the Constitution to allow for a United States-Japan-Korea security arrangement has no real basis in law, it is most certainly based in antagonistic Japanese-Korean relations and the Japanese public's fear of being drawn into a war by "power politics."²⁶¹ Because the United States was unable to secure a collective agreement in Asia, comparable to NATO in Europe, it became a partner to a diverse range of bilateral and multilateral Asian pacts. Therefore, neither Japan nor South Korea has a formal commitment to assist each other during a conflict. Such arrangements will come under increasing scrutiny because of cost-effectiveness, and the potential for the United States to be required by treaty to assist one ally in the region during a crisis while a very capable ally, i.e., Japan, observes the outcome.

²⁵⁹Hata, previously cited, p. 20.

²⁶⁰Pacific Defense Reporter, October 1988, p. 42.

²⁶¹Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 71 mentions "...Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law...the government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum limit (necessary for the defense of Japan) and constitutionally is not permissible."

Since the Japanese Constitution can be interpreted to not rule out preemptive strikes for self-defense, retaliation against an aggressor country on its territory, or the dispatch of forces overseas to defend Japan, such military contingencies cannot be discounted because of the Western notion of unconstitutionality, if the public recognizes such actions as inherent to Japanese security.²⁶² As stated in the previous chapter, if diplomacy fails, Japan's military capability to regain the Northern Territories in the 1990s is real, and such action would not necessarily be interpreted as unconstitutional.

United States diplomats who negotiate for a collective defense system with Japan should be prepared for the "constitutionality question" to be raised by their Japanese counterparts, and realize the political machinations behind it. President Reagan and Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's joint communique in 1981 acknowledged the appropriateness of a rational division of labor in defense, and Mr. Suzuki's following statement that Japan, "within the framework of the Constitution," would protect its sea lanes of communication to 1,000 miles as a national policy, clearly shows that Japan is willing to adopt appropriate security policies if it perceives there is a danger to the Japanese national interest.²⁶³

If the United States is to adjust its security commitments in Northeast Asia during the next decade and beyond, it would seem prudent to attempt to induce Japan to join in some form of collective security pact, and to recognize that any Japanese opposition to do so is based primarily on political reasons and not the Constitution.

²⁶²Van de Velde, previously cited, p. 41.

²⁶³James E. Auer, "Japan's Defense Policy," Current History, Vol. 87, No. 528, p. 146.

Japanese interpretation of the Constitution has consistently displayed flexibility in virtually every aspect of defense, except collective security. This is detrimental to the security interests of the United States for a more important reason than arguments of "burden sharing." It shows a Japanese inclination to "go-it-alone," and an unwillingness to assist in a common, rather than individual, security. For example, a U.S. combatant that is attacked outside of Japanese territorial waters would not, in theory, receive assistance from a Japanese combatant nearby, as it would no longer be purely for Japan's own defense, according to a 1972 interpretation.²⁶⁴ If Japan chooses to pursue an independent route regarding national security, the existing balance of power will change and some of the United States allies and friends, such as Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines, may view Japanese military strategy as a security threat. To contain Japan from choosing such an independent option that could lead to increased United States-Japanese political tensions, a new security arrangement should preferably include the U.S., Japan, and Korea.²⁶⁵ At a minimum, it should seek a Northeast Asian collective security effort, even if it excludes the United States. For example, a Japanese-Korean pact would be preferable to the interests of the United States than an independent Japanese defense strategy that was supported

²⁶⁴Langdon, previously cited, p. 404. Japan has recently announced that it would assist US transports resupplying a Japan that was under attack. While some in US military circles consider this positive, should not this be expected of any ally, and that the converse would be an outrage.

²⁶⁵Edward A. Olsen, "Security in Northeast Asia: A Trilateral Alternative," Naval War College Review, January-February 1985. On p. 20, Prof. Olsen points out that concerning a joint effort, "virtually no pressure has been exerted on Tokyo or Seoul by Washington towards an expanded Japanese-ROK defense relationship."

by three-six percent GNP of the world's second largest economy.²⁶⁶ In short, if the United States withdraws or reduces military presence in Asia, hegemony by a single power can be prevented through joint security efforts. Continuation of the security status quo prevents the building of trust between Japan and her neighbors concerning defense, makes an independent Japanese security option more probable, and most importantly, prevents the Japanese public from realistically appraising and accepting Japan's legitimate security role and accountability of that role. A Japanese defense force that will have the world's third largest budget in the 1990s, maintains top-of-the-line equipment, yet is under-deployed, does not appear to be a real test of civilian control over the military. When Japan finally considers the SDF to be an active instrument of influence to promote and defend national interest, the historical supremacy of the Japanese military may challenge democracy in Japan.

B. DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL CONSTRAINTS

The greatest restraint to an expanded Japanese security effort in Northeast Asia is, of course, a fear of revived militarism. This persists within Japan and in the surrounding countries of the archipelago. The underlying reason for such fears is the belief that Japan, in comparison to Germany, has not learned the lessons of World War II.²⁶⁷ Opponents of militarism in Japan believed the one percent of GNP limit on

²⁶⁶Japan would dominate such an alliance, but South Korea may be in a more threatened position if the US conducted dramatic withdrawals from Asia. The purpose of a Japanese-Korean pact would be to build trust and impose restraints on power.

²⁶⁷Urban C. Leher, Asian Wall Street Journal, 9-10 September 1988, p. 1, reports that a Japanese intellectual remarked, "the West Germans are trying to learn from the war experience. The Japanese are trying to bury it." Also, a Korean diplomat said that he worries "30-40% of Japanese feel they did nothing wrong in Korea."

defense spending, promulgated by Prime Minister Miki in 1976, acted as a hadome, brake, to prevent Japan from becoming a great military power.²⁶⁸ Also, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), setting forth the required minimum force structure to deter small-scale aggression, was established by the Miki government to counter fears of unchecked military growth.²⁶⁹ An "exclusively defensive defense," senshu boei, policy was adopted by Japanese governments in response to the overwhelming desire of Japan's citizens that the nation not follow the path of militarism that lead to war. Japanese were able to embrace pacifism and unarmed neutrality for decades because of the U.S. guaranteed security. This has prevented a realistic appraisal of security requirements in Japan comparable to West Germany. Most importantly, unlike West Germany, the public's attitude towards the Japanese Self-Defense Forces has remained confused.²⁷⁰

It seems the Japanese public's rejection of a revised Constitution, allowing for removal of any military restraints, has checked militarism.²⁷¹ However, in denying any security role outside of Japan, i.e., collective security, the notion of civilian control remains untested. Since the rise of militarism in Japan was linked to an unaccountable military establishment, especially overseas, in the 1920-30s, it would appear prudent to

²⁶⁸Odawara, previously cited, p. 248.

²⁶⁹Chuma Kiyofuku, "What Price the Defense of Japan," Japan Quarterly, July-September 1987, p. 254.

²⁷⁰Langdon, previously cited, p. 408, quotes former Socialist Party Chairman Ishibashi, in 1984, as saying, "the SDF which are unconstitutional are legal in existence pursuant to the SDF laws established in the Diet."

²⁷¹Odawara, previously cited, p. 251, mentions that Japan's major political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, has maintained a party platform since 1955 that promotes "revision to an autonomous Constitution."

exercise civilian control of Japanese forces outside of Japan, i.e., in a collective security context. Collective security among independent nation-states requires consultation and compromise to function properly, and it usually restrains excessive security policies. As Japan's defense structure continues to accumulate military capability, it remains to be seen how accountable to civilian control that power will be once it is exercised in conjunction with legitimate security interests.²⁷² Now that the Berlin Wall is politically defunct, fears of a unified Germany, while lingering, are basically put aside because West Germans have passed the litmus test of democracy: accountability in the military. Indeed, Mr. Manfred Woerner, a German, is Secretary General of NATO. Unfortunately, because of the over-dependence on the United States security guarantee, Japan remains to be tested, and consequently, is not perceived to be willing to contribute to Western security vis-a-vis West Germany.

Japanese opposition to militarism frequently is linked to the United States-Japanese security arrangement. Most Japanese do not consider the mutual security pact a treaty of allies,²⁷³ and Japan's security relationship with the United States is viewed by both the right and left-wings as one of a "lackey" to Washington's "power politics."²⁷⁴ Japan's defense growth, then, is seen as nothing more than a series of

²⁷²see, Okazaki, previously cited, Chapter Seven, "Can Japanese Democracy Fight a War," for related concerns.

²⁷³Armacost, Current Policy, No. 974, previously cited, p. 5, mentions that at the Williamsburg Summit meeting in 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone asserted that "Japan is firmly a member of the West." This was significant, since the 1981 statement of "alliance" with the US almost brought down the Suzuki government.

²⁷⁴Maeda Hisao, "Opening the Door to a Military Buildup," Japan Echo, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1987, p. 64.

responses to United States pressure to do something about economic friction, i.e., arms purchased from the United States helps the balance of trade between the two nations. Also, the Japanese left finds the concepts of "balance of power," "deterrence," and the role of the military in security issues as invalid in today's modern world. The idea that the United States was able to follow a policy of isolationism under the aegis of Pax Britannica, and was later forced to assume world responsibilities after the Second World War, is an inappropriate example for Japan to follow.²⁷⁵ The pervasiveness of this left-wing view in Japan, symbolized by the forced resignation of Japan's Foreign Minister after Prime Minister Suzuki declared the United States and Japan allies in 1981, is eroding with the realities of the late 1980s. The evident collapse of "administrative bureaucratic socialism," to use the phrase coined by Moscow, symbolized by the lowering of the Berlin Wall, is a confirmation of the United States grand strategy of Containment and all that it implies, i.e., deterrence, balance of power, etc. George Kennan's correct prediction, that "tyranny carries with it its own seeds of destruction," reconfirms that his policy of containment is the prime mover for events in East Europe. The popular revolt against communism in Eastern Europe appears to be the results of people power, but the final outcome of European political status will largely be determined by those nations which can exercise power and influence to support the self-determination of East Europeans. Perhaps, Soviet approval of events in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia is merely an attempt to buy time for reforms, to forestall the "seeds of destruction" inherent in tyranny.

²⁷⁵Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Rejecting the Military Path", Japan Echo, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1986, p. 56.

Power politics is a reality, reconfirmed by the success of Containment to erode the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, and Japan will not doubt abide by that mode of international relations in the next decade. Japanese power politics to date has relied on economic measures, but as Japan gamers military capability in the 1990s, it is not unreasonable to expect Japan to promote national interests by all means possible--including the military. The removal of the one percent GNP limit on defense spending is a step in that direction. As Japan assumes political and military stature commensurate with its economic standing, the restraints on military power in the execution of national interest policy will become the greatest post-war exercise of democracy by the Japanese people to date.

An independent Japanese defense role in Northeast Asia will certainly be opposed by every nation which experienced Japanese aggression during World War II. Unfortunately, few Japanese have yet to reach a catharsis on the legacy of the war and move beyond a "victim mentality." There is a common belief that the NICs of Asia owe a large amount of their success to the efforts of Imperial Japan.²⁷⁶ A joint United States-Japanese security effort in the region can lessen regional fears, much in the same way NATO has done for Germany in Europe. However, an increase of three percent GNP on defense, a revised NDPO that proposes unlimited force structure, and an independent Japanese security strategy is not the interest of any U.S. ally in the

²⁷⁶Flora Lewis, "Japan's Looking Glass," New York Times, 8 November 1989, p. A21. Ms. Lewis quotes Shintaro Ishihara, a top LDP dietmember who notes economic success in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. and says they "were all, at one time or another, under Japanese administration. We are aware some negative things happened under Japanese administration, but it cannot be denied that many positive things were left behind."

region.²⁷⁷ Prime Minister Lee of Singapore has told Japan that it would be ill-advised to leave the United States security arrangement.²⁷⁸ The same holds true for Korea, Taiwan, P.R.C., and the Philippines. However, Japan, while possessing a GNP treble of all other nations combined in Northeast and Southeast Asia, is not capable of returning to the military dominance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Even though Japan's defense budget will probably equal that of all the countries in Greater East Asia combined (Soviets excluded) in the early 1990s, the individual nations of the region are not the military "back waters" of the colonial 1930s. Nationalism will certainly prevent a military hegemony of any single power from imposing its will in the whole region, much like Latin America views the "power from the North." Values, in particular the exclusion of those outside the group, remain the "achilles heel" of any Japanese ultra-nationalism. Japan will likely occupy the unloved position of being an overly developed economic hegemon in the region.²⁷⁹

Another check to revised militarism is the younger Japanese generation's outlook in life, just as young Germans reject the militarism of Nazi Germany. Economic consumerism and political pluralism is just beginning to take hold in Japan, producing a new generation that might find the ideology of the ancient way, Kokutai, absurd.

²⁷⁷Betts, previously cited, pg. 12, points out that, "if Japan were to become a military as well as economic superpower, resolution of economic tension between Washington and Tokyo would be more imperative. Such a transformation would amount to a revolution in the international system. With genuine military multi-polarity, the US would have less reasons to remain involved through forward deployment and defense commitments in the region."

²⁷⁸Washington Post, 14 October 1988, p. A32.

²⁷⁹Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles," International Affairs, 1988, pp. 567-570.

They are considered so different from the older generations that a new phrase, shinjinrui, new human race, has been coined for them.²⁸⁰ U.S. efforts to open up Japanese markets, eliminate the antiquated distribution system, and introduce consumerism, did strike at the very core of Japan's ancient social values. This is the underlying reason why Japan, even though it maintains an average trade surplus of \$50 billion with the United States and finds no obstacles to investment in America, has recently voiced strong opposition to U.S. requests for trade based on reciprocity.²⁸¹ Japan's future prosperity may well depend on whether the younger generation assimilates Western values, i.e., individual freedom, or prefers to be "uniquely" group oriented Japanese. The latter belief, termed Nihonjinron, theorizing on the Japanese race, seems to be a revival of Kokutai without military strings attached. Basically, the thesis portrays the Japanese as unique in the world, supposedly due to both nature and nurture. Hence, U.S. trade negotiators find that American access to certain markets in Japan, such as beef, ski equipment, and construction is stonewalled because Japanese have "unique" intestines, snow, and soil. Combine Nihonjinron with the myth that the Emperor is not a mortal being, and the possibility for future extremism is real.²⁸²

²⁸⁰The Economist, "Japan Survey," 5 December 1987, p. 33.

²⁸¹Ishihara Shintaro, "NO Wa NO De Aru," Bungeishunju, No. 11, 1989. Mr. Ishihara, co-author of "A Japan That Can Say No", points to cultural and historical differences as underlying U.S.-Japanese trade friction. Mr. Ishihara believes the Heisei Era, Emperor Akihito's reign, is the dawn of a new civilization, not necessarily based on Western values. Mr. Ishihara is a member of the Reimei no Kai, new civilization association (habatsu) in Japan's Diet.

²⁸²The Central Japan Tourism Promotion Liaison Council, "The Splendors of Central Japan," May 1988, published by the Aichi prefectural (state) government, Nagoya, p. 30, describes Ise shrine as "dedicated to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess-the ancestor of the Imperial household." (author's emphasis)

Perhaps an indication of whether the next generation of Japanese elite favor reform or revision, will take place in 1990 during the daijosai, the rite of Akihito's enthronement. This ancient ceremony provides for the symbolic impregnation of the Emperor by deities and his rebirth with divine qualities.²⁸³ Hopefully, the shinjinrui will see through any right-wing efforts to revive Kokutai or State Shinto via the Daijosai.²⁸⁴ Japan's future as an economic and military great power, perhaps superpower beyond the next decade, will have to face the contradiction between some residual ancient social values and the Western values of individual freedom, now spreading even to "administrative bureaucratic socialist" countries behind the Iron Curtain.

²⁸³van Wolferen, previously cited, p. 324.

²⁸⁴The daijosai ceremony and official visits to Yasukuni Shrine appear to be a clear violation of the Constitution, i.e. separation of church and state, or at least not in the spirit of "democratization and demilitarization" values supposedly held in postwar Japan. While Japan has received strong protests from Korea and China over visits to Yasukuni, and probably will receive more for the daijosai if it smacks of State Shinto, it remains a mystery why the U.S. State Department has remained silent on this issue.

V. THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE ALLIANCE IN CHANGING TIMES

The improvement of United States-U.S.S.R. relations after the Malta Summit has the potential to bring about an end to the Cold War and decrease the threat of an unwinnable global nuclear war. Events during the latter months of 1989 in Eastern Europe portend a "beyond-containment" world. The Bush Administration desires perestroika to succeed in the following aspects: 1) reform the Soviet economy and join the international system of free trade; 2) reduce Soviet military expenditures to a real level of "reasonable sufficiency," allowing both the United States and U.S.S.R. to shift from military confrontation to international economic competition; 3) work together to resolve low-intensity conflicts in the Third World through political, rather than military, means; and 4) most important in the long-term, develop incremental democracy that erodes the unpredictable excesses of dictatorship. If perestroika succeeds in the above criteria, United States security strategy will be due for a drastic over-haul to meet the new international environment. As the symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, totters, it is not unreasonable to envision a dramatic decrease in United States-U.S.S.R. troop presence in Europe.²⁸⁵ This could lead to U.S. force reductions in Asia. If perestroika fails, the United States must be prepared for a hard-line regime to emerge in Moscow, Marxist fundamentalists clinging to a revolutionary ideology, and a possible increase in the tensions between open and closed societies. Indeed, a hard-line regime

²⁸⁵New York Times, 20 November 1989, p. A16, reports SECDEF Cheney has directed studies on reducing the US Defense budget by \$180 billion over the next five years.

in Moscow confronted with economic disaster and nationalist turbulence may strike out against a perceived threat.²⁸⁶ Therefore, whatever security rearrangement with Japan that takes place must also take into account both the optimistic and pessimistic predictions of United States-U.S.S.R. relations. In short, it must be a flexible strategy in Asia to account for the possibilities of failure or success of Gorbachev's reforms.

While United States public opinion seems to be following the European public view of a less-threatening Soviet Union, American-Japanese perceptions of each other are beginning to depart from the post-war norm. For example, recent surveys show that Japan's economic domination is a greater threat to United States national security, according to U.S. public opinion, than the traditional threat of Soviet expansionism.²⁸⁷ The late Theodore White, in 1985, argued that a relentless Japanese economic juggernaut aimed at deindustrializing the United States was seeking to win the "war of the Pacific" through unfair economic tactics.²⁸⁸ Also in the security sphere, new frictions are beginning to appear. "Techno-nationalism" over the FSX fighter has strained United States-Japanese relations to a level reminiscent of the Vietnam-era. The U.S. Department of Defense has even warned Congress that "there is a limit beyond

²⁸⁶The Chinese Communist Party declared the 1989 student protest a counterrevolutionary movement supported by foreign nations desiring the overthrow of the socialist order. Would not the Soviets blame a similar occurrence on the "bourgeois support" of the West?

²⁸⁷Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 August 1988, p. 10.

²⁸⁸see David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, N. Y.: William Morrow and Company, 1971), and Russell Braddon, Japan Against the World (Briarcliff Manor, N.J.: Stien, 1983) for alarmist views of post-war Japan.

which Japan should not go in defense expenditures" and to treble Japanese defense spending (to three percent GNP), "would be a destabilizing factor."²⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Japan is increasingly finding status quo subservience to the United States unacceptable. Some Japanese have recently advocated that Japan has the power to say "no" to the United States, and a new international order, not based on U.S. power but Japanese, is possible.²⁹⁰ For example, Japan could threaten semiconductor supply, harming U.S. military capability. By and large, the Japanese view themselves as victims of the Second World War and the power politics of the Cold War.²⁹¹ This is probably the major block for Japan to enter a collective defense system. As an example of victim mentality, certain Japanese polls found that, among high school students, the United States was chosen as the most probable enemy if Japan were to be in a hypothetical war. Many are developing a "soft nationalism" that recognizes

²⁸⁹Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 October 1988, p. 984.

²⁹⁰Lewis, previously cited, extensively quotes Shintaro Ishihara and the founder of Sony Corporation, Mr. Morita, from their co-authored book "A Japan That Can Say No." Mr. Ishihara wrote, speaking of super conductors, that, "this type of technology does not exist anywhere in the USSR or US. It exists only in Japan and Germany. If the giants in the economic field and the politicians can join together around this type of technology, it would open up new possibilities for our advancement. Whether or not this can be achieved depends upon our large and small choices in the future; in sum it is a question involving the sensibilities of our politicians." Mr. Morita wrote, "the time will never again come when America will regain its strength in industry, we are going to have a totally new configuration in the balance of power in the world."

²⁹¹Urban C. Leher, "Revised View of History Finding Favor," Asian Wall Street Journal, 9-10 September 1988, p. 1 quotes influential rightist, Hideaki Kase, as saying, "Japan did not wage an unjust war. As a matter of history, we have been treated very unfairly by the victors...Japan adopted a pertinent pose after WW II because it is much easier to say everything we did before 1945 was wrong and we are so sorry. It lets us get away with spending only 1% of GNP on defense while we let the Americans play mercenary."

Japan has a role, its proper place in international society, but they do not quite know exactly what it is. A revised security arrangement should seek to lessen United States-Japanese friction and strengthen the bilateral relationship by compensating for each other's weaknesses. Security arrangements between the United States and Japan have served the national interests of both nations well for the past four decades. An agreement crafted to meet the needs of both nations, reflecting political, economic and military conditions that have changed since the commencement of the current security treaty, may lead to more decades of mutual prosperity.

Japanese, by and large, support the continuation of the special relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and realize the dangers of seeking to become an independent power center. Mr. Seizaburo Sato, a foreign policy advisor to Mr. Nakasone, says the greatness of power is measured by four things: wealth, military strength, political ideas and the will to impose them, and a culture that appeals to other people and can influence them. Only the United States meets all of these superpower requirements.²⁹² Yet the Japanese are recognizing they cannot continue a minimalist foreign policy, and their economic stature requires a reappraisal of seikei bunri in favor of a realization of the interrelationships of economic and military factors.²⁹³ Perhaps the greatest fear is that Japan will be faced with a real security threat, become shocked out of its idealism and find its version of democracy unprepared for the power politics

²⁹²The Economist, 13 August 1988, p. 29.

²⁹³Hideki Ohata, "Dialogue with Morgenthau in Japan: A New Approach to Power Politics," Pacific Focus, Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1987.

of international relations.²⁹⁴ While U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at an all time high, U.S.-Japanese relations, due to economic friction, show increasing tension that may become more difficult to manage in the 1990s. The U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan could lead to protectionist laws by Congress, requiring Japan to protect a widening economic sphere in Asia and the Pacific, placing it in direct confrontation with the U.S. and upsetting the balance of power. The challenge facing both the U.S. and Japan is to manage change without excessive protectionism and Nippon-Utsu, "Japan-bashing," in the United States and opening markets in Japan without reviving an unhealthy Japanese nationalism that could go to the extreme.²⁹⁵ A collective Northeast Asian security arrangement can help reinforce Western democratic values, as it has in Germany. Certainly, a beyond-containment strategy should apply in Asia as well as in Europe.

A. A SECURITY REVIEW: ISSUES & OPTIONS

The United States long ago recognized that Japan would someday arise from defeat in the Pacific War to power and influence. America's effort to influence Japanese values during the occupation, by policies of democratization and demilitarization, seemed to have kept this in mind. Because of the special relationship between the United States and Japan, i.e., Japan's dependence on the United States for defense, it remains to be proven that the above mentioned values have completely

²⁹⁴see Tetsuya Kataoka, Waiting For a Pearl Harbor (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Press, 1980), that predicts such a change to Japanese democracy.

²⁹⁵George R. Packard, "The Coming US-Japan Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987-88, pp. 352-357.

taken hold in Japan.²⁹⁶ With the occupation at an end, NSC-125 was formulated for Japan as an adjunct to the American Containment policy, codified in NSC-68, in 1952. The basic idea of NSC-125 was to promote long-term stability in Northeast Asia, with Japan playing a central role. Specifically, the doctrine set the following goals:

- The United States will defend Japan from external aggression, given the importance of Japan (geostrategic and economic).
- The United States will set up a Pacific Collective Security Organization (Pacific Pact), which Japan will be expected to join.
- The United States will promote Japan's rearmament with conventional weapons and provide necessary assistance.
- The United States would support Japan's admission into the United Nations.
- The United States would see that Japan obtains resources by participating in development of S.E. Asia.
- The United States will provide Japan economic assistance (aid and access to the U.S. market).
- As a long-term projection, Japan will be in the Western camp, but will eventually want freedom of action in Asia, in which case a clash with U.S. interests may arise.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶Yamane, previously cited, p. 1308, says, "...the nationalist conservative camp, an overwhelming majority in Japan, will eventually split into two opposing factions: one continuing to emphasize a pro-American status-quo oriented policy, and the other will view such a policy to static and undignified. A danger of Japan sliding into the role of a regional military power backed by ultra-nationalism is real."

²⁹⁷Hata, previously cited, p. 19.

With such guarantees to national security, it is not surprising that Japan opted to raise Constitutional conflicts with points two and three of NSC-125.²⁹⁸ In hindsight one can make a strong case that Japan chose not to agree to these points due to historical antagonism with proposed pact members, i.e., Korea or Taiwan, and that relying on the United States for defense allowed Japan to concentrate scarce resources on rebuilding the nation. Japan, unlike West Germany, was able to claim itself a pacifist nation, due to the unique experience of the atomic bombing. Thus, the United States had to assume sole responsibility for security of Northeast Asia in general, and Japan in particular. To achieve this, the United States formed bilateral security arrangements with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. By unilaterally guaranteeing the defense of Japan, the United States postponed a realistic assessment of security needs by the Japanese people.²⁹⁹ Consequently, an idealistic unarmed neutralism held sway in Japan into the 1970s. Political consensus for national security was lacking, and the public did not even support the legality of the SDF until only within the last decade.³⁰⁰

Point number two and three of NSC-125 were obviously proposed concerning the immediate challenge of the day, conflict in Korea, but they were also favored for the

²⁹⁸Martin Weinstein, *The Washington Quarterly*, previously cited, on p. 19., refers to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty to be what the Japanese government has always officially called an anzen hoshō, a security guarantee extended by the U.S. to Japan.

²⁹⁹Sato Kinko, "The Irrational 1% Ceiling on Defense Spending," *Japan Echo*, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1985, on p. 25, said, "US military aid is the contemporary equivalent of the Kamikaze, or Divine Wind, that swept in and saved Japan from Mongol invasions."

³⁰⁰Chuma, previously cited, p. 258, points out only 15% of Japanese polled in 1987 approved of the removal of the 1% ceiling for defence spending, while 61% expressed disapproval. Nevertheless, the 1% limit was disbanded.

underlying values that the United States held regarding the future of international and regional security.

For example, before negotiating a security treaty with the Japanese, John Foster Dulles stressed the importance of trust and collective security and the ultimate preference for United States-Japanese security relations. In his speech to the Japanese press club in February, 1951, Dulles said:

Collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. The likelihood of failure is a deterrent to aggression...Japan can draw some useful lessons from these elemental security principles...the Japanese government and people will then have primary responsibility to maintain in their homeland a protection corresponding to that of a householder...any people who avoid that precaution are guilty of contributory neglect and deserve little sympathy...the UN was formed with its first stated purpose to effect collective measures for the preservation of peace. The Security Council was given the duty to create an international force to deter aggression. Japan, if so disposed, can share collective security protection against direct aggression. The security plan we outline does not require that the Japanese nation become militaristic...the program would realize the UN ideal, which is the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defense' shall so be implemented that 'armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'...we seek a peace in which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of full sovereignty which peace will have restored; opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example...to create a feeling...that Japan is now a nation to be trusted.³⁰¹ (author's emphasis)

The ideals of NSC-125 have guided the United States-Japanese security relationship since Japan regained sovereignty. The belief that "so long as they wish American protection, the Japanese should be able to count on the United States to defend Japan whether or not they are prepared to mount a major defense buildup in their own behalf"³⁰² clearly contradicts the initial United States security objectives

³⁰¹John Foster Dulles, "From Occupation to Cooperation," Speaking of Japan, January, 1984.

³⁰²Franklin B. Weinstein, previously cited, p. 13.

regarding Japan in Northeast Asia. In light of Japan's capability to reach maritime parity vis-a-vis the Soviets in the 1990s, such support for a minimalist Japanese defense policy seems to ignore Japan's defense structure growth. Despite Japanese reluctance to assume responsibility for defending the home islands, the United States concluded a Security Treaty with Japan in 1951.

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan in 1951 and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States in 1960 differ dramatically regarding the original intentions of NSC-125. The former treaty stated in its preamble that:

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression....(author's emphasis)

Further support for NSC-125 was also included in Article Four:

This treaty will expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.³⁰³ (author's emphasis)

The revised treaty of 1960 removed the previous preamble, with its "expectation that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility," and also deleted any reference to collective security expiring the treaty as stated in Article Four. Instead, the United States commitment to defend Japan was enlarged while Japanese expectations were lowered. For example, the former treaty states the function of U.S. forces stationed in Japan as simply "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security

³⁰³Tiedman, previously cited, pp. 183, 184.

in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without." Article Five of the current treaty states:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its Constitutional provisions and processes.....³⁰⁴ (author's underline)

The present treaty, in comparison to the original treaty, clearly favors Japanese interest over the U.S. ideals expressed in NSC-125. An attack on Japan by the U.S.S.R., while increasingly improbable, is a common danger to United States and Japanese interests. But is not conflict in Korea also a common danger to United States and Japanese interests? Apparently not, since according to the archaic treaty of 1960, even an attack on U.S. forces outside the territory of Japan, even if it is only a mile, is not in any common interest of both the United States and Japan. U.S. forward deployed forces in Japan have the unbelievable possibility that they can depart from bases on foreign soil, to defend that foreign land, come under attack, return to the same foreign base, and expect no assistance from the nation they defend. Now that Japan has more conventional defense structure on the islands than the United States has in the Western Pacific, outside of the power projection capabilities of sea-based air power and nuclear submarines, the notion that U.S. forces in Japan are mere mercenaries is pervasive in Japan.³⁰⁵ A recurrence of another Persian Gulf scenario,

³⁰⁴Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 260.

³⁰⁵Edward A. Olsen, US-Japanese Strategic Reciprocity (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 97 points out Prime Minister Nakasone as saying, "Japan will defend itself by its own efforts, but also will use US forces a hundred percent in an emergency. This will make the defense cost cheaper."

where U.S. forces are sent into harm's way, while a very capable ally with common interests contributes next to nothing, will be increasingly difficult to justify to the American public. For this very reason, U.S. defense credibility on the Korean Peninsula decreases with each year that Japan gains military capability. Revising the United States-Japanese security arrangement, based on reciprocity, is long overdue.

With Japan's security guaranteed by treaty, U.S. overseas bases and a Navy of unprecedented dominance in Asia provided a stable, secure environment that fostered economic growth in the region for decades. However, the debacle of Vietnam ended the sense of U.S. military supremacy and commitment in Asia. The United States pledged "no more land wars in Asia" and began to rely solely on a maritime strategy combining sea power and air power to protect interests in the region. This strategy began to appear insufficient when naval force structure was reduced (from a high of 931 combatants in 1968 to 479 combatants in 1979) while the Soviets built their Pacific Fleet into a "blue water" navy.³⁰⁶ The U.S. military function has been primarily the ability to reinforce and resupply allies and friends, with adjustments to divisions of labor, if attacked. However, to deter attack, the basic U.S. contribution has been to assume that the strategy for defense is militarily effective, and seen by our adversaries to be so.³⁰⁷ The lack of adequate naval forces required for escorting convoys resupplying and reinforcing (Re&Re) Europe in a global war scenario lessened the credibility of maintaining an effective deterrence. U.S. naval force reduction worldwide forced the necessity of announcing a new maritime strategy, the swing strategy,

³⁰⁶Webb, previously cited.

³⁰⁷Reagan, previously cited, p. 18.

during the Carter Administration. The swing strategy relied on shifting elements of the Third Fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic theater, in the event of war, to ensure sufficient force would be available to reasonably guarantee Re&Re of Europe.³⁰⁸ This strategy followed previous ideas of transferring naval forces from one ocean to another in time of need, i.e., transferal of Atlantic Fleet ships to the Pacific before World War II. However, the swing strategy seemed more of a political gesture to signify commitment to NATO than a realistic war-fighting strategy.³⁰⁹

The swing strategy carried important implications for the nations of Asia, notably Japan. Admirals Zumwalt and Bagley remarked in 1978 that "U.S. policies in the Pacific are placing sole security alliance on American sea power that is already over committed...and if the swing strategy is implemented...then the security of Japan may be the most vulnerable at the time of greatest hazard."³¹⁰ To make matters worse, the Islamic revolution in Iran threatened vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, and the United States Navy was required to provide continuous battle group presence in the Indian Ocean. This unexpected development in Southwest Asia furthered the need for warship procurement above and beyond Northeast Asia and Atlantic requirements. Japan became more vulnerable than before the swing strategy, in a global war scenario, since the United States now had to divide its limited naval resources among three potential

³⁰⁸ Betts, previously cited, p. 10.

³⁰⁹ James C. George, ed. The Soviet and Other Communist Navies (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 283, 284.

³¹⁰ ADMS. Elmo Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley, "Strategic Determination in the Pacific: The Dilemma for the US and Japan," Pacific Affairs, January 1978, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 122, 127.

fronts (Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and with whatever forces remained, Pacific).³¹¹ It seems to be no coincidence that at the same time that U.S. naval forces declined, Japan began to develop a Comprehensive National Security policy that funded warship construction which today makes Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force the most modern Asian navy.

A key element in the rearmament of the United States during the Reagan Administration was to build a 600 ship navy. To correct the deficiencies of the swing strategy, these ships were to provide enough naval force structure to ensure Re&Re of Europe in a global war without diminishing Asian security by default. However, 600 ships would not be enough to conduct naval operations in simultaneous theaters (Atlantic, N.E. Asia, and Indian Ocean) with sufficient force required for a favorable order of battle. In short, there were not enough carrier battle groups (15) for all three fronts at once, and still have a prudent reserve in American waters. The United States inability to fight three fronts at once is a condition of strategic significance in post-war national security policy.

In a worst case scenario, global war, a three-front naval requirement is not at all improbable given the close proximity of Soviet armed forces to the areas in question. Soviet participation would not be required for a simultaneous two front requirement, i.e., Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula. While the United States has insufficient naval force structure to conduct offensives simultaneously in three theaters, it may be able to conduct offensive and defensive operations in all three theaters if allied assets, especially Japanese, are committed to the order of battle. A failure of perestroika and

³¹¹Tsurutani, previously cited, p. 92, points out, "the US 7th Fleet has to patrol the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, it cannot be expected to provide much assistance to Japan unless some of its carriers happen to be in close proximity."

emergence of a hard-line regime in Moscow may require a three front capability by the United States to maintain a flexible response deterrence.

The Reagan administration introduced its Maritime Strategy to counter the deficiency of naval forces required to maintain a favorable balance in a global war scenario. The Maritime Strategy consists of three phases. The first phase, deterrence or the transition to war phase, seeks to control escalation by showing the Soviets the United States will cede no area by default. Aggressive forward movement of anti-submarine (ASW) forces, both submarine and maritime patrol aircraft, would force Soviet submarines to retreat to defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines. This forward surge of U.S. naval forces, sea-based air power and submarines, intends to tie down Soviet forces, limiting the transfer of force to Central Europe. The second phase, seizing the initiative, tasks U.S. naval forces to destroy Soviet forces in forward areas, i.e., Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific, and neutralize Soviet clients if required. As U.S. battle groups move forward, ASW forces would wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. With the destruction of the Soviet Fleet in phase two, U.S. forces would commence phase three, carrying the fight to the enemy. Here, Soviet bases are threatened and the continued assault on Soviet ballistic missile submarines changes the nuclear balance to favor the United States. War is then terminated on terms acceptable to the United States by threatening direct attack on the Soviet homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.³¹²

³¹²Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in the Maritime Strategy, Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 8-14.

The Maritime Strategy influenced United States-Japanese security relations. During the formulation of the Maritime Strategy, Japan's security relations with the United States reached unprecedented levels of cooperation. A 1978 guideline for United States-Japanese defense cooperation was promulgated, strengthening planning, intelligence, logistic, and training ties between the nation.³¹³ However, the guideline continued to restate Japan's role as being only to repel limited, small-scale aggression as spelled out in the NDPO. Since 1981, the United States has maintained that, as a part of the division of defense responsibilities in United States-Japanese security arrangements, the United States provides for the protection of Japanese SLOCs in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Japan protects the territory, air and SLOC around its island territories, which include the Bonin and Okinawa island chains, extending nearly to Guam and Taiwan, respectively.³¹⁴ This 1,000 mile sea lane mission and Japanese statements to mine the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya straits, bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet, if warranted, enhanced the credibility of the Maritime Strategy. But while Japan agreed to assume an extended sea lane mission, and did in fact share intelligence with the United States concerning Soviet naval movements, the JMSDF continues to remain "pierside navy" in comparison to the U.S. 7th Fleet tempo of

³¹³Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, pp. 261-265.

³¹⁴Auer, previously cited, p. 181.

operations.³¹⁵ Also, the U.S. 7th Fleet and JMSDF have yet to go beyond the training stage, i.e., conduct "real world" operations together at sea.³¹⁶

The Maritime Strategy has raised a great debate, centered on specific issues such as feasibility, parochialism, and cost.³¹⁷ In general terms, the Maritime Strategy reflects the traditional Mahanian function of naval forces, i.e., the destruction of the enemy fleet through a decisive battle or series of battles at sea. Consequently, naval force structure procurement in the 1980s favored power projection instruments, i.e., nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, over traditional elements of sea control, i.e., surface combatants. Another traditional naval school of thought, based on Corbett, believed the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. This command of the sea meant nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes.³¹⁸ According to Corbett, the function of the fleet was to guard one's own communications and seize those of the enemy. Thus, a balanced fleet was necessary that included an appropriate mix of elements for the decisive battle (power

³¹⁵Japan Defense Agency, previously cited, p. 145, states in 1987 the JDA requested budget allocations for an annual increase of 1,400 to 1,600 hours of steaming time, which equates from 58 days per year to 66 days per year for each flotilla. This is less than one-third operational tempo of the Seventh Fleet.

³¹⁶Cooperation ashore contrasts to the two nation's naval forces at sea. The author served almost four years on board combatants based in Japan and joint "real world" operations were nonexistent.

³¹⁷See John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," and Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security," in International Security, Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1986, for a critique and rebuttal of the Maritime Strategy.

³¹⁸Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 91, 94.

projection) and escort (communication control). The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s may be required, due to domestic budget considerations and lowering of the Soviet threat, to shift toward a balanced fleet that Corbett would have favored.³¹⁹

In an Asian context, the current Maritime Strategy seems to follow in the footsteps of the swing strategy by continuing to consider the Pacific as only an afterthought to the Atlantic theater.³²⁰ For example, a war in Central Europe, in accordance with the Maritime Strategy, will bring a response of horizontal escalation, including strikes against the Soviet Far East, near the Japanese periphery. Would NATO be willing to execute horizontal escalation on the Soviet Western flank if only Japan came under attack by the Soviets? Consequently, many Japanese feel the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific is a NATO contingency plan, and their security is a mere pawn to horizontal escalation. Some Japanese seek a defense buildup to lessen the option of horizontal escalation by the United States near Japan.³²¹ Japanese objections to bringing the war to the Pacific, if there is war in Europe, seems valid considering the economic value of the Pacific vis-a-vis the Atlantic.³²²

³¹⁹see John J. Weltman, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," The National Interest, Spring 1989, for a proposal of a naval force structure suited for maritime communication defense rather than excessive power projection capabilities.

³²⁰It is interesting to note that the Maritime Strategy seems to hold the same principles, i.e. three phases of warfare, in both the Atlantic and Pacific, yet US naval strategy and tactics in the Atlantic and Pacific during World War II were dramatically different, based on different theater requirements, assets, and threats.

³²¹Sato Seizaburo, "The Case For a Strong Defense," Japan Echo, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1986, pp. 69-70. Mr. Sato says if Japan is weak it will have to follow a US decision (horizontal escalation), but if Japan is military capable, the US would need help of the JSDF to operate effectively in and around Japan, i.e., with Tokyo's assent.

³²²Christian Science Monitor, 6 November 1989, p. 10, reports that in 1987 total Asian GNP was worth \$7,688 billion in contrast to EEC GNP of \$4,259 billion.

Also, the idea of attacking Soviet ballistic missile submarines in Asia, i.e., in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, may lead to vertical escalation, including tactical nuclear warfare or even a strategic exchange, very close to Japan. The United States could separate Japan from the Western cause if it attacks Soviet ballistic missile submarines near Japan, during a European front war scenario, and the Soviets responded with tactical nuclear ASW weapons.³²³ Some Japanese do not concur with the United States assessment that it may not happen, just because there is no written doctrine by the Soviets saying that they will not utilize tactical nuclear weapons in defense of their ballistic missile submarines.³²⁴ In an Asian military context, the debate over ascertaining what the Soviets will or will not do based on published strategy contradicts traditional military maxims. Sun Tzu's primary thesis is that war is based on deception. To base one's strategy on the enemies overt statements is to submit oneself to deception. According to Sun Tzu, strategy is a secret and disseminated to an opponent only for deception.

The U.S. forward deployed strategy in Asia is primarily based on maritime assets. A maritime strategy will become increasingly important if overseas basing rights, i.e., the Philippines, become difficult to maintain in the 1990s. It will become even more important if U.S. ground forces are withdrawn from Korea and Europe in large numbers. If the U.S.S.R. does indeed join the community of nations, and cuts military force structure to the level where it is no longer considered threatening, then the Cold

³²³see Francis Fukuyama, "Asia in a Global War," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1987, for the negative effects of horizontal escalation near Japan.

³²⁴Brooks, previously cited, p. 79, stresses that to assume the Soviets will use tactical nuclear weapons in defense of SSBNs is a "misreading of stated policy."

War may be over. However, the requirement to keep an "open door" to commerce, resource access, and protect national interests will still require the maintenance of a maritime strategy in Asia, if not the "Maritime Strategy."

The continued budget crisis has made the 600 ship navy goal unattainable during the Bush administration. As stated in Chapter One, U.S. naval force structure has been cut in FY 89 and 90 during periods of economic growth. Secretary of Defense Cheney's proposals for \$180 billion in defense cuts, if required, during the early 1990s may decrease U.S. Navy force structure to approximately 500 ships, a number similar to the late 1970s and the era of the swing strategy. Furthermore, recession could prolong the delay of warship procurement that was not as favored as power projection elements during the years of the Maritime Strategy, i.e., surface combatants. If the Persian Gulf was an indication of future low to middle-intensity conflicts, then surface combatants will be in increasing demand to protect maritime communications. To meet the challenge of maintaining a flexible security strategy which can account for either Soviet success in real "sufficient defense," or Soviet regression into a hard-line offensive threat in the 1990s, the United States should restructure the security treaty with Japan to meet the requirements of three naval theaters.

B. A REVISED U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY STRATEGY

A United States-Japanese alliance should replace the strategy of Containment in Asia that places primary security responsibility on the armed forces of the United States. In formulating such an agreement, the United States should consult and promote the participation of our Asian allies, Japan, Korea, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and others if required, in developing a common understanding (the security *status quo*)

is increasingly unacceptable) of beneficial objectives (continued stability and prosperity) for all concerned nations.³²⁵ This would diminish anxiety over an increased Japanese security role in the region and signify the U.S. has continued security interests with the nations stated. The purpose of a United States-Japanese security strategy would be to share the burden and decision making of protecting convergent United States-Japanese interests. The basic idea of this strategy is for Japan to assume a primary area of security responsibility (PASR) in the Northeast Asia from aggression.³²⁶ Japan's PASR would range from the Kuriles to the Bashi channel. Japan's favorable maritime balance vis-a-vis the Soviets in the 1990s supports this strategy. How Japan decides to implement the strategy is up to the Japanese, but in doing so they can depend on partial U.S. assistance should aggression occur.³²⁷ By consulting with Japan on the integration of United States-Japanese PASR strategies, a joint analysis would determine the character of naval forces required for the plausible threat of war, the strategic capabilities and positions which would present a credible peacetime deterrent, and the actions each nation should take with its own sea power so that effective, coordinated

³²⁵Olsen, previously cited, "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific," p. 48, comments that, "the US can only hope to explain its strategic purposes in the Western Pacific and Asia if it first builds a more comprehensive set of common perceptions of shared interests."

³²⁶Sato Seizaburo, previously cited, p. 43, recommends, "Japan can make a valuable contribution to the Western Alliance by bolstering its surveillance system, air power, ASW capability, taking responsibility for all air space and sea lanes from the Kuriles to Guam and the Philippines to the South."

³²⁷Edward A. Olsen, "Determinants of Strategic Burden Sharing in East Asia," Naval War College Review, May-June 1986. comments on pp. 12, 13. that a "transfer of the onus of responsibility to Japan for devising a new and improved framework for a revised Mutual Security Treaty" negates accusations that "manipulators try to ply Japan into a strategic blueprint designed by the Pentagon."

naval deployments are proportionately and reliably shared.³²⁸ For example, agreement on a U.S. role to support Japan's northern flank, by deploying U.S. naval forces near the Aleutians, lessens the need for Japan to overexpand defense forces.

Preferably, a Japanese-Korean agreement on security around the Korean peninsula could be reached. Japan has already declared military exercises with the R.O.K. as legal.³²⁹ South Korea's decision to allow the R.O.K. Navy to participate during next year's RIMPAC exercise allows for the first ever joint Japanese-R.O.K. naval training exercise. If U.S. Army troops are reduced or withdrawn from the peninsula, as a measure of continued commitment, U.S. Marines in Okinawa could continue, on an annual or bi-annual basis, to participate in the Re/Re exercise, Team Spirit, in Korea. Japan can play a legitimate, constructive role in supporting Korean defense, discussed later. This reverses the current status of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty, in which the United States has primary responsibility for defending Japan and no guarantee of Japanese support in a Korean War scenario.

In return for Japan's responsibility for taking the lead in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, in this revised strategy the United States would continue to assume PASR of the vital sea lanes from the strait of Hormuz to Taiwan. Japan would still depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but to deter conventional aggression the Japanese should defend themselves with only partial United States assistance, i.e., an Aleutian Task Force to support Japan's northern flank. U.S. forces in Japan, mainly F-16 fighter aircraft, could be withdrawn in the 1990s as Japan deploys the FSX fighter.

³²⁸ADMS. Zumwalt and Bagley, previously cited, p. 126.

³²⁹Simon, previously cited, p. 46.

American naval forces in Japan would be tasked with only the primary mission of defending the sea lanes from Hormuz to Taiwan. The only U.S. naval forces that should be primarily concerned with the defense of Japan should come from a joint U.S.-Japanese naval task force, discussed later. Consequently, a new security treaty with Japan should spell out that Japan is responsible for full, rather than limited, conventional defense. This increases the credibility of maintaining the preferred international order by defeating the enemy in whatever theater if global war breaks out. The United States can concentrate on theaters that are vital to the free world with sufficient force to prevail, i.e., the Persian Gulf.

This proposed strategy would allow for either an end of the Cold War between the U.S.-U.S.S.R., the emergence of a hard-line regime in Moscow, and a Japan gaining in stature in the world military sphere. United States interests in Northeast Asia would not be unilaterally impaired since U.S. naval forces, officially tasked for Indian Ocean and South China Sea duties, could be shifted in accordance with need. U.S. marines in Okinawa would indicate a commitment to Korea. Japan's MSDF would increase its operational tempo and deploy in Northeast Asia. Thus, United States presence could be scaled down, but can be reinforced if necessary. If perestroika succeeds, the United States can decrease deployments, and further depend on Japan to carry out its own strategy in the Northeast Pacific near the Soviet periphery. This might coincide with the implementation of CFE reductions. The U.S. Navy can continue to provide the traditional presence role that is useful to shipping in the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. If perestroika fails, and a credible contingency is required in a global war scenario, the United States would then have a more favorable

correlation of forces in the Pacific if it were to deploy two carrier battle groups and one battleship battle group to the Indian Ocean, ensuring that the straits of Hormuz remain open, and an equal force disposition near the Aleutians, in a position to assist in the defense of Japan's northern flank, yet in a prudent reserve position. All other elements of the U.S. Pacific fleet would be in American waters awaiting deployment orders based on the requirements of the moment. Japan seems likely to hold its own against a Soviet conventional attack in the 1990s. To say otherwise, is to cast doubt on the United States combat ability in the Western Pacific, since the U.S. has fewer fighter aircraft and surface combatants than the Japanese. By unifying Japanese assets and strategy with a revised U.S. Pacific Maritime Strategy, the United States and Japan together can meet the requirement of three naval theaters. This would deter war and increase the credibility of maintaining the preferred international system if deterrence fails. Moreover, if perestroika fails, the United States can exercise this strategy without Japanese acceptance, i.e., force the Japanese to defend themselves by declaring beforehand an intention to do less in the region during a global crisis.

Most importantly, the United States can ascertain what the ultimate security objectives of Japan are. A PASR would propel Japan on the world arena as a great power, not just an economic superstate. It would further subject Japanese values to regional scrutiny. Japanese-Soviet relations may actually benefit in the long-term.³³⁰ As a matter of course, the U.S. should support Japan in becoming a permanent member

³³⁰Sato, previously cited, p. 43, mentions that if Japan assumed a regional security role, "though it might strain Japanese-Soviet ties for a while, over the long-run it should bring stability to the bilateral relationship."

of the United Nations security council as it assumes political and military power commensurate with its economic standing.

To induce Japan to assume bilateral defense roles with the United States in the region, thus reducing Asian fears of a militant Japan, the United States would have to revise, what the Japanese officially call the current Security Guarantee Treaty, Anzen Hosho Joyaku, altering it to become a Mutual Defense Treaty, Sogo Boei Joyaku. The current treaty can be revised after a notification of one year, allowing sufficient time to consult allies and prepare details. During the interregnum, the U.S. should stress to Japan that the treaty revision is acceptance of Japan's power and should not be perceived as further "Japan bashing" in response to U.S.-Japanese economic tension. Japan would prefer this than no treaty at all with the United States. Soviet nuclear weaponry in the region is beyond the capabilities of a unilateral Japanese defense in the early 1990s. Procrastination on changing the security status quo may force Japan to choose an independent security option since Japan has replaced the United States, in economic terms, as the principal power in Asia.³³¹ Thus, the United States does have a superior position, based on the nuclear umbrella, to influence the Japanese to accept collective security with the United States for defense of the region, including the Korean peninsula. The United States has the power, by threatening to do less, to influence both Japan and Korea to accept an agreement for the common good. Both U.S. and Japanese military planners are operating on the assumption that the two

³³¹Daniel Sneider, "How Japan Became the Dominate Player in Asia," Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 1989, pp. 10, 11. reports that Japan now has more total trade with Asia than with the US, and that 65% of all funds in Asia, government aid and private investment, is from Japan. Based on economic interest, Japan has more investment, trade, and aid to Asia than to the US.

countries would begin cooperating right from the outbreak of hostilities. A revised security arrangement would merely bring official defense policy in line with reality.³³² Japan's Constitution may have to be revised, but it is far better to let Japan reform Article Nine in a period of peace than to have it rewritten in a time of crisis. With a new security agreement, Japan could join the United States in the following joint defense roles:

- **UNITED STATES-JAPANESE JOINT TASK FORCE.** Combine three U.S.N. and three JMSDF combatants, under a single joint command which would rotate between senior U.S. and Japanese Officers. Their tasking would be to patrol the waters of Japan, conduct ASW operations, and joint training. They would be a ready force for "real world" operations. Monitoring the Soviet Fleet if they approach the straits should be their primary mission. Language barriers exist, but not as bad as Standing Force Atlantic (NATO). After a few years, South Korea probably could join this little group operating in the Sea of Japan. This would solidify operational responsibility for sea lane defense with our Asian friends. It would free the 7th Fleet for PASR tasking in the Indian Ocean or South China Sea, without increasing "states-side" deployments. Savings would be substantial. Patrol in the Sea of Japan, during the past Olympics, and search for KAL 007, would have been a perfect examples of U.S.-Japanese Joint Task Force, BEI-NICHI TOGO SAKUSEN NINMU BUTAI, assignment.
- **ARG ESCORT.** Integrate U.S.N. Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) with JMSDF Flotillas for transits between Okinawa and Korea. ARGs are deficient now in escort protection and will be more so in the 1990s. A U.S. carrier battle group may not be near Northeast Asia, a "come-as-you-are" scenario for ARGs. This lessens the credibility of our Korean defense posture. The JMSDF could pick up an ARG in Okinawa, provide protection along the way, and "hand off" to the R.O.K.N. in the Tsushima straits. Return would be the reverse, R.O.K.N. "handing off" to the JMSDF. The transit would never leave waters adjacent to Japan. Therefore, Japan could openly declare those waters an "area of non-aggression" and the JMSDF role is to simply prevent aggression in Japan's territorial and adjacent waters, a truly defense role. The idea of safe transit in waters adjacent to Japan may not even require Constitutional revision, since JMSDF forces are merely escorting vessels in a declared peace zone. Even the announcement of such a plan would help deter an attack on U.S.N. amphibious ships resupplying and reinforcing the R.O.K. in time of conflict. This would assist in defense of

³³²Okazaki, previously cited, p. 46.

the Korean Peninsula, show Japan's contribution, and build trust between Japan and Korea.

- **JOINT BATTLE GROUP PRESENCE.** To signify commitment and solidify the alliance, occasionally, JMSDF Flotillas could join a scaled down U.S. Navy carrier or battleship battle group en route to Indian Ocean duty. Or, a future Japanese carrier could be escorted to the Indian Ocean by U.S. Navy combatants deployed from the United States without a U.S. carrier. Savings would be substantial, and such a strategy would be preferable to a completely reduced U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan would realize the U.S. accepts it as a full partner in Western security since the Japanese would be assuming a great power role in securing world energy supplies.

The role Japan decides to perform in Northeast Asian security can be substantial if influenced to do so by the United States. Numerous influential Japanese support such an expanded role in Northeast Asian security.³³³ It is a test of the U. S. goals of Asian stability and peace in general and post-war Japanese "democracy and demilitarization" in particular. Regrettably, U.S. policy on Japan's role in regional defense has gone from a "free rider" to "don't spend any more," without much innovation in utilizing Japanese assets. Many Japanese feel what the United States wants from Japan is not rearmament or even a real military alliance, but "defense cooperation," meaning Japanese purchases of U.S. weapons without Japanese input in strategy and policy.³³⁴ Now that the United States is facing dramatic defense cuts, it cannot leave the impression of a withdrawal without serious contemplation of what security arrangements

³³³Okazaki, Miyoshi, Sato, Tsurutani, etc. cited as references, support a Japanese defense role becoming of a nation state.

³³⁴Chalmers Johnson, *Speaking of Japan*, previously cited, p. 25.

are left behind. Otherwise, the upshot may be for Japan to introduce a 1990s version of the Sumada plan if United States-Japanese political tensions continue to increase.³³⁵

C. THE RISKS OF CHANGING STRATEGIES

All strategies carry inherent risks. This thesis has highlighted the risks of continuing the security status quo with Japan. A revised security arrangement, as submitted for consideration in this thesis, also has risks. However, the following risks listed will, in the opinion of the author, only increase as Japan garners economic, political, and military wherewithal in the 1990s.

First, Japan may not reach an agreement with the United States on a collective security treaty. In such a case, Japanese nationalism may go to an extreme and Japan may decline a bilateral agreement in favor of an independent security strategy. Increased trade friction between the U.S. and Japan may make it difficult for Japan to reach a consensus on a revised treaty. Without any treaty, U.S. forces forward deployed in Japan would be forced to withdraw, increasing risk for U.S. national interests in the region without a Japanese guarantee to accept a formal security responsibility.

Second, Japan may not be satisfied with the PASR described herein. In particular, defense of Korea may be rejected by the Japanese, even though an agreement on the larger area (PASR) is reached. Likewise, Japan may be willing to accept a formal security role south of the archipelago, but may decline any role in the Sea of Japan

³³⁵Hata, previously cited, p. 20, mentions that Defense Agency Director Sumada proposed a policy in 1955 that was to have the Defense Ministry revert to a Ministry of Defense, establishment of local militia, develop nuclear weapons, and state ownership of defense industries.

and/or Sea of Okhotsk, especially if an agreement is reached with the Soviets on the Kuriles.

Third, once agreed upon, Japan may not follow the terms of the treaty, i.e., pursue an independent option. Considering that Japan reluctantly supported the British during conflict in the years of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and independently pursued a strategy of self-strengthening, this may be the highest risk.

Fourth, Soviets, Chinese, and Koreans may feel threatened by Japan's new security role. This may harm U.S. interests if the above nations blame the U.S. for Japan's new role. This short-term risk may be minimal if the alliance proceeds to build trust in the region in the long-term. Apprehension in countries of Northeast Asia can be lowered if the United States conducts full consultations and seeks advice from the nations concerned before treaty negotiations commence.

Finally, a reduction of U.S. forward deployed forces may revive an isolationist tradition, placing United States interests at peril. Such was the outcome of the first grand strategy in Asia, the "Open Door." In this context, Congress may press for further reductions of any U.S. role after an agreement has been reached. However, American pre-war isolationist tradition can be an asset during negotiations. For example, the U.S. should stress that failure to reach a formal PASR agreement with the Japanese may result in a return to pre-war U.S. strategy of non-involvement in foreign affairs, with a dramatic decline in capability to defend interests to the preferred international order that Japan depends on. The common denominator for risk appears to be ultra-nationalist tendencies in Japan.

VI. CONCLUSION

During a period of dramatic East-West change, the key relationship in Asia between the United States and Japan appears to be heading into uncertain waters. While the security relationship has set the framework for stability, prosperity, and progress, many on both sides of the Pacific are beginning to question the appropriateness of a security treaty that was framed during a different era. Despite increasing economic frictions between the nations, the United States and Japan hold very similar interests in areas of vital importance.

Differing values between the United States and Japan may exacerbate the special relationship if misunderstanding between the two societies is not cleared. Nationalism in Japan may be a force for stability in the region, or instability if it is extreme. Japan's efforts to assume a political, and perhaps military, role commensurate with its economic standing will first have to rectify the contradiction between residual ancient social values and individual rights of those outside the group. The United States can assist Japan in assuming a political role equal to its economic status by readjusting the bilateral security relationship.

If the procurement trends of the 1980s continue, Japan's maritime forces will attain a clear conventional superiority over the Soviet Union's maritime forces in the 1990s. This may have a dramatic affect in the Northeast Asian region. It will provide Japan with heretofore non-existent security options as an instrument of national power to promote the national interest. The Japanese people may be confronted with a test

of their democracy, depending on the manner Japan eventually decides to deploy the military, i.e., in a collective security context or an independent strategy.

The United States should insist on a revised security treaty with Japan and propose that Japanese naval forces assume primary responsibility of stability and peace in Northeast Asia while the United States continues primary responsibility of stability and peace in the vital sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. This strategy has risks, but a failure to readjust the security arrangement while Japan continues to accumulate military capability, yet declines to commit to a common security, may be the greatest risk in the long-term.

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